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Background: The study of personality concerns how people are different, and how and 
why they behave as they do. Recently, there has been an increasing interest in the 
development of a unified personality theory, which would aim to integrate existing 
personality theories and counselling methods. There is little understanding, however, of 
how a unified personality theory should treat free will and moral responsibility. Despite 
a widespread belief that personality theories have clashing views on the subject, little is 
known about the place of free will and responsibility in personality theory and 
psychotherapy. 
Research question: The thesis sets out: 1) to determine whether it is possible to 
integrate two influential and rival theories by Freud and Rogers concerning free will and 
responsibility; 2) to establish the functions of free will and responsibility in 
psychoanalytic and client-centered therapies. 
Method: The thesis investigates Freud’s and Rogers’s corpora, draws on philosophical 
literature of free will, and it builds on empirical research related to personality and free 
will.  
Results: The thesis argues that Freud’s and Rogers’s theories can be fully integrated 
concerning free will and responsibility. Contrary to the commonly held belief, the two 
theories have compatibilist (the view that determinism is compatible with free will) and 
even complementary views. Additionally, the thesis argues that exercises of free will 
and responsibility, properly understood, are important for human mental health and can 
contribute to psychotherapy.  
Implications: The thesis supports the assumption that the integration of personality 
theories is possible, and it suggests that there are good reasons for a unified personality 
theory to adopt a compatibilist theory of free will, given the facts that compatibilism 
appears to dominate among personality theories, and that free will and responsibility 
have high instrumental value for human welfare and for psychotherapy. The thesis also 
suggests that training of mental health specialists should include scholarly modules in 







Personality is a common term of everyday vocabulary. When we describe other 
people, try to understand them, think of personal development or psychotherapy, we 
often refer to human personalities. But what does personality really mean? 
Though the study of personality has very long history, researchers have reached 
little consensus in this inquiry. For one, we still do not have a universally accepted 
definition of personality. Typically, personality refers to a set of individual differences 
that which are displayed in thinking, feeling and behaving. In addition, we do not have a 
generally accepted theory of personality. A personality theory usually pursues four main 
goals: to identify individual differences among people; to identify human similarities; to 
determine the architecture of personality (which underlies the differences and 
similarities among people); and to introduce methods of intervention (e.g., methods of 
psychotherapy, techniques of personal development etc.) (Deaux & Snyder, 2012, p. 
34). It is possible to distinguish a few big schools within personality psychology that are 
in competition with one another: psychodynamic, behaviorist, cognitive, trait, 
humanistic, existential and transpersonal. Each school, in turn, may contain dozens of 
concepts and counselling approaches (Prochaska & Norcross, 2018).  
One of the mainstreams in psychology in recent years has been the integrative 
movement, which aims to bridge the gap between different existing perspectives.  
Originally, researchers have started with the incentive to fashion an effective 
integrative psychotherapy (Norcross & Goldfried, 2005; Palmer & Woolfe, 1999). The 
goal was to integrate the existing therapeutic techniques from different schools in order 
to create a more versatile and effective method of psychotherapy. Nowadays, integrative 
psychotherapy has already become an independent therapeutic approach and practiced 
by thousands of counsellors worldwide. It is important to note, however, that most of 
integrative counsellors hold that integrative psychotherapy does not require a unified 
theory of personality, generally accepted theory of psychopathology or consensus on 
philosophical questions. It is believed that effective psychotherapy can be conducted 
without this theoretical baggage.  
However, recently researchers have also shown a soaring interest in the 
development of integrative personality theory. A unified theory of personality (aka 
integrative theory) should cross not only the therapeutic techniques but also explain 
what human personality is: why people are different, how they acquire 
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psychopathologies, what drives them etc. The general idea is that a unified theory can 
draw upon the advantages of some contemporary theories, and thus it can become more 
comprehensive than any contemporary theory alone. In 2015, the Journal of Research in 
Personality has devoted a special issue to the analysis of this topic (Fajkowska & 
DeYoung, 2015). Some have already suggested some models and concepts on the 
matter (Epstein, 2003; Henriques, 2011; McAdams & Pals, 2006; Mischel & Shoda, 
2008). One common message is that the existing personality theories may profit from 
drawing upon the other, that they are not fully antithetical, and they can be combined if 
we have an appropriate framework.  
Yet, there are also some objections to the integrative project. Some believe that 
the integration is possible, but the suggested concepts lack accuracy or inclusiveness 
(Epstein, 2007; Maddi, 2007). Others cast doubt, however, on the prospects of 
integration per se. Wood and Joseph argue, for example, that grand theories of 
personality cannot be integrated into a single theory, for the contemporary theories rest 
on “fundamentally irreconcilable” and “incompatible” philosophical assumptions about 
human nature (2007, p. 57f). Grand theories differ concerning “a) the characteristics 
that people have been endowed with through evolution, (b) the nature of the interaction 
of human nature and culture, and (c) which characteristics are the product of human 
nature and which are the result of culture” (ibid). 
The view that personality theories are incompatible because of different 
philosophical assumptions is not brand new. Hjelle and Ziegler, for instance, outlined 8 
assumptions about human nature that supposedly divided personality theories (Hjelle & 
Ziegler, 1992; Ziegler, 2002). They are: 1. freedom vs. determinism; 2. rationality vs. 
irrationality; 3. holism vs. elementalism; 3. constitutionalism vs. environmentalism; 4. 
changeability vs. unchangeability; 5. subjectivity vs. objectivity; 6. proactivity vs. 
reactivity; 7. homeostasis vs. heterostasis; 8. knowability vs. unknowability. Allegedly, 
all these assumptions are ingrained in every personality theory. It is also proposed that 
personality theories adhere to different assumptions, which consequently entail the 
“fundamental differences” between the theories (1992, p. 23). This view became quite 
widespread. Many contemporary personality textbooks, for example, replicate the 
model of philosophical assumptions, attempting to highlight the differences between the 
theories (Engler, 2013; Schultz & Schultz, 2016). Some empirical studies have also 
referred to this model, investigating the position of ordinary people on philosophical 
assumptions (Hochwälder, 2000; Marsden & Littler, 1998). 
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One limitation of the aforesaid view, however, is that it lacks any in-depth 
philosophical examination of the subject. There is no doubt that personality theories 
have many differences indeed. But it may be that the belief in fundamental 
incompatibility of theories is exaggerated. Moreover, even if there are some big 
disagreements, it may still be possible to find a way to overcome these controversies 
and to reconcile the theories.  
In addition, it is useful to distinguish between full integration and partial 
integration. I understand full integration as combining two or more theories in full, in 
their original state. Partial integration, on the other hand, means combining only some 
parts of the theories, only some ideas and concepts. I doubt that full integration is either 
possible or desirable. It is worth remembering that many postulates of existing 
personality theories – Freud’s psychoanalysis, for example – can be either outdated or 
even refuted nowadays (Cioffi, 1998; Grünbaum, 1984; Robinson, 1993; Sulloway, 
1979). No doubt it would be simply unreasonable to integrate false or unwarranted 
concepts. Partial integration, on the other hand, may fare well, attempting to bring 
together only verified and compelling ideas and premises.  
Given the scale of the problem, it is not feasible to examine all assumptions and 
all theories in one thesis. The reasonable project would be to engage only with one 
subject and a few grand theories to get the ball rolling. In this thesis, I will concentrate 
on free will and moral responsibility in the theories of Sigmund Freud and Carl Rogers.  
The thesis lays down two interconnected goals. First, it seeks to establish whether 
we can integrate Freud’s and Rogers’s theories concerning free will and moral 
responsibility. Second, the thesis sets out to determine the functions of free will and 
responsibility in the psychoanalytic and client-centered counselling work. 
The rationale for this research is twofold. First, theories by Freud and Rogers 
belong to the group of the most influential theories of personality. Freud’s 
psychoanalysis underpins the psychodynamic direction, while Rogers’s client-centered 
theory paves the way for the humanistic direction. Furthermore, Freud and Rogers are 
ranked in the top of the list of the most renowned psychologists of the 20th century 
(Haggbloom et al., 2002). Freud could be hailed as the godfather of personality 
psychology, as he is the author of the first comprehensive theory of personality and 
psychotherapy. Rogers, on the other hand, is considered by a number of surveys as the 
most eminent psychotherapist of the past century (Cook et al., 2009). Nowadays, 
psychoanalysis and client-centred school keep developing and provide therapeutic 
service. From a historical point of view, it is important to know how two of the most 
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eminent theories of personality and psychotherapy treat the theme of free will and moral 
responsibility. From a philosophical perspective, it is important to know whether two 
renowned theories hold plausible views.  
Second, free will is a significant theme both for philosophy and psychology, and it 
is one of the most complex and long-term metaphysical issues (Kane, 2011). People 
tend to require freedom while living in society, but can one be free at all? The 
assumption that people can act freely underlies a vast scope of social practices, 
including the system of justice, politics, economics, ethics, religion and ordinary 
interpersonal relations. If it is proved that free will does not exist, this may overturn the 
world as we know it, entailing one of the biggest social reforms in history. Free will and 
responsibility also have direct relevance to psychotherapy. Any mental disorder can be 
characterized as a certain loss of freedom, whereas psychotherapy can be regarded as a 
tool how people can become freer in their agency and life. Furthermore, many of the 
issues that are discussed during psychotherapy have a moral nature. This can be moral 
dilemmas, conflicts with others. Some try to understand what would be the right thing 
to do or how to treat one’s unappealing urges. Still others seek help to cope with their 
intense moral feelings, such as guilt, shame or indignation. The theme of moral 
responsibility becomes especially important for those who undergo rehabilitation in 
prison and reflect on their misdeeds.  
In this inquiry, we will be able to fill a few gaps in the scientific literature. First, 
the thesis will explain the place of free will and responsibility in Freud’s psychoanalysis 
and Rogers’s client-centered therapy. Though both Freud and Rogers touch the subject 
of free will and responsibility in their writings, neither discloses it sufficiently, leaving 
many gaps, blind spots and even contradictions behind. Why should counsellors 
encourage responsibility? What kind of freedom can clients obtain following the 
therapy? Under what conditions can people be blameworthy for their unconscious 
behavior? On the one hand, there is still on-going debate how to understand Freud. 
Much uncertainty still exists whether Freud supported free will at all or not (Erwin, 
2002; Tauber, 2010; Viney & Parker, 2016; Wallwork, 1991). I will argue that a widely 
accepted view that psychoanalysis rejects free will is false (Erwin, 2002), and I will also 
challenge the view that psychoanalysis allows any leeway freedom (Wallwork, 1991). 
On top of that, I will develop one of the first detailed compatibilist interpretations of 
Freud (the view that determinism is compatible with free will). On the other hand, far 
too little attention has been paid to Rogers. It is surprising that the contemporary 
literature lacks any thorough and philosophical examination of Rogers’s theory on free 
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will, given that Rogers is often considered to be the most renowned psychotherapist of 
the last century and one of the main proponents of freedom in psychology. I will put 
forth one of the first comprehensive interpretations of Rogers’s theory on the matter, 
arguing that it belongs to compatibilism. 
Second, the thesis will identify the framework how Freud’s and Rogers’s theories 
can be integrated concerning free will and responsibility. As mentioned before, there is 
a view that personality theories cannot be integrated because of different philosophical 
assumptions about human nature (Wood & Joseph, 2007). I will issue a challenge to this 
view. Though I am not able to cover all assumptions, we can start with the assumption 
of free will, which is one of the main assumptions about human nature. The idea of free 
will is present in all major personality theories, including Freud’s and Rogers’s (Freud, 
1901; Rogers, 1961; Rozsnafszky, 1974). Moreover, a common view is that Freud 
denies the existence of free will, while Rogers argues that free will exists (Brunton, 
2016; Nye, 2000). The theme of free will, apparently, represents one of the obstacles for 
the integrative project. Provided two theories hold polar metaphysical views on free 
will, we can rightfully infer that these theories are “fundamentally incompatible”, and 
they cannot be integrated. I will show, however, that we can harmoniously integrate 
Freud’s and Rogers’s theories both with regard to free will and responsibility. Though 
the research will focus mainly on Freud and Rogers, I will also mention Skinner 
(behaviorism), Frankl (existentialism) and Ellis (cognitivism) in this inquiry. At the end, 
we will have enough information to judge whether the subject of free will represents a 
threat for the integrative enterprise at all. It should be also mentioned that there has been 
no research on free will or responsibility in the context of integrative project before. So, 
we have a beautiful chance to fill the gap in this area of knowledge. 
Third, the thesis will extend our knowledge about the function of free will and 
responsibility in psychotherapy. Though almost every counselling theory mentions this 
subject at some point, the discussion is mostly restricted to some theoretical questions 
about whether free will exists or not, or whether moral responsibility is justified. Far too 
little attention has been paid, however, whether free will and responsibility can be of 
use for mental well-being and psychotherapy. I contend that this gap should be filled. 
Whether we talk about a unified theory or any existing counselling practice, therapists 
should keep abreast of any implications that free will and responsibility may have on 
human welfare and how to proceed in this case. 
With regard to free will, a body of recent studies indicates that the belief in free 
will has a considerable positive impact on human agency (Baumeister & Monroe, 
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2014). Given this, some elaborate modules that can help counsellors to facilitate the 
belief in free will over the therapy (Young, 2016). Little is known, however, about the 
role of free will itself (and not just the belief in free will) for mental treatment 
(Callender, 2010; Jenkins, 1997). How can counsellors define free will? Is free will (if it 
exists) meaningful for mental health? How can counsellors boost human free will? I will 
argue, for one, that counsellors can define free will as the capacity for rational choosing, 
and by helping clients to get used to making conscious and autonomous choices 
therapists can facilitate human welfare and therapeutic process.   
With regard to moral responsibility, it is argued that assuming responsibility for 
one’s actions is a necessary vehicle for change, as clients should admit their misdeeds 
and stop their harmful patterns of behavior (Pickard, 2014). Pickard also argues that 
while responsibility is essential for psychotherapy, therapists should also avoid blame, 
as blaming one’s clients can undermine effective therapy. To suspend blame, it is 
suggested to take into account past histories of one’s clients and to recognize how they 
have come behave as they do. No previous study has investigated, however, how 
different senses of responsibility can be of use for psychotherapy. I will argue that 
therapists can refer to three senses of responsibility – role-responsibility, causal 
responsibility and capacity-responsibility – during the therapeutic work, which would 
be conducive in different ways for enhancing psychological conditions of one’s clients. 
Furthermore, so far there has been little discussion about what techniques counsellors 
can use to suspend blame intentionally. I will contend that attending to past histories of 
one’s clients can be insufficient in some cases, and I will suggest that counsellors can 
take advantage of cognitive techniques to tame their tempers. 
The thesis is made up of two Parts and nine Chapters. Part 1 is concerned with the 
subject of free will, while Part 2 moves on to moral responsibility.  
Chapter 1 begins with examining two opposing interpretations of psychoanalysis. 
A hard determinist interpretation holds that psychoanalysis is committed to hard 
determinism, rejecting the possibility of free will (Erwin, 2002; Wallace, 2008). I recall 
first that hard determinism is a view which holds that determinism is incompatible both 
with free will and moral responsibility. I then point out that Freud consistently 
supported the concept of moral responsibility. Since Freud believes in both determinism 
and moral responsibility, psychoanalysis cannot be associated with hard determinism by 
definition. A libertarian reading, by contrast, contends that Freud promotes an 
idiosyncratic understanding of determinism, which allows the possibility of free will 
defined as the ability to do otherwise (Wallwork, 1991). I argue, however, that there is 
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no direct evidence to vindicate this reading. The chapter concludes that the only robust 
option left is to refer to a compatibilist interpretation. 
Chapter 2 suggests a novel compatibilist reading of psychoanalysis. I first 
introduce the distinction between a libertarian and compatibilist concepts of free will 
and freedom-related terms used by Freud. I then argue that Freud rejects only a 
libertarian type of free will, while remaining open to a compatibilist free will. 
Psychoanalysis allows free will, which can be understood as the ability to make a 
conscious choice. I further propose that Freud was potentially groping towards a view 
formulated later by Watson (1975), which, broadly speaking, amounts free will to the 
act on reason. Lastly, I contend that the psychoanalytic therapy helps people to boost 
their free will by coaching to make choices consciously and becoming mindful of their 
unconscious life. 
Chapter 3 revisits Rogers on free will. After making a distinction between 
negative freedom and the experience of freedom, I determine that Rogers also supports 
a compatibilist thesis of free will. Rogers basically understands free will as the ability to 
make a choice. I then suggest that we can again refer to Watson’s theory to make 
Rogers’s perspective more explicit and robust (1975). After that, I explain that one of 
the goals of Rogerian therapy is to help people to acquire free will by learning to make 
personal choices rather than to conform to the will of others. The chapter concludes that 
Freud’s and Rogers’s theories turn out to have much in common: both authors are 
compatibilist, both amount free will to the ability to make a choice on reason, and their 
views can be united by Watson’s mesh theory. 
Chapter 4 enquires about the instrumental value of free will. Rogers reports that 
the act of choice (aka the exercise of free will) is highly significant and can contribute 
to psychotherapy. To verify this assumption, I make an overview of available empirical 
studies which examine the impact of decision-making. Consistent with Rogers’s 
observation, a considerable body of research shows that choosing correlates with 
various positive outcomes, such as increased motivation, better task performance and 
vitality. Yet, I also point out that complex choices can result in negative outcomes, such 
as stress and frustration. In addition, Skinner argues that people often make self-
harming choices, and therefore society would be better off with total external control 
over human behavior. I respond, however, that Skinner’s argument does not consider 
the fact that people reap the psychological benefits from personal choosing. This 
suggests that while some external control is desirable without any doubt, total external 
control would be debilitating. The chapter concludes that choosing (aka free will) is a 
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considerable determinant of mental well-being, which can result both in positive and 
negative implications. The task of the therapist, therefore, is to know when to encourage 
choosing, when to facilitate it and when to restrict it. The findings of this chapter also 
suggest that even if people cannot have a libertarian type of choice (the ability to do 
otherwise), there is no good reason to depreciate a compatibilist type of choice (the 
ability to act on reason). That said, I make a caveat that incompatibilists can agree with 
the view that a compatibilist type of choice has instrumental value but disagree that this 
kind of choice can render people morally responsible (I return to this problem in 
Chapter 7).  
Chapter 5 seeks to nail down the function of responsibility in Rogers’s theory. I 
suggest that Freud and Rogers mean different things by the broad term “responsibility”, 
and it makes sense to refer to Hart’s taxonomy to pin down these distinctions (1968). I 
then interpret that by responsibility Rogers primarily means the sense of role-
responsibility (taking obligations). That is, by referring to role-responsibility the 
counsellor encourages the clients to recognize their obligations or undertake some tasks. 
I then pose a question whether the aspect of role-responsibility has any instrumental 
value for mental health. The overview of empirical research indicates a very similar 
pattern to the impact of choosing revealed in Chapter 4. While taking duties generally 
correlates with increased mental well-being, but complex and risky duties are associated 
with stress and deterioration of mental health. The chapter concludes that the task of the 
counsellor is to differentiate when it is appropriate to encourage taking duties, when to 
simplify them and when to abandon them at all. 
Chapter 6 seeks to determine the function of responsibility in Freud’s theory. One 
problem for understanding the role of responsibility in psychoanalysis is that Freud 
lumps together a few distinct responsibility-related themes without paying due attention 
to any of them. I identify four themes that deserve individual scrutiny: causal 
responsibility, the value of causal responsibility, culpability for unconscious actions and 
the feeling of responsibility. First off, I construe that by the slippery term responsibility 
Freud chiefly means the sense of causal responsibility (causality). By referring to the 
idea of causal responsibility, the counsellor encourages the client to recognize the link 
between some event (e.g., a dream) and the behavior which gives rise to this event. I 
then argue that the aspect of causal responsibility has a considerable instrumental value, 
similar to the act of choosing and role-responsibility. The merits can be connected to 
self-knowledge, self-control, maintaining the unity of the mind and promoting moral 
relationships with others. After that, I examine under what conditions people can be 
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judged blameworthy for their unconscious and unintentional actions, such as forgetting. 
I propose that one possibility is to take into account whether the agent had the means, 
conscious resources to prevent the occurrence of an unconscious event or action. Lastly, 
I consider the role of feelings and their relationship to responsibility. I interpret that the 
task of the therapist is to coach the client to distinguish between feelings and facts and 
to detect unwarranted feelings of guilt that may prompt a person to assume 
responsibility without any reasonable ground. 
Chapter 7 responds to Wallwork’s argument against a compatibilist interpretation 
of Freud, and it explores the relevance of alternate possibilities to counselling practice. 
Objecting to the compatibilist interpretation of Freud, Wallwork argues that to be 
morally responsible people must have alternate possibilities (to be able to do otherwise) 
(1991). It is noteworthy, however, that if determinism is true, people do not have any 
alternate paths into the future and cannot do otherwise. Wallwork appears to refer to the 
so-called principle of alternate possibilities (the PAP), which interconnects moral 
responsibility and alternate possibilities. My first line of the argument is that there is no 
good reason to conclude that the PAP is true. The principle has been challenged by 
Frankfurt (1969), and nowadays many argue – including some incompatibilists – that 
people can be responsible while having no alternate possibilities (Fischer & Ravizza, 
1998; Widerker, 2009). My second line of the argument is that we should keep in mind 
different senses of responsibility when we talk of psychotherapy. I point out that 
alternate possibilities might be relevant only to the sense of liability-responsibility 
(blame). That is, to deserve punishment for one’s actions, the person must have been 
able to act differently. But while liability-responsibility is the main meaning of 
responsibility in law, it is not particularly present or relevant to the therapeutic work, 
including Freud’s and Rogers’s practices. It is worth remembering that Freud is mainly 
interested in causal responsibility, while Rogers is preoccupied with the aspect of role-
responsibility. This suggests that even if the PAP turned out to be true after all, this 
would not have any considerable implication for the counselling work. As before 
counsellors would continue working with role, capacity and causal responsibility. 
Chapter 8 examines the nature of Rogers’s and Freud’s practices which maintain 
responsibility but avoid blame. The chapter first intends to explain why Freud and 
Rogers presumably avoid blame in their counselling work (liability-responsibility). My 
argument is that the idea of blame is simply incompatible with the non-judgmental 
therapeutic attitude promoted both by Freud and Rogers. The non-judgmental attitude 
fulfils many therapeutic functions, such as building rapport with the client, maintaining 
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the climate of psychological safety, facilitating self-disclosure and keeping counter-
transference under control. Blame, on the flipside, runs counter to the non-judgemental 
approach, introduces a threat to the client, and thus it can jeopardize effective 
therapeutic work. After that, I examine whether it is coherent to have responsibility 
without blame in the counselling work. I first consider Pickard’s argument, which 
suggests that “responsibility without blame” is a possible and desirable counselling 
attitude (2011). Pickard points out that to hold someone responsible and to blame 
someone are distinct things. Responsibility, on the one hand, is about other person 
having self-control, choice and conscious knowledge of their behavior. Blame, on the 
other hand, is about our negative responses to the wrongdoings. I agree with Pickard 
that it is coherent to have responsibility without blame. I propose, however, that 
counsellors can also bear in mind the distinction between different senses of 
responsibility to escape confusion. Blame and responsibility are interlinked only in the 
sense of liability-responsibility. Meanwhile, role, causal and capacity-responsibility do 
not presuppose blame responses. Therefore, counsellors can work with three senses of 
responsibility (role, causal, capacity) and successfully steer clear of blame in their work. 
Chapter 9 explores how counsellors can deliberately suspend blame responses in 
their work. I first establish the type of blame-free relationship presupposed by Freud’s 
and Rogers’s therapies. I draw a line between suspension and abolition of blame. 
Suspension means temporary termination of blame under certain conditions (e.g., 
excuses), while abolition refers to the removal of reactive attitudes universally and 
permanently (Milam, 2016). I further suggest that abolitionism can be supported both 
by free will sceptics (hard abolitionism) and free will supporters (soft abolitionism). I 
point out that potentially a psychotherapy can be committed either to abolitionism or 
suspension, but, when it comes to Freud and Rogers, we have a classic example of 
suspension. After that, I consider some methods by which counsellors can suspend 
blame if needed. Some suggest that  adopting beliefs in determinisms can freeze 
reactive attitudes (Pereboom, 2001). Another technique is to appeal to the past histories 
of people, analysing what made people behave as they do (Pickard, 2014). I point out, 
however, that these two methods can be insufficient. Some incompatibilists, for 
example, report that despite their convictions, they continue expressing reactive 
attitudes in their ordinary life. I propose that counsellors can avail themselves of the 
techniques available in the cognitive psychotherapy. Counsellors can identify the beliefs 
that cause blame feelings in the first place, and by changing these beliefs they can 
manage their feelings.  
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There is a widespread belief that Freud’s psychoanalysis rejects the existence of free 
will. For example, Heinz Kohut, the founder of self-psychology,1 shares his own 
experience: “[C]linging to Freud's model of the mind … I could find nо place for the 
psychological activities that go by the name of choice, decision, and free will – even 
though I knew that these were empirically observable phenomena” (1977, p. 244). In a 
similar vein, Viktor Frankl, the founder of logotherapy, reports that psychoanalysis 
holds a “dangerous assumption… which disregards [a person’s] capacity to take a stand 
toward any conditions whatsoever” (1985, p. 154). 
But what does Freud really bequeath us? The psychoanalytic corpus contains a lot 
of statements about freedom, free will and determinism, which often seem 
contradictory. This situation entailed an ongoing debate about how to comprehend 
Freud. While it remains widely accepted that psychoanalysis rejects free will (Erwin, 
2002; Viney & Parker, 2016; Wallace, 2008), there are also many alternative 
interpretations, which hold that psychoanalysis leaves a room for different liberties and 
even freedom of the will (Askay & Farquhar, 2006; Cavell, 2003; Dilman, 1999; 
Meissner, 2007; Tauber, 2010; Wallwork, 1991). 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate a hard determinist and libertarian 
interpretations of psychoanalysis.  
In § 1.2., I explain the distinctions between hard determinism, compatibilism and 
libertarianism. It will form a necessary background to investigate both Freud’s and 
Rogers’s theories. Section 1.3. explores a hard determinist interpretation of 
psychoanalysis. I will argue that psychoanalysis cannot be related to hard determinism, 
since Freud unambiguously and consistently supports both determinism and the concept 
of moral responsibility, not to mention the idea of free choice. Section 1.4. examines a 
                                                          
1 The psychoanalytic (also known as the psychodynamic) school is composed of a few sub-directions and 
theories. It is possible to distinguish the classical psychoanalysis (Freud), Neo-Freudians, Post-Freudians 
etc. Kohut’s self-psychology is one of the psychoanalytic theories that explores the development and 
function of the Self. 
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libertarian interpretation of psychoanalysis by Wallwork. I will contend that there is no 





1.2. On free will 
To be able to examine Freud’s and Rogers’s theories (or any other counselling theory), 
we first need to understand the fundamentals of free will debate. 
One common view is that free will amounts to sufficient control over one’s 
actions. If people have free will, then it is “up to us” how we will, what we choose, and 
how we act. It certainly “feels” at least sometimes that we have a choice, control, and 
that we are the authors of our actions. But whether it is actually true has been a bone of 
contention for two millennia. 
Free will is often related to other important notions, such as moral responsibility 
(desert, blame, punishment, praise, justice), autonomy, originality, creativity, self-
worth, love. One question that is frequently asked is, “How should we change our life if 
there is no free will?”  
Most often, free will is discussed in relation to moral responsibility. Many believe 
that free will involves the type of control that is necessary or even sufficient for moral 
responsibility (McKenna & Pereboom, 2016). If people have a sufficient amount of 
control over their behavior, if their actions are up to them, it appears fair to blame or 
praise people for the choices they decide to make. But if people are bereft of sufficient 
control over their choices, they do not seem to deserve to be blamed or praised for their 
behavior (either wrongdoings or achievements). Yet, some deny the link between free 
will and moral responsibility. One view is that people can be morally responsible even 
if they do not have free will (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998).  
Technically, there are two debates: a) do we have free? and 2) are we morally 
responsible? (or in what sense can we be responsible?) Though these questions are often 
interconnected, it is possible to set up separate discussions. I will focus on free will in 
Part 1 and move on to the notion of moral responsibility in Part 2. 
It should be said from the outset that there is no universally recognized definition 
of free will. Philosophers are at loggerheads concerning the type of control that is 
necessary for free will. I’ll get to more of this a bit later. 
One crucial issue of the debate is whether people can have free will in a 
deterministic universe. Causal determinism is a thesis that every event is necessitated by 
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some prior events and laws of nature (Hoefer, 2016). Think of the law of cause and 
effect. Every event is caused by some prior events; while those events are caused 
themselves by some earlier events, and so to infinity. Human choices, for example, are 
caused by some preceding events, such as desires, beliefs, experience etc. One 
implication of causal determinism is that there is only one possible physical outcome. 
This suggests that if determinism is true, the universe allows only one possible present 
and only one possible future.   
The issue of determinism splits researchers into different camps. There are four 
main standpoints on free will: hard determinism, hard incompatibilism, compatibilism 
and libertarianism.  
Hard determinism is a thesis that determinism is true, free will does not exist, and 
moral responsibility is unjustified (James, 1884; Vilhauer, 2004). With regard to 
determinism, hard determinists believe that the Universe – including human behavior – 
is governed by the rule of cause and effect. The Universe can be compared to a 
clockwork mechanism. Once set, it moves inevitably in one direction. This suggests that 
it is already fixed what should happen in the near or distant future. It is already fixed, 
for example, what you will do in ten years at 10.34 a.m. on March 23rd. It is already 
“known” whether you will marry or not, whether you will divorce, or whether you will 
ever travel to Barbados. If we knew all initial conditions (past causes), it would be 
possible not only to forecast events but also to report exactly how the future would 
unwind. With regard to free will, hard determinists normally define free will as the 
ability to choose otherwise. That is, there should be the ability that could empower 
people to swerve away from the predetermined course of action. Yet, since the Universe 
is deterministic, people do not have the ability to do other than what they do. The 
preceding events and laws of nature necessitate only one course of action. There can be 
only one possible past, one possible present and one possible future. Since no 
alternatives are available, hard determinists infer that people do not have free will. By 
extension, hard determinists infer that people are not morally responsible; that is, they 
do not deserve blame or praise for their actions. If determinism is true, it was simply 
preordained that some people would become cruel criminals, while others would 
become priests, police officers, inventors, doctors, or billionaires. Yet, hard determinists 
tend to agree that criminals can still be imprisoned or isolated to prevent their misdeeds 
and maintain social order. 
With the development of quantum mechanics, it became known, however, that the 
Universe contains both deterministic and indeterministic processes. The very fact that 
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indeterminism exists has issued a serious challenge to hard determinism. Yet, hard 
determinists can still argue that what science shows is that indeterminacy exists only 
among subatomic particles, but it does not show that there is any indeterminacy among 
the developed organisms or large material objects (McKenna & Pereboom, 2016, p. 23). 
In other words, while indeterminacy might exist on a micro level, there is no evidence 
that it extends to a macro level. This suggests that human behavior may remain fully 
subject to the rule of determinism.  
Hard incompatibilism is a view that determinism is false, yet free will still does 
not exist, and moral responsibility is unjustified (Pereboom, 2001). Hard 
incompatibilists concede that there is both determinism and indeterminism in the 
Universe. Yet, it is argued that neither determinism nor indeterminism makes it possible 
for people to have free will. The threat of determinism is that it necessitates how people 
behave. The threat of indeterminism is that it robs people of control over their actions, 
introducing the existence of chance. Hard incompatibilists tend to define free will as the 
ability to be the ultimate source of one’s actions. It is argued, however, that people 
cannot possibly be the ultimate sources of their behavior. It is always possible to find 
some antecedent causes outside human control, which determine human actions. Hard 
incompatibilists also argue that society should abandon the belief in free will and moral 
responsibility. This would primarily entail a reform of the penitentiary system and 
change common interpersonal relations. 
Compatibilism (also called sometimes full compatibilism or soft determinism) is a 
view that determinism is true, free will exists, and moral responsibility is justified. The 
premise of compatibilism is that determinism does not threaten free will. Two 
phenomena can coexist, provided we coin a definition of free will that does not conflict 
with determinism. Compatibilists propose various definitions of free will. Some define 
it as the power to act as you want to without constraints and coercion (Mill, 1865, p. 
285). Others hold that free will requires action on a particular type of desires (Frankfurt, 
1971). Still, others relate free will to self-control (Baumeister, 2008; Dennett, 1984). 
Compatibilism can be broken down into two sub-directions. Hard compatibilism posits 
that free will is compatible with determinism and even hidden manipulation (Watson, 
1999). Semi-compatibilism holds that determinism is compatible only with moral 
responsibility but not with free will (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998).  
Libertarianism is a view that determinism is false, free will exists, and moral 
responsibility is justified. It is believed that since the Universe contains some 
indeterminacy, there is a possibility for people to have free will. Like hard determinists, 
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libertarians tend to define free will as the ability to do otherwise.  Libertarian theories 
are unanimous that free will requires indeterminism, but they differ in terms of the type 
of indeterminacy required for a free action. Libertarianism consists of three sub-
directions. Event-causal theories affirm that a free act should be caused by prior events 
(e.g., desires, beliefs), but it should be caused in the indeterministic manner (Kane, 
1985). Non-causal theories hold that a free act should be uncaused at all (neither by 
desires nor beliefs) (Pink, 2011). Agent-causal theories hold that people are enduring 
substances that can cause actions without being caused themselves by prior events 
(prime mover unmoved) (O’Connor, 2011).  
Incompatibilism refers to any position which denies the compatibility of free will 
with determinism. Hard determinists, hard incompatibilists and libertarians are all 
varieties of incompatibilism. 
 
 Is determinism 
true? 









Hard determinism + - - - 
Hard 
incompatibilism 
- - - - 
Compatibilism + + + + 
Libertarianism - - + + 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, there is no generally accepted definition of free will. But as 
the debate is often set up, there are at least two common options (O’Connor & Franklin, 
2018). Free will requires either: a) to have the ability to do otherwise, or b) to be the 
source of one’s actions. Yet, it remains hotly disputed in what sense it would be 
sufficient to have the ability to choose otherwise or to be the source of one’s actions. 
Compatibilist and incompatibilist promote different analyses. 
Classical compatibilists (also known as dispositionalist) suggested that we should 
consider the agent’s ability to do otherwise in a conditional or hypothetical sense (Ayer, 
1954; Hume, 1740). This means: if the agent had wanted (attempted, willed or decided) 
to do otherwise at that time, then he would have done otherwise. Thus, one’s ability to 
do otherwise is based on some counterfactual scenario. The proposal is that free will 
21 
 
requires having only this conditional power. Notice that free will would be compatible 
with determinism in this case. While determinism entails that what one willed is 
determined and one’s choice is inevitable given the past and laws of nature, 
determinism allows to have a counterfactual thinking of agency: indeed, it may be that 
one would have done otherwise, has one willed to do otherwise. 
 It was pointed out, however, that conditional statements could lead to false results 
(Chisholm, 1964; Lehrer, 1966). Consider the cases of phobia as an example. Imagine 
that Frank has an extreme stage fright: it has such an extent that performing in front of 
the audience is psychologically impossible for him. Even talking about public speaking 
makes Frank have a panic attack. Naturally Frank decides to stay away from the stage. 
The question is: “Was Frank able to decide otherwise and choose to perform?” The 
conditional analysis suggests that “yes”. If Frank had decided (willed, tried or desired) 
to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise. Yet, this ignores Frank’s actual 
ability. Given Frank’s psychological condition, he was unable to want or try to go on 
stage, i.e., to do otherwise. The conditional analysis of “could do otherwise”, thus, fails, 
as it involves implausible implications. We can, of course, imagine a world in which 
Frank desires to speak to the audience, and so he does. But in this case, Frank would not 
suffer from the phobia, which would impair his ability to perform in front of people. 
The new dispositionalists keep making attempts to rehabilitate the conditional 
ability to do otherwise, furnishing new analysis (Fara, 2008; Vihvelin, 2013). One goal 
is to show how some determined agents have the conditional ability to do otherwise, 
while other agents (e.g., phobics) are deprived of this ability. 
Incompatibilists argue that “the ability to do otherwise” should be understood 
only in the categorical terms. This means: the agent can do otherwise if the agent can 
do anything other than he does at time t, while all conditions remain the same up to the 
moment of choice. There should be no “ifs” as compared to the conditional analysis. 
The point is that the agent can choose either A (to do something) or B (e.g., to refrain 
from doing A or to do C) at one particular moment. It should be noted, however, that 
such ability would be incompatible with determinism. If determinism is true, the past 
remains fixed, and the preceding events necessitate only one course of action: that there 
is only one possible present and only one possible future. In other words, the agent is 
inclined to choose only one certain alternative and cannot do otherwise.  
Free will sceptics often refer to the Consequence argument in this discussion. The 




1. If determinism is true, then our actions are the necessary consequences of the 
laws of nature and events happened in the distant past. 
2. Yet, it is not up to us what the laws of nature are or what events happened in the 
distant past before we were born. 
3. It follows that our present actions are the consequences of the things which are 
not up to us. 
 
The argument suggests that people do not have the categorical ability to do 
otherwise. If determinism is true, then the future is closed to alternatives; the future is 
fixed by the past, i.e., the future is the natural consequence of the past. People – while 
being a determined part of the world – are powerless to swerve away from this 
predetermined flow and introduce an alternative. 
Libertarians, on the other hand, agree that people cannot have the categorical 
ability to do otherwise under determinism, but they point out to the existence of 
indeterminism. Some form of indeterminism (e.g., non-causal, event-causal, agent 
causal) may be involved in human agency and break the deterministic chains (Brembs, 
2011; Kane, 1996). Hence, indeterminism may render the categorical ability to do 
otherwise possible. The plausibility of this argument, however, is under debate.   
Some argue, however, that free will (or moral responsibility) does not require the 
ability to do otherwise at all (Frankfurt, 1969; Wolf, 1990). Allegedly, people can act 
out of free will even if they cannot choose differently. Equally, people can be morally 
responsible for their actions even if they could not have done otherwise. 
An alternative view is that free will requires an appropriate source of one’s 
actions. What truly matters either for free will or moral responsibility is not whether the 
agent could do otherwise, but how the action is brought about.  
The first compatibilist option is a reason-responsive theory (Fischer & Ravizza, 
1998; McKenna, 2013; Sartorio, 2016; Wolf, 1990). The reason-responsive theories lay 
stress on the agent’s cognitive capacities. To be the source of one’s actions, the agent 
should have a reason-responsive mechanism. The general idea is: the agent acts out of 
free will if the agent remains responsive to a sufficient range of reasons (e.g., rational 
considerations, moral reasons) at the moment of choice. The available reasons can 
either support or oppose a certain decision. What matters is that the agent can 
understand these reasons and respond to them by adjusting their behaviour if necessary. 
This also involves some counterfactual scenario. The agent does A out of free will only 
if, in at least one hypothetical scenario, the agent had reasons not to do A, then he 
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would not do it. The agents who are not sensitive to the reasons available to them are 
bereft of free will. Consider our previous example of Frank who suffers from the 
phobia. The reason-responsive view suggests that Frank does not act out of his free will, 
when he decides to stay away from the stage. The primary reason is that Frank’s reason-
responsive mechanism is impaired: even if he was given a convincing reason to go on 
stage, he would never respond to it. 
The second compatibilist option is an identification theory (also known as self-
determination, mesh, hierarchical theories) (Bratman, 2000; Frankfurt, 1971; Watson, 
1975). Identification views put emphasis on the motivation of action. To be the source 
of one’s actions, the agent ought to be able to identify with a certain motive. The 
general premise is: the agent acts out of free will if they act on the motives with which 
they are identified. The human mind is a home for various urges, conflicting desires, 
values, goals etc. All of them give some incentive for action. But we do not identify 
with all of them, i.e., we would not consider all of them as appropriate, desirable or 
acceptable in our behaviour. Basically, the agent acts out of free will only if the agent 
reflects critically on their motives, identifies the best one, resists the others and realizes 
it in their behaviour. Free will is gummed up if the agent is moved by a motive 
considered undesirable or alien. Consider again Frank who suffers from the phobia. 
Frank may, in fact, want to perform on stage, i.e., he identifies with this incentive. But 
he is not able to act on it and eventually feels the compulsion to refrain. Hence, Frank is 
robbed of free will, as he cannot realize his true will in his behaviour. 
Now back to Freud and Rogers. One of the crucial problems is that neither 
psychoanalysis nor client-centered theory has a coherent or articulate view on free will. 
One of the primary tasks of this research will be to fill this gap. I will first show that 
two authors are compatibilist, that is, psychoanalysis and client-centered theory 
maintain that free will and determinism are compatible. I will also point out that two 
theories speak against the ability to do otherwise and gravitate towards the source 
account of free will. Lastly, I will argue that we can leverage Watson’s theory (1975), 
an identification theory, in order to account both for Freud’s and Rogers’s perspectives 
separately and jointly. Watson’s theory may serve as a point of integration for two 





1.3. A hard determinist reading of Freud 
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The most widespread view is that Freud was a hard determinist (Brunton, 2016; Erwin, 
2002; Hospers, 1952; Wallace, 2008). As Erwin states in the “Freud Encyclopedia”: 
“Freud gave an unequivocal verdict on the traditional philosophical question of freedom 
of the will: There is no such thing. Our belief in free will is deeply rooted, but is 
nonetheless illusory … [Freud’s] argument is just the traditional one of the “Hard 
Determinist” (2002, p. 214f). Importantly, almost every contemporary personality 
textbook, which introduces students to psychology, gets on the bandwagon and sides 
with the view that Freud was committed to determinism rather than to free will (Engler, 
2013; Hjelle & Ziegler, 1992; Schultz & Schultz, 2016).  
Those who interpret Freud as a hard determinist refer, first and foremost, to the 
fact that psychoanalysis is based on the concept of psychic determinism (Wallace, 2008, 
p. 771f). Freud clearly endorses the idea of the determination of the human mind and 
behavior. As Freud writes: “Psycho-analysts are marked by a particularly strict belief in 
the determination of mental life” (1910, p. 38). And elsewhere: “Nothing in the mind is 
arbitrary or undetermined” (1901, p. 242). Determinism presupposes that everything in 
the world is entailed by preceding events and laws of nature. If extended to people, 
every human act is the result of some preceding cause. One may not be always aware of 
those causes, but they still exist. One consequence is that human behavior cannot be 
contingent or haphazard. A person, for example, cannot do or say anything by chance. 
Another consequence is that human behavior cannot be ultimately free. On the one 
hand, determinism implies that there is always some cause that underlies human 
behavior. Goals, talents, capacities, desires, interests, love are all determined. On the 
other hand, determinism implies that there are no alternative paths into the future. 
Preceding events and laws of cause and effect entail only one course of action. It 
follows that people cannot really do otherwise.  
Second, those who support a hard determinist interpretation point out that Freud 
repeatedly rejects that free will exists (Erwin, 2002, p. 215). With the support of 
determinism, Freud often urges skepticism that there could be any “psychic freedom” or 
“free will”. In one place, he contests against the possibility of psychical freedom: “You 
nourish the illusion of there being such a thing as psychical freedom, and you will not 
give it up. I am sorry to say I disagree with you categorically over this” (1916–17, p. 
49). Further on, he calls the concept of free will “unscientific”: “Once before I ventured 
to tell you that you nourish a deeply rooted faith in undetermined psychical events and 
free will, but that this is quite unscientific” (ibid., p. 106). Freud even declares that free 
will is an illusion: “There are also all the unfulfilled but possible futures to which we 
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still like to cling in phantasy… which nourish in us the illusion of Free Will” (1919, p. 
236).  
Third, many point out that psychoanalytic ideas per se pose a serious challenge to 
the possibility of free will (Hospers, 1952; Sugarman, 2010). One threat is the view that 
unconscious processes could subvert the possibility of real choice. Repressed emotions 
buried deep in unconscious could pull the strings over one’s behavior without the 
person even recognizing that. Unconscious processes could stealthily trigger the choice, 
while people believe that they make choices consciously and thoughtfully. Another 
threat is that early relationships with significant others could predetermine the lifestyle 
in adulthood. A person can mechanistically and slavishly reproduce the same 
deleterious patterns of behavior or the same type of interactions, which they once learnt 
in their childhood. 
Lastly, some interpreters refer to some incompatibilist principles which are 
supposedly ingrained in psychoanalysis. Erwin writes:  
 
“If Freud is right, then the events that largely determined what kind of person I have become 
occurred during my infancy, especially during the Oedipal period. If Object Relations 
theory is correct, they occurred even earlier. But I had little or no control over these events 
from my early life that led inevitably to my becoming neurotic or in acting in certain sorts of 
ways… How, then, can I ever be morally responsible if all my actions are the inevitable 
result of events over which I had no control?” (2002, p. 217).2  
 
 
Erwin appears to refer to the so-called “Consequence Argument” developed by 
Van Inwagen (1983, p. 16). If determinism is true, then every act of the person is 
entailed by some preceding causes. Those causes, in turn, are entailed by some other 
causes, and so to infinity. It follows that how people behave in present fundamentally is 
the natural consequence of some initial events over which people had no control. For 
example, it is not up to people where and when to be born. It is not up to them what 
events could happen and traumatize them during their childhood. It is not up to them 
what genes or talents they inherit. In sum, a certain kind of life is forced upon people 
with all its slings and arrows. The argument suggests that free will does not exist, as 
people cannot control all events happened in the distant past, and which eventually and 
inevitably led them to acquire certain personalities and do what they do today.   
                                                          
2 A similar point was earlier expressed by Hospers concerning moral responsibility: “In a deeper sense we 
cannot hold the person responsible: we can hold his neurosis responsible, but he is not responsible for his 
neurosis, particularly since the age at which its onset was inevitable was an age before he could even 
speak” (1952, p. 571). 
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Erwin, however, also mentions one objection to the consequence argument (2002, 
p. 217). Compatibilists can respond that we should distinguish between the types of 
causes that bring about the inevitable present situation. A brain impairment or abusive 
environment in childhood, for example, can prevent normal development of cognitive 
capacities and interpersonal skills. A relatively normal childhood, on the other hand, 
leads to the development of fully fledged mental and physical capacities, which 
empower people to process data, to weigh options, to distinguish right from wrong, to 
understand moral norms, to identify the most desirable course of action and to exercise 
self-control. It is true that in both cases it is not up to people where to be born. But, in 
fact, only some events can strip people of the capacities necessary to be free and 
morally responsible, such as the ability to make choices, to have conscious knowledge 
over their behavior etc. That said, Erwin emphasises that Freud is not a compatibilist, 
rejecting that “free choice and determinism can co-exist” (2002, p. 215).  
It is hard to understand why Erwin holds that Freud rejects that “free choice and 
determinism can co-exist”. It is noteworthy that despite Freud’s commitment to 
determinism, the theme of choice is present consistently in all periods of Freud’s 
writing.  
For example, in the discussion of therapeutic work, Freud instructs analysts to 
make clients promise to refrain from any “important decisions” during the therapy: 
“…[B]y making him [a patient] promise not to take any important decisions affecting 
his life during the time of his treatment – for instance, not to choose any profession or 
definitive love-object – but to postpone all such plans until after his recovery …” (1914, 
p. 153).  
In the discussion of social morality, Freud says that upon finishing the therapy 
patients can take their own decisions how to lead their sexual life: “…[A]nd if, having 
grown independent after the completion of their treatment, they decide on their own 
judgement in favour of some midway position between living a full life and absolute 
asceticism, we feel our conscience clear whatever their choice” (1916–17, p. 434).  
The most intriguing dictum occurs in 1923. In “The Ego and the Id”, Freud states 
that the therapy does not intend to neutralize every pathology, but it intends to furnish 
the ego with the power of decision-making. As he writes: “After all, analysis does not 
set out to make pathological reactions impossible, but to give the patient’s ego freedom 
to decide one way or another” (1923, p. 50; emphasis in original).  
In the long run, the theme of choice lived up to the very end of Freud’s life. Freud 
explains that before the therapy patients might make some “inadequate decisions” in 
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their life. Yet, the therapy makes it possible to substitute those decisions with “a correct 
solution”. When it is done, the therapy can be finally over. “…[T]hanks to having 
strengthened the patient’s ego, [only then psychoanalysis] succeed in replacing by a 
correct solution the inadequate decision made in his early life. Only in such cases can 
one speak of analysis having been definitely ended” (1937, p. 220).  
Taken together, we have textual evidence that psychoanalysis supports the idea of 
some sense of free choice, despite its commitment to determinism. This fact alone can 
point towards compatibilism. 
But there is a more compelling argument against any hard determinist 
interpretation of psychoanalysis. We should not forget that Freud endorsed clearly and 
consistently the concept of moral responsibility. For example, discussing the question 
whether people should take responsibility for the content of their dreams, Freud states: 
“There seems to be no justification for people’s reluctance in 
accepting responsibility for the immorality of their dreams” (1900, p. 620). Elsewhere, 
he reiterates:  “Obviously one must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses of 
one's dreams” (1925, p. 132ff) [see Chapter 6 for the detailed analysis of responsibility 
in psychoanalysis]. 
Freud’s commitment to moral responsibility gives us a sufficient cause to 
undermine any hard determinist interpretation of psychoanalysis. As mentioned earlier, 
the thesis of hard determinism is that determinism is true, free will does not exist, and 
moral responsibility is unjustified. In other words, hard determinists hold that 
determinism is incompatible with both free will and moral responsibility. It is believed 
that if people are unable to do otherwise, they cannot be held responsible for what they 
do (Smilansky, 2013, p. 106). Another way to put it is to say that people are deprived of 
such freedom that would be sufficient for them to be morally responsible for their 
actions (Trakakis & Cohen, 2009, p. 72).  
Clearly, the thesis of hard determinism does not square with Freud’s position. 
While being a vigorous determinist, Freud, nonetheless, supports the view that people 
can be morally responsible agents. Therefore, psychoanalysis cannot be related to hard 
determinism by definition.  
It can help to refer to Wallace’s (2008) reading of Freud to put the point across. 
According to Wallace, Freud was a hard determinist: “Freud was, as I am, a staunch 
believer in a hard biopsychosocial determinism” (2008, pp. 744, 771). Wallace holds 
that psychoanalysis does not allow any contra-causal free will, but he does not object 
that Freud endorses moral responsibility. On the contrary, his view is that perhaps the 
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concept of moral responsibility can withstand even if determinism is true, and free will 
does not exist. For morality, what looks important is whether people have normal 
mental capacities rather than free will. As Wallace puts it: “What is then decisive is, as 
so many jurists have held, whether the agent was reality oriented, appreciated the 
difference between right and wrong, and understood the likely consequences of his 
behavior. Whether he could have acted otherwise is beside the point” (2008, p. 773).  
The problem is that Wallace, in fact, does not describe the view of hard 
determinism. There is a terminological error. Hard determinism does not allow that 
determinism can be compatible with moral responsibility. As a matter of fact, what 
Wallace describes is the thesis of semi-compatibilism (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998). Semi-
compatibilism is one of sub-directions of compatibilism, which posits that determinism 
is incompatible with free will, but determinism can be compatible with moral 
responsibility [see Chapter 7 for a more detailed review of semi-compatibilism]. 
Long story short: the most widely accepted view that Freud was a hard 
determinist could be successfully debunked. Even if we turn a blind eye to the fact that 
psychoanalysis contains passages about freedom and decision-making, the fact that 
Freud is wedded to the concept of moral responsibility ineluctably removes 
psychoanalysis from the group of hard determinist theories. The real question now is 





1.4. A libertarian reading of Freud 
One of the most well-known libertarian interpretations of psychoanalysis can be found 
in the work by Wallwork (1991, 2002, 2012).  
To start with, Wallwork questions the meaning and generality of all anti-freedom 
passages in the psychoanalytic corpus (1991, p. 82f). By way of example, consider a 
phrase Freud uses, the “illusion of free will” (1919, p. 236). Wallwork points out that 
this phrase was used in very specific context and did not mean to apply to all people. 
The paragraph deals with the concept of “double” [Doppelgänger].3 Freud explains that 
the double creates projections, multiple selves, and reproduces crushed strivings and 
                                                          
3 The “double” is the suppressed aspects of human personality. It incorporates repressed desires, 
unfulfilled dreams, wicked traits (everything that is unacceptable to the ego and society). It stems from 
infantile narcissism, when a child is used to imagine self in different roles. In the adult life, the 
appearance of double prompts the feeling of uncanny (unheimlich). In literature and arts, the double is 
often depicted as an evil twin of personality.  
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unreal phantasies. When this happens, it nourishes in people “the illusion of Free Will”. 
Freud does not indicate, however, that free will is always an illusion. Rather, what he 
says is that there are certain conditions (i.e., the appearance of double) when people live 
in the illusion of freedom.  
Another famous example is the phrase: “[F]aith in undetermined psychical events 
and free will … is quite unscientific” (1916–17, p. 106). Wallwork argues that editors of 
the Standard Edition committed a mistranslation. The original German text says: 
“Glaube an psychische Freiheit und Willkürlichkeit … ganz unwissenschaftlich ist” 
(GW 1916–17b, p. 104). From here, we can extract two points. First off, literally 
translated “Psychische Freiheit” stands for “psychic freedom”, but not “free will”. 
Wallwork points out that if Freud was really implying “free will”, then he would not 
employ a bewildering term “Freiheit”. He could have used the relevant and exact 
terminology, e.g., “freier Wille” or “Willensfreihet”. Second, the notion “Psychische 
Freiheit” does not implicate the idea of free choice. Contextually, “Psychische Freiheit” 
is related to the term “Willkürlichkeit”, which denotes “arbitrariness” or arbitrary acts. 
A few sentences later, Freud says: “the idea produced by man was not arbitrary nor 
indeterminable” [nicht willkürlich, nicht unbestimmbar] (SE 1916–17, p. 106; GW 
1916–17b, p. 104). All in all, it is suggested that Freud calls “unscientific” a possibility 
of undetermined events rather than a possibility of free will (understood as a sensible 
choice).  
Then, Wallwork moves on to oppose hard determinist, indeterminist and some 
soft-determinist interpretations of Freud (1991).  
First, Wallwork denies a hard determinist interpretation. His main worry is that 
determinism presupposes that all events are inevitable, and it precludes the ability to do 
otherwise. If every act is deemed unavoidable, moral responsibility (blame and praise) 
does not seem to be justified. As an argument, Wallwork points out that hard 
determinists interpreters depreciate those passages in Freud’s corpus that carry the ideas 
about freedom, liberation, moral responsibility, ego’s autonomy and the ability to 
choose.  
Second, Wallwork stands against an “indeterminist” (aka libertarian) view. His 
worry is that indeterminism introduces randomness, a chance, and, thus, can undermine 
control over one’s behavior. It is hard to see how an agent can have freedom if their 
actions are capricious. Besides, it is doubtful that this interpretation can be consistent 
with Freud’s emphasis on determinism. If I understand Wallwork right, he opposes only 
some libertarian interpretations (e.g., event-causal theories). The thing is that Wallwork 
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defends a view which depicts free will as the ability to do otherwise, and which, in fact, 
represents a common libertarian position. This point will be explicated in more detail 
below. 
Lastly, Wallwork goes against some soft determinist (aka compatibilist) 
interpretations. Wallwork argues against the view, which he calls a “thin theory”, 
promoted by British empiricists including Hobbes, Locke and Hume (1991, p. 70). A 
thin theory holds that an act is free if the agent acts in accordance with their desires and 
preferences, while the act is not compelled or coerced. Consider a contrast. A thief acts 
freely, for they act voluntary on their desire to steal, without being compelled or 
coerced. But a kleptomaniac is unfree, for they are moved by a neurotic compulsion to 
steal. Wallwork admits that it is very tempting to relate Freud with the thin theory. It 
appears that Freud talks frequently about freedom in connection to the liberation from 
neurotic compulsions. As an example, a reader can recall the case of “Rat Man”. The 
man was suffering from obsessive compulsive disorder, i.e., he was compelled to do 
things he did not like doing. Freud points out, in this case, that the treatment helped the 
patient “to be freed of his obsessions” (1909, p. 173). By and large, if the thin theory 
were Freud’s position, it would be no problem at all. Such form of free will is 
compatible with determinism, as determinism allows people to act on their desires and 
not being coerced.  
Wallwork spends some time arguing against Knight and Wallace, who suppose 
that the therapy creates only some “feeling of freedom”, and that the successful therapy 
makes a change in “the cause-effect sequence”. More specifically, the therapy 
eliminates the causation by unconscious motives and substitutes it with the causation by 
the ego, which is fully determined by the interplay of biological and environmental 
factors. But Wallwork retorts by stating that that such approach to therapy would be 
cynical and the outcome of therapy would be meaningless. An agent would falsely 
believe that they obtain free will after the end of the therapy, while in reality it would be 
just an illusion. An agent’s wanting, deliberating and choosing would remain fully 
under the control of determinism. No matter what people do, they remain to be taken 
hostage of some external forces that they are unable to control (1991, p. 81).  
Wallwork objects, pointing out that Freud does not state anywhere that he 
subscribes to this position. On his view, Freud appears to advocate a far broader 
understanding of free will than the concept of uncompelled behavior. Having developed 
the structural model of mind, Freud seems to attribute to the ego the capacity of 
deliberation, self-government and leeway choice.  
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By way of an alternative, Wallwork suggests the view which he dubs “self-
determination”. According to this view, the ego or the self – while being caused by 
antecedent events – can, nonetheless, become a cause itself. As he puts it: “persons саn 
become the sources or causes of their own action, even though they are themselves the 
products of а complex network of various types of causes extended over time and now 
hierarchically organized” (Ibid, p. 97).  
Self-determination is an acquired ability. Wallwork concedes that people vary in 
the strength of the ego that can determine an act. For example, an individual with 
neurotic disturbances has weak or impaired ego’s powers, while a child does not hold a 
mature ego at all. In this case, an act is likely to be issued by the urges of the id, defense 
mechanisms or unconscious psychodynamics. However, it is not always the case. Once 
a person develops a strong ego, they acquire the ability of self-determination.   
Wallwork concedes that the ego is itself caused and determined. But under 
favorable conditions the ego is capable of developing and acquiring the ability to 
exercise a choice (1991, p. 81). Importantly, Wallwork insists that people acquire 
“leeway” capacities (1991, p. 85, 88). His contention is that the ego is not caused in 
such a manner that it would be deprived from freedom to do otherwise.  
Yet, Wallwork also admits that an individual does not have an absolute freedom 
of choice. Alternatives are always limited by an array of constraints. They are limited 
by different motives, architecture of the psyche, the ego’s own reasons and defensive 
mechanisms that cannot be removed completely. Nonetheless, it does not seem to be a 
problem. Though alternatives are limited, the mature ego is able to choose between the 
options that are available. It holds the “power to introduce novelty and affect the future” 
(1991, p. 73). 
 
“But for the relatively normal, mature personality, there remains some leeway within the 
constraints set by the principles that govern mental functioning … to choose among 
alternative courses of action in а waу that makes а difference to the outcome. Persons thus 
have some, albeit limited (and varying) capacity tо determine and guide their own actions 
rather than allowing them to be caused by something other than themselves” (1991, p. 98; 
emphasis added).  
 
 
It is important to underscore that Wallwork insists on leeway choice. This fact 
gives a reason to relate Wallwork’s interpretation to libertarian views, as libertarians 
tend to understand free will as a leeway choice (the ability to do otherwise).  
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One question needs to be raised: “How can leeway choice square with 
determinism?”. We know that pure determinism and leeway choice are mutually 
exclusive phenomena. Metaphorically speaking, one can’t have a cake and eat it too. 
Foreseeing this problem Wallwork proposes, however, that determinism in the 
psychoanalytic theory has an idiosyncratic meaning (distinct from the concept used in 
natural sciences), which allows the possibility of leeway choice. Wallwork points out 
that Freud never used the term “causal determinism” in his writings and refrained from 
any metaphysical statements. In fact, Freud used the term “psychic determinism” 
[psychischer Determinismus].  
It is tempting to respond straightaway that “psychic determinism” amounts to 
“causal determinism”. The adjective “psychic” only means that Freud emphasizes his 
interest and research in the domain of psyche. But Wallwork counters this objection 
indicating that Freud never gave a definition of “psychic determinism”, and therefore it 
would be too quick to jump to conclusions.  
Wallwork insists that “psychic determinism” and “causal determinism” (which he 
also calls “metaphysical”, “physical” and “universal” determinism) are distinct 
concepts. One should not blend them. To Wallwork, Freud “is groping toward а new 
understanding of determinism” (p. 72), that he is after a “broader concept of 
determinism” (1991, p. 84).  
Theoretically, this move helps to escape the inconsistency between determinism 
and leeway choice. One can argue that while causal determinism is incompatible with a 
leeway choice, psychic determinism, as an idiosyncratic concept, is fully compatible 
with leeway choice. 
 
“Freud nоwhere abandons the postulate that everything is determined by causes, but he 
moves increasingly further away from notions of determinism derived from the physical 
sciences, which аrе suggestive of а psychology of passivity, and develops the implicit 
notion that causes and laws take оn а different character when they govern not physical 
things but mental асtivities, especially the higher functioning of the ego” (1991, p. 72). 
 
 
Overall, the argument is that interpreters make a semantic error. Purportedly, 
mixing up “psychic determinism” and “causal determinism” entailed a distorted reading 
of Freud. Think of the cases when Freud talks about determinism: “nothing in the mind 
is arbitrary or undetermined” (1901, p. 242); “psycho-analysts are marked by a 
particularly strict belief in the determination of mental life” (1910, p. 38); “[one] must 
yield to the demand of a determinism whose rule extends over mental life” (1916–17, p. 
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106). Wallwork contests that many commentators misunderstood what Freud really had 
meant by these statements: 
 
“Маnу interpreters take these comments tо imply аn extension of the strict assumptions 
about causal determinism found in the natural sciences to all mental activities, including 
deliberations, choices, and apparently voluntary actions. Вut this is not the point that Freud 
himself makes in these passages. Complete psychic determinism for Freud is the thesis that 
all mental activities аre “meaningful” – that is to say, “purposeful” – as in consciously 
intended conduct” (1991, p. 79).  
 
 
Wallwork ascribes two interlaced characteristics to the concept of psychic 
determinism. First, psychic determinism signifies that all actions are “meaningful” and 
“purposeful”. Before Freud it was widely believed that trivial forms of behavior are 
meaningless or purposeless. But psychoanalysis intended to show that every behavior or 
mental event bore an interpretive value for diagnostics. There are no meaningless 
activities or events. Therefore, therapists should pay attention to all kinds of behavior, 
as they all make sense. If an individual does not comprehend the meaning of an act, it 
does not follow that this act is pointless. Much of behavior stems from the unconscious. 
It is natural then that an individual may fail to recognize the meanings of some behavior 
right away. Second, psychic determinism implies that every act has a motive. When 
Freud discovered the realm of unconscious, he simply endeavored to demonstrate that 
all behavior was motivated. Before that, many trivial forms of behavior – e.g., dreams, 
verbal slips, free associations, accidental self-injuries – were deemed to be fortuitous. 
Freud’s work was to show that those events did not happen by chance. In reality, they 
are brought about by unconscious motives. What Freud denies, thus, is that an act can 
occur without a motive.  
Defending this interpretation, Wallwork repeatedly gets back to the question of 
alternate possibilities (1991, pp. 73, 78, 83). He persists that “psychic determinism” has 
nothing to do with inevitability or impossibility of free choice. Metaphysics is beside 
the point here.  
 
“Psychic determinism holds only that all psychological behavior is motivated… not that it 
could nоt be other than it is (p. 73)…The corollary of Freud's contention…is not that all 
human conduct is inevitable, but that [all forms of behavior] “make sense” and are 
explicable in the sense of “interpretable”. There is absolutely nо reason to read this …[as if] 





Drawing a line between causal and psychic determinism, Wallwork also 
distinguishes “causes” in these two forms of determinism. The reader may have 
probably noticed in one of the above quotes Wallwork’s claim that Freud “develops the 
implicit notion that causes and laws take оn а different character when they govern not 
physical things but mental асtivities” (1991, p. 72). In a nutshell, Wallwork sets apart 
psychological causes in psychic determinism (psychoanalysis) from causes in causal 
determinism (causes existing in the natural world). Psychological causes include 
motives, desires, beliefs, reasons and all other mental determinants. Conversely, the 
causes in the natural sciences are called “non-purposeful forces” (1991, p. 75). 
Wallwork assumes that it makes sense to detach psychological causes from other 
causes. Allegedly, there is a change in a “mode of determination” once causes enter the 
mind and turn into reasons (1991, p. 77). An agent can exercise a certain control over 
reasons, e.g., to assess them, to reject them or to act on them. In this case, people are 
active agents. They self-determine an action. Clearly, this case differs from a situation 
when an agent is passively and blindly moved by some “non-purposeful forces”, i.e., 
causes that an agent is not aware of or which they do not control. 
Concerning the idiosyncrasy, one can object, however, that Freud had a deep-
running bond with natural sciences. Freud obtained the MD at the University of Vienna. 
While in academia, he conducted empirical research in the laboratory of physiology. It 
is also important to remember that Freud’s tutors – Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke, Carl 
Claus, Theodor Meynert and Jean Charcot – were predominantly positivists, who 
regarded people as complex biological machines. Furthermore, there is some evidence 
that Freud showed a profound respect to some of his materialist tutors. Take Ernst 
Brücke, who was a zealous proponent of positivism and Freud’s mentor. Freud worked 
under Brücke’s supervision in the physiological laboratory during 1876 – 1882. When 
Brücke died in 1892, Freud named his newborn son in his honor (Sulloway, 1979, p. 
15). Thirty years later, in the recollections, Freud wrote that Brücke “carried more 
weight with me than anyone else in my whole life” (1926, p. 253).  
This background was one of the reasons why Freud apparently started “The 
Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1895). In this work, Freud attempted to present 
psychology strictly as a natural science, which rests on anatomy, neurology, chemistry 
and physics. As he puts it: “The intention of the project is to furnish us with a 
psychology which shall be a natural science; its aim, that is, is to represent psychical 
processes as quantitatively determined states of specifiable material particles and so 
make them plain and void of contradictions” (1895, p. 295).  
35 
 
There is no doubt that Freud had “materialistic roots”, but Wallwork makes a 
thrust. First, along with the positivist tradition, Freud was also influenced by some 
humanistic philosophy. While at the university, Freud attended lectures by Franz 
Brentano, an influential German philosopher and priest. In short, Brentano was a 
theologist (of Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective) who maintained a belief in God and 
human free will. Freud enrolled in five philosophical modules by Brentano, apart from 
his main medical curriculum. It appears that Brentano made a very strong general 
impression on young Freud. As a matter of fact, Freud was even thinking to get a dual 
Ph.D. that would include philosophy. There is certain documentable evidence that can 
indicate Brentano’s influence on Freud. In an unpublished letter to his friend Edward 
Silberstein in 1875, Freud writes: “This peculiar, and in many respects ideal man, ... For 
the moment I will say only this: that under Brentano’s influence I have decided to take 
my Ph.D. in philosophy and zoology” (Vitz, 1993, p. 52). 
Second, Wallwork suggests that we should clearly differentiate psychoanalysis 
(texts written between 1900 – 1940) and “The Project for a Scientific Psychology” 
(written in 1895) (“Project” for short). It is true that in the “Project”, Freud was under 
the deep influence of Helmholtz tradition. The “Project” was designed to account for 
psychological phenomena relying on the knowledge in physiology and neurology. To 
put in differently, the “Project” should have established the link between the mind and 
the brain. Contemporary neuroscientists might say that Freud tried to elaborate a 
neurobiological model of mind. However, this enterprise failed. Freud was not content 
with the results and therefore he had to abandon the “Project”. Here, Wallwork 
suggests, we should stop. Psychoanalysis was a whole new ball game. It was far away 
from the goals of the “Project” and should not be associated anyhow with it. 
Psychoanalysis was designed to deal exclusively with psychological facts and tried to 
steer clear of neurological speculations.  
As the evidence, Wallwork notes that there is a certain reduction of the use of 
mechanistic terms in Freud’s writing over the time.4 In the “Project”, we can see a peak 
of the use of mechanistic vocabulary. During the first period of psychoanalytic 
theorizing (1900 – 1923) – during the time of topographical model – mechanistic terms 
were still used quite often. Yet, even in this period, one can observe a substantial 
decline, as compared to the “Project” time. And finally, during the last period (1923 – 
1940) – during the period of the structural model – the number of mechanistic terms 
                                                          
4 By mechanistic terms I mean positivist terminology that portrays human as a biological machine; it 
includes terms from physics, chemistry and other exact sciences. 
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dropped drastically. In sum, Wallwork hints that there occurred a certain shift in Freud’s 
outlook over the time. “Freud developed several models of the mind during the course 
of his long career, and these divergent models suggest changing perspectives on the 
determinism issue” (1991, p. 57). 
It is time now to consider some objections. The main shortcoming with 
Wallwork’s argument is that it fails to provide any direct evidence that Freud 
subscribed to any idiosyncratic understanding of determinism.  
First, the fact that Freud never defines the term “determinism” does not mean that 
this term bears some idiosyncratic meaning and deviates from the concept used in 
natural sciences. Many materialist scientists never define determinism either, but it does 
not follow that they all imply some idiosyncrasy.  
Second, the fact that Freud had respect for Brentano does not prove that Freud 
decided to develop an idiosyncratic view on determinism. Biography carries little 
dialectical weight. It seems plausible that, thanks to Brentano, Freud did absorb some 
humanistic ideas. But it does not follow that he also decided to give up his positivistic 
mindset.  
Third, the fact that Freud abandoned the “Project” does not mean that Freud also 
abandoned his positivist outlook. It looks as an extreme overgeneralization. On the 
contrary, the texts of the first period of psychoanalysis testify that Freud never turned 
back on his materialist convictions. There are still plenty of mechanistic terms. There 
are regular comparisons between mental events and physical phenomena. Elsewhere, 
Freud draws a direct relation between the idea of psychic determinism and 
Weltanschauung of science: “If anyone makes a breach of this kind [if one assumes that 
there can be random events] in the determinism of natural events at a single point, it 
means that he has thrown overboard the whole Weltanschauung of science” (1916–17, 
p. 28). 
Some researchers draw a direct link between Freud’s psychoanalytic concepts and 
ideas promoted by Helmholtz school. For example, Bernfeld (1981) argues that Freud 
adopted Brücke’s ideas about dynamic principles in physiology and transferred them to 
mental events. For this reason, the structure of mind in psychoanalysis is described in 
dynamic terms (e.g, the internal “psychodynamics”, “energy” and so on). We can also 
find the abundance of chemical, physical and mechanistic metaphors in Freud’s texts 
(e.g., “mental apparatus”, “homeostasis”, “system”, “charges” and so forth). Frequently 
enough, Freud compares mental events with those appearing in the natural world (1916–
17, p. 48f).  
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Sulloway, in his praiseworthy book “Freud, Biologist of the Mind”, also argues 
that Freud never abandoned his earlier biological views (1979). Sulloway attempts to 
dissolve the myth that Freud elaborated psychoanalysis ex nihilo, just out of personal 
brilliance. Freud apparently was developing psychoanalysis, drawing on different 
scientific fields and theories, including neurobiology. Sulloway argues Freud always 
remained “the biologist of the mind”, even though he tried to conceal it. A careful 
examination shows that Freud’s earlier positivistic views run throughout his entire 
psychoanalytic work.  
One source of Freud’s inspiration was evidently the work of Darwin. At the end 
of the 19th century, Darwinian ideas held sway. The theory of natural selection was 
completely deterministic and endeavored to establish the connection between nature, 
biology and human development. Naturally, such theory opposes the idea of free will (at 
least in a libertarian sense). For every bit of human behavior is viewed as an inevitable 
outcome of evolutionary process. Species act according to the programs that were 
acquired during the evolution. For our discussion, it is important to know that Darwin’s 
ideas can be present in psychoanalysis. In his autobiography, Freud recollects: “At the 
same time, the theories of Darwin, which were then of topical interest, strongly attracted 
me, for they held out hopes of an extraordinary advance in our understanding of the 
world” (1925, p. 8). Freud seemed to be particularly attracted by the implications of 
Darwin’s discoveries for psychology. In “On the Origins of Species”, Darwin makes a 
note that “Psychology will be based on a new foundation… Light will be thrown on the 
origin of man and his history” (1859, p. 306). In some way, the phrase “light will be 
thrown on the origin of man and his history” bears a reminiscence of the psychoanalytic 
method. As Darwin, Freud believed that the past was a key to understand the present of 
the person. For this reason, any therapy starts by the investigation and reconstruction of 
the past of a client. The implicit idea of psychoanalysis (which seems to originate from 
Darwin) is that certain events from the past (from the childhood) determine what type of 
personality and what types of issues a person has in the present. 
Fourth, the fact that there occurred a decrease of mechanistic terminology and an 
increase of freedom-related dictums in psychoanalytic texts over time also does not 
prove that Freud had subscribed for an idiosyncratic understanding of determinism. For 
one, the occurrence of freedom-related passages does not reveal that there should be any 
tension with the concept of causal determinism. Determinism can be compatible with 
negative freedoms (when one is free from coercion) or with any compatibilist 
understanding of free will. Thus, there is no need to conclude that Freud decided to 
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adopt any novel understanding of determinism, because of the presence of freedom-
related terminology. A more plausible explanation would be that Freud simply made a 
shift from a hard determinist to a compatibilist outlook at some period. 
Importantly, Freud never mentions that he adopts any novel understanding of 
determinism before or after. It is important to keep things in perspective. Freud wrote 
23 volumes of texts; it is around 40 years of non-stop writing. But he never leaves a 
note in between that he decides to adhere to some novel, unusual understanding of 
determinism. It is not a marginal thing. The concept of determinism in psychoanalysis 
plays the fundamental role. But we have nothing. Given this, we can, of course, 






In this chapter, I have investigated the hard determinist and libertarian options to 
interpret psychoanalysis. I have argued that both readings succumb to some 
considerable objections.  
I have argued that interpreting psychoanalysis as a hard determinist theory is 
clearly false (see § 1.3.). The thesis of hard determinism holds that determinism is 
incompatible with both free will and moral responsibility. It is noteworthy, however, 
that though Freud advocates determinism, he also explicitly and consistently endorses 
the concept of moral responsibility. This suggests that even if we disregard the theme of 
free will, we still cannot relate psychoanalysis to hard determinist theories anyhow. 
What is more, Freud’s writing contains passages about the possibility of free choice 
(freedom of the ego to make a choice). It follows that despite his commitment to 
determinism, Freud concedes on some level that people can make some sort of free 
choices at least sometimes and be responsible for them even living in the deterministic 
world. 
The fact that Freud supports moral responsibility prompts us to move on towards 
libertarianism and compatibilism. The main weakness of the libertarian interpretation by 
Wallwork, however, is that it fails to provide any direct evidence for this reading (see § 
1.4.). There is no textual evidence that Freud accepts any form of indeterminism, which 
would be a necessary condition for any libertarian theory. In fact, Freud repeatedly 
argues that nothing in the mind is undetermined. Alternatively, there is no direct 
evidence that psychoanalysis promotes an idiosyncratic view on determinism, which 
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could leave a room for a libertarian free will. Of course, one can go on arguing for the 
libertarian interpretation. But so far, we have no compelling evidence for this reading. I 
do not deny, however, that one day this gap might be filled.  
For the time being, we have no other robust option, however, except to move 
towards compatibilism. The next chapter will explain how we can understand 
psychoanalysis from a compatibilist point of view.  
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The previous chapter objected to both hard determinist and libertarian readings of 
psychoanalysis. Though the hard determinist interpretation is the most widespread 
reading of Freud, we have revealed that it is a clear mistake to associate psychoanalysis 
with hard determinism. On the other hand, there is also no direct evidence to 
substantiate the libertarian interpretation. Thus, we are left only with the compatibilist 
option.  
To be fair, some researchers have already assumed that Freud was a compatibilist 
(D. L. Smith, 2002; Tauber, 2010). Tauber writes, for example: “In the free will-
determinism debate, Freud must be viewed as a member of the “compatibilist” camp of 
Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and John Stuart Mill, who found no conflict between 
commonsensical notions of human choice and the determinism of the natural world” 
(2010, p. 221f). Smith also suggests that Freud understands free will as actions 
“determined by motives of which one is conscious and with which one identified” 
(2002, p. 435). Two authors, however, make only a passing remark that Freud may be a 
compatibilist, without providing any details and substantiating this standpoint. It is not 
clarified, for example, how the compatibilist interpretation can be consistent with 
Freud’s theory overall, earlier or later concepts. It is not spelled out what or why any 
definition of free will would correctly reflect Freud’s position. And it is not explicated 
how we should treat the fact that Freud sporadically rejects and then endorses the theme 
of freedom. Overall, it is nebulous what evidence we have to vindicate that 
psychoanalysis maintains compatibilism. 
The goal of this chapter is to develop a thorough compatibilist interpretation of 
psychoanalysis, which would overcome the constraints of other readings.  
In § 2.2., I will argue that Freud rejects the possibility of libertarian free will, but 
he is also implicitly committed to a compatibilist view on free will. The compatibilist 
free will in psychoanalysis can be understood as the action on one’s conscious reasons. 
In § 2.3., I will argue that psychoanalysis can be associated with a group of hierarchical 
views on free will. More specifically, I propose that we can make Freud’s position more 
explicit and consistent if we refer to Watson’s mesh theory of free will (1975). Section 
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2.2. A compatibilist reading of Freud 
To reach the goal of the chapter, we need to shed light on some terminological and 
conceptual distinctions first. I should start off with philosophical terminology. As noted 
earlier, there are two big views that support the idea of free will: libertarianism and 
compatibilism. 
The first basic distinction is how libertarians and compatibilists define free will. 
Leeway libertarians understand free will as a possibility of leeway choice, viz., as the 
ability to do otherwise at one given moment. Compatibilists, by contrast, propose a 
range of alternate definitions of free will. For example, some define free will as the 
ability to act on a particular type of desires (Frankfurt, 1971), while others refer to the 
ability of self-control (Dennett, 1984).  
The second basic distinction between compatibilism and libertarianism is the 
attitude to determinism. Libertarianism states that determinism and free will are 
incompatible. The incompatibility is due to the fact that determinism forecloses the 
possibility of leeway choice. The preceding events and laws of cause and effect can 
entail only one course of action, and therefore there is no real chance to do otherwise. 
Accordingly, libertarian free will is possible only if there is some form of indeterminacy 
that can generate alternate possibilities for a human choice. By contrast, compatibilism 
maintains that determinism and free will are compatible. This is because all 
compatibilist accounts of free will can be realized under the rule of determinism. For 
example, it is feasible to act according to one’s desires or to have self-control in the 
deterministic world.  
Now let’s proceed to Freud. At first, we need to distinguish different periods of 
Freud’s work. Historically, it is common to mark out three periods of Freud’s 
theorizing: early (1880–1895), middle (1900–1920) and late (1920–1939) periods. The 
early period involves the “Project for a scientific psychology” (1895) and pre-
psychoanalytic texts. The middle period starts with “Interpretation of dreams” (1900), 
which introduces the topographical model of mind. The late period begins with 
“Beyond the pleasure principle” (1920) and introduces the structural model of mind. It 
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is important to keep in mind these periods, as Freud seems to change his attitude 
towards free will in the course of these periods.  
Then, we need to distinguish Freud’s terminology related to freedom. If we 
investigate all Freud’s corpus scrupulously, we can determine that Freud, in fact, uses 
different freedom-related terms. Freud utilized four freedom-related terms in his texts: 
“free will” [freier Wille] (1901, p. 253; 1919, p. 236), “psychical freedom” [psychische 
Freiheit] (1916a, p. 49), “mental freedom” [seeliche Freiheit] (1915b, p. 170) and 
simply “freedom” [Freiheit] (1915, p. 168; 1923b, p. 50). Not only do these terms have 
a terminological distinction, but they also have different meanings. Most importantly, 
Freud did not oppose all of them. 
To foreshadow, I will argue that the terms used by Freud describe different types 
of free will. Some terms amount to libertarian free will, whereas other terms 
characterize the compatibilist type of free will. Plus, Freud introduced the terms that 
reflected a compatibilist free will only in the late period of the psychoanalytic theory. 
2.2.1. A libertarian free will 
Originally, Freud used just two terms “free will” [freier Wille] and “psychical freedom” 
[psychische Freiheit]. We can notice that these terms appear only during the early 
period (1880–1895) and the mid period (1900–1920) of Freud’s writing, which are 
marked by the topographical model of mind. These terms then vanish in the late period 
(1920–1939) that is devoted to the structural model of mind.  
The two terms seem to be interchangeable, for we can see them coming up in the 
same contexts. The terms are used when Freud argues against possible objections to 
psychical determinism [psychischer Determinismus]. Contextually, these terms 
presuppose the existence of indeterminism [die Willkürlichkeit]5 and alternate 
possibilities (i.e., the ability to do otherwise). To put it in other terms, the two terms 
denote the libertarian type of free will, which involve indeterminism and the ability to 
do otherwise. 
For example, Freud writes: “[those who oppose determinism] would like to claim 
that we could have acted otherwise; … of our free – and unmotivated – will” (1901, p. 
253f).6 Elsewhere, he reiterates: “something else might have occurred to him! You 
nourish the illusion of there being such a thing as psychical freedom” (1916–17, p. 49). 
                                                          
5 Freud uses the term “die Willkürlichkeit”, which literally means arbitrariness.  
6 Freud then defends his initial claim that every bit of human behavior is determined. Those actions that 




In both cases, Freud goes on to say that he disagrees that there could be undetermined 
phenomena or that one could act otherwise.  
Let’s consider two passages in a bit more detail to put the point across. In the 
discussion of parapraxes, Freud considers whether parapraxes are a reliable source of 
information (e.g., slips of the tongue). The question is whether the agent could have 
produced a different kind of slip under same given circumstances. Freud’s interlocutor 
puts it this way: “It may have been so, but it may just as well have happened otherwise. 
And something else might have occurred to him…” (1916–17, p. 48). To this Freud 
responds:  
 
“It is strange how little respect you have at bottom for а psychical fact! Imagine that 
someone had undertaken а chemical analysis of а certain substance and had arrived at а 
particular weight for оnе component of it—so and so many milligrams. Certain inferences 
could be drawn from this weight. Now do you suppose that it would ever occur to а chemist 
to criticize those inferences on the ground that the isolated substance might equally have 
had some other weight? Everyone will bow before the fact that this was the weight and none 
other and will confidently draw his further inferences from it. But when you аrе faced with 
the psychical fact that а particular thing occurred tо the mind of the person questioned, you 
will not allow the fact's validity: something else might have occurred tо him! You nourish 
the illusion of there being such a thing as psychical freedom, and you will not give it up. I 




For a start, Freud draws a parallel between the chemical processes and mental 
events. He asserts that there is no substantial difference between those two, for they 
follow the identical deterministic laws. Given the determinism, the chemical reactions 
and mental events occur in one specific way, and they could not be different. A 
psychologist should thus treat an occurred mental event with the equal attention as a 
researcher in a chemical lab.  
Psychical freedom, meanwhile, is considered as an opposite phenomenon to 
psychical determinism. It is important to grasp the terminological and semantic contrast 
between psychical determinism [psychischer Determinismus] and psychical freedom 
[psychische Freiheit]. The former clearly implies deterministic causality. It suggests that 
every mental event is strictly caused by preceding events. The latter implicates 
indeterminism and that there could be alternate possibilities. Freud, however, does not 
grant the possibility that something else could have occurred. He insists that “psychical 




Now, let’s turn to the description of free will. In “The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life” (1901), Freud contends that there are no accidental or meaningless acts. 
Every seemingly casual act is entailed by a specific internal cause. Then, Freud 
addresses a possible objection. He notes that people may repel the idea of psychical 
determinism, for they have a feeling of free will. 
 
“Many people, as is well known, contest the assumption of complete psychical determinism 
by appealing to a special feeling of conviction that there is a free will. This feeling of 
conviction exists; and it does not give way before a belief in determinism…. [It is] precisely 
with regard to the unimportant, indifferent decisions that we would like to claim that we 
could have acted otherwise; that we have acted of our free – and unmotivated – will. 
According to our analysis it is not necessary to dispute the right to the feeling of conviction 
of having a free will. If the distinction between conscious and unconscious motivation is 
taken into account, our feeling of conviction informs us that conscious motivation does not 
extend to all our motor decisions… But what is this left free by the one side receives its 
motivation from the other side, from the unconscious; and in this way determination in the 
psychical sphere is still carried out without any gap” (1901, p. 253f). 
 
  
Freud suggests a reason why people tend to hold on to belief in free will. He 
compares two kinds of decisions: important and unimportant choices. When one is 
faced with an “important decision”, there occurs a natural feeling of internal 
compulsion. People often confirm the existence of this compulsion when announcing 
that it is impossible for them to act differently in a given situation. “Here I stand: I can 
do no other”, Freud cites Martin Luther (1901, pp. 253–254). The situation is different, 
however, when it comes to “unimportant” decisions. In these cases, one does not 
experience any compulsion, any necessity to act one way or another. It may seem that 
there appears some “causal gap”. That is, the person does not perceive that there are any 
causes which force them to act any particular way. Therefore, the agent may be tricked 
to believe that they could “have acted otherwise” in that situation. Freud contends, 
however, that causes exist in all types of decisions. This can be seen once we take into 
account all sources of human motivation. Some so called “unimportant” decisions can 
stem from unconscious. Naturally, the person is prone to be oblivious of unconscious 
motivation. But once the unconscious is uncovered, the “gap” can be filled. In fact, 
there has never been any gap. Every act has always been determined. 
Often, interpreters do not go beyond this point. It is common to jump to the 
conclusion that Freud rejects the possibility of free will in toto (Erwin, 2002). I propose, 
however, to be more attentive and specify the type of free will Freud is opposing here.  
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First, the type of free will in question is indeterministic (and therefore 
libertarian).7 For one, Freud cursorily notes that such free will creates some “gap” in the 
deterministic causality. But Freud then objects to any such possibility in reality: the 
“determination in the psychical sphere is … carried out without any gap” (ibid). This 
claim is  reiterated in subsequent texts, e.g., “[i]f anyone makes a breach… in the 
determinism of natural events at a single point, it means that he has thrown overboard 
the whole Weltanschanuung of science” (1916–17, p. 28). In addition, the general 
purpose of the above text is to contend against the possibility of arbitrariness 
[Willkürlichkeit] (i.e., indeterminism) in the mind and human behavior. Before the 
above passage, Freud was arguing that a person was unable to do anything arbitrary: 
e.g., to pick a number or say a nonsense. He starts off the discussion of free will with 
the phrase: “[my] understanding of the determination of apparently arbitrarily selected 
names… may perhaps contribute to the solution of another problem [a feeling of free 
will]” (ibid.). 
Second, the type of free will under consideration entails alternate possibilities. It 
is noted, for example, that in having such free will, one “could have acted otherwise” 
(ibid.). 
Lastly, Freud notes that free will under consideration is unmotivated. Note the 
phrases “of our free – and unmotivated – will” and “what is thus left free by the one 
side receives its motivation from the other side” (ibid). It may be puzzling why Freud 
does not associate free will with motivated behavior. There is a simple explanation. 
First off, one of the pillars of psychoanalysis is the claim that all actions and mental 
events are motivated. If the action is not motivated by conscious process, then the action 
is motivated by unconscious forces. The second point is that Freud establishes a very 
close link between motivation and determinism. Moreover, Freud seems to use these 
terms interchangeably. For instance, he writes: “I demonstrated that a whole number of 
actions which were held to be unmotivated are on the contrary strictly determined…” 
(1906, p. 104f, emphasis added).8 So, in Freud’s terms it is equally acceptable to say 
that an individual was caused, determined or motivated by desire D to act A. But, since 
                                                          
7 As mentioned earlier, all libertarian theories of free will involve some form of indeterminism. 
8 Some suggest that the term “psychical determinism” can be easily substituted for “motivational 
determinism” (Eagle, 2011, p. 42). 
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in the above passage, Freud talks about non-deterministic free will, he thus infers that 
this free will is unmotivated.9 
Let’s make a short summary. It is noteworthy that Freud is directing his verbal 
barbs only at a particular type of free will and standpoint. The closer analysis reveals 
that Freud amounts “free will” and “psychical freedom” to the libertarian type of free 
will, that is, free will that presupposes indeterminism and the ability to do otherwise. It 
is well known that the foundation of psychoanalysis is the concept of psychic 
determinism. Given this, it is natural that Freud opposes any possibility of undetermined 
events or actions.  
2.2.2. A compatibilist free will 
On the eve of the development of the structural model of mind, Freud introduces two 
new freedom-related terms: “freedom” [die Freiheit] and “mental freedom” [seeliche 
Freiheit]. They also seem to be interchangeable, as they occur in the very same paper 
and context (GW 1915a, pp. 319–20; SE 1915b, pp. 168–70). But, most important, they 
hold a different meaning, as opposed to “free will” and “psychical freedom”. The two 
terms are used to characterize the prevalence of conscious mental activity as against the 
unconscious activity.  
To start with, Freud notes that the “transference-love” – which stems from the 
unconscious – “has perhaps a degree less of freedom” than the normal love (1915b, p. 
168).10 Then, Freud goes on to introduce the idea of “mental freedom”. It is said: “[a 
patient] has to acquire the extra piece of mental freedom which distinguishes conscious 
mental activity – in the systematic sense – from unconscious” (1915b, p. 170). This 
sentence is a key. Freud sets forth that “mental freedom” features the operation of 
consciousness. 
Afterwards, we see the reoccurrence of the term “freedom” in 1923. Freud says 
that the therapy should “give the patient’s ego freedom to decide one way or another” 
(1923, p. 50; emphasis in original). 
                                                          
9 Some researchers question how indeterminism can be compatible with motivated and intentional 
behavior. Non-causal theories, for example, assert that a free action does not require any causes at all. On 
this view, beliefs, judgements, desires, or values are not causes. But, if there are no causes preceding – 
and also motivating – the decision, then it is hard to explain how a person forms an intention to do 
anything at all. It may be just a matter of chance or luck (Clarke, 2011). 
10 The normal love is the form of affection that occurs between individuals that hold some sufficient level 
of mental well-being, while the transference-love is a kind of affection that the client experiences towards 
the therapist under the influence of unconscious material.  
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Importantly, we can notice that the term freedom has a similar meaning both in 
1915 and in 1923. In 1915, Freud uses the terms “freedom” and “mental freedom” in the 
context of the “conscious mental activity”. Equally, in 1923, Freud puts the term 
“freedom” in the context of the “ego’s activity”. As we know, the ego is the only 
structure that can initiate and guide the “conscious mental activity”. Thus, there is the 
consistency between 1915 and 1923. In both cases, Freud employs the term “freedom” 
in relation to conscious mental activity. The writings in 1915 seem to have 
foreshadowed the future conceptual revisions that occurred in 1920 upon the 
introduction of the structural model of mind.  
In the late period (texts from 1920–1939), Freud never relinquished the idea of 
mental freedom. On the contrary, he proclaims that the primary goal of the therapy is to 
“free” the ego from various restrictions and to make it more “independent” in its 
operation (1926, p. 205).  
In conclusion, I suggest that the terms “freedom” [die Freiheit] and “mental 
freedom” [seeliche Freiheit] signify a compatibilist type of free will. Specifically, by 
free will we can understand the operation of conscious mental activity. That is, the 
person acts freely insofar as they act on their conscious reasons. By contrast, the agent 
is unfree, if their behavior is the result of unconscious process.  
When we talk about the ego’s freedom, it does not mean that the ego is uncaused. 
The ego is not immune in respect of causal nexus or laws of nature. The ego is a caused 
entity, as everything else in the mind. The only difference from other entities is that the 
ego has a potential to produce conscious and volitional activity. It is noteworthy that 
this kind of free will is compatible with determinism, for determinism does not preclude 
that some human actions can be conscious.     
2.2.3. Free will in different periods 
There is a worry, however, whether free will is consistent with Freud’s theory per se. 
Askay & Farquhar, for example, point out that there is a “clear-cut contradiction” 
between the texts of psychoanalytic theory (metapsychology) and the texts of clinical 
practice (2006, p. 326). The idea of freedom can be present in clinical transcripts, as 
Freud talks about the liberating effect of the therapy. But the psychoanalytic theory (the 
concept of mind) can simply lack the idea of freedom as a theoretical construct. 
To respond to this worry, it is important to refer to different periods of Freud’s 
work. It may be true that the psychoanalytic theory does not contain the idea of 
compatibilist free will in the early or middle periods. But it is tempting to think that 
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psychoanalysis incorporated the idea of compatibilist free will in the late period with the 
introduction of the structural model of mind. 
In “The Ego and the Id”, one of the first texts of the late period, Freud proclaims 
the aim of psychoanalysis. The aim is “to give the patient’s ego freedom to decide one 
way or another” (1923, p. 50). It is worthwhile to pose some questions to understand 
this passage better. Why should the analysis give the ego freedom to do anything? Is the 
ego unfree? If so, under what conditions does it become free?  
It is relevant to outline a few facts about the ego. First, the ego is not the strongest 
structure in the first place. According to the structural model, the ego does not hold its 
own source of energy, and it has to derive energy from the id (1923, p. 25). Second, the 
ego does more work than any other structure in mental apparatus. It has to reconcile 
internal conflicts, ensure the survival, give realistic interpretations, adapt to the external 
world, execute mental functions (e.g., memory, attention), to name but a few. Finally, 
the ego is believed to serve “three tyrannical masters”. Freud holds that the ego serves 
the id, the super-ego and the external world (1933, p. 77). Every “master” wants to have 
their demands met first. The id strives for pleasure. The super-ego casts a vote of moral 
norms. The external world wants the obedience to the rules of environment. Sometimes 
the demands are incompatible and put simultaneously. In this situation, the ego finds 
itself torn and impoverished. All in all, the ego is unfree to a large extent indeed. From 
this, it is comprehensible why the therapy should assist a person to boost the amount of 
their ego’s freedom. 
One can enquire how exactly psychoanalysis can emancipate the ego. In “The 
Question of Lay Analysis”, Freud seems to make an appeal to negative freedom, that is, 
helping a client to achieve freedom from various constraints (1926b). Specifically, the 
therapy educates a client how to break through maladaptive defenses and surmount 
threatening urges. This step should help the ego to restore its active command over the 
behavior. As Freud puts it, “We try to restore the ego, to free it from its restrictions, and 
to give it back the command over the id which it has lost owing to its early repressions. 
It is for this one purpose that we carry out analysis, our whole technique is directed to 
this aim…” (1926b, p. 205; emphasis added). 
In “The Ego and the Id”, Freud proclaims that “psychoanalysis is an instrument to 
enable the ego to achieve a progressive conquest of the id” (1923, p. 56). From 1923 
and afterwards, this view was reiterated invariably virtually in every publication. In “An 
Outline of Psycho-analysis” (1940), the final Freud’s book, published posthumously, 




“The ego is weakened by the internal conflict and we must go to its help… The analytic 
physician and the patient’s weakened ego, … have to band themselves together into a party 
against the enemies, the instinctual demands of the id and the conscientious demands of the 
superego… We form a pact with each other… Our knowledge is… to give the ego back its 
mastery over lost provinces of his mental life” (1940, pp. 173f). 
 
 
In “New Introductory Lectures”, Freud notes that in the course of the therapy the 
patient’s ego gets empowered (1933). The ego increases its perception and enlarges its 
organization. Importantly, it is said that the ego achieves an additional amount of 
independence. It means that the ego gets strengthened in respect of both the super-ego 
and the id. Here, we find the famous dictum: “Where id was, there ego shall be”. As 
Freud writes: “[The psychoanalytic] intention is, indeed, to strengthen the ego, to make 
it more independent of the superego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge its 
organization, so that it can appropriate fresh portions of the id. Where id was, there ego 
shall be” (1933, p. 80).  
In “Analysis Terminable and Interminable”, Freud points out that the therapy does 
not intent to liberate a person from all passions or possible conflicts (1937). The goal is 
rather to bolster the ego so that the person will be prepared to respond to any problem 
consciously, if it ever occurs. “The business of the analysis is to secure the best possible 
psychological conditions for the functions of the ego” (1937, p. 250).  
It is time to make a summary. There can be a worry that a construct of free will is 
alien in respect of Freud’s own theory. I agree that the idea of free will may not be 
distinctly present in all periods of Freud’s work. I argue, however, that the compatibilist 
type of free will became an integral part of Freud’s theorizing in the late period, with 
the development of the structural model of mind. Initially, the ego is impaired and 
submissive with regard to other internal structures of the mind. But the therapy is 
designed to help the person liberate their ego from the influence of other processes,  
strengthen it, make it more autonomous and “give[s] it back the command” over 
behavior (1926b, p. 205). In sum, to the extent that the ego is functioning well, the 
person can enjoy free will. 
2.2.4. The room for choice 
It is worth saying a few words about the meaning of choice-related phrases in Freud’s 
writing. As we remember, Freud uses choice related phrases from time to time. For 
example, Freud says elsewhere that the therapy should “give the patient’s ego freedom 
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to decide one way or another” (1923, p. 50). The usage of choice phrases may look 
baffling, given the fact that Freud is also committed to determinism. Determinism and 
choice can be considered as mutually exclusive phenomena. 
The term choice, however, is a murky and contentious one. It is important to 
emphasize that there is no universally recognized understanding of what it takes to 
choose freely. Honderich makes a comment, which is on target: “We don’t have a single 
settled idea of what has to be true if a choice is to count as free. And our ordinary 
language does not contain such a single idea. The fact of the matter is that “free” and a 
lot of related terms are systematically ambiguous” (2002, p. 112).  
 Incompatibilists, for example, tend to understand free choice as the possibility to 
have “leeway” choice. Leeway choice implies the ability to act otherwise, given the past 
events and laws of nature remain the same. Simply put, the agent should be able to 
choose A to the very same extent as to choose B at time T. Suppose Mr. A decides to 
make a cup of tea. According to the incompatibilist thesis, Mr. A has a choice only if he 
has at least two equally possible alternatives for action at time T. For example, he can 
equally decide to make a cup of tea or decide to make coffee. If Mr. A could do only 
one thing, incompatibilists would argue that Mr. A’s deciding is, in fact, an illusion. 
Since there are no alternatives available, Mr. A could not escape doing what he does.  
Some libertarians argue, however, that free will implies a “torn, leeway” choice. 
In a torn choice, the agent experiences the equipoise of two or more alternatives. That 
is, there are equally good reasons for two or more actions. Because of this, the agent is 
at loss which option to pick, they feel internal conflict of the wills, experience being 
“torn” (uncertain and hesitant) right up to the moment of choice. The agent may say, “I 
have equal reasons to make tea and coffee; I can decide either way, I should just pick” 
(Balaguer, 2012, p. 75; Kane, 1996, p. 130). 
Compatibilists, by contrast, tend to define free choice as the ability to make a 
“definite” choice. A definite choice, broadly speaking, refers to the ability to identify 
one best course of action and fulfil it. Of course, an agent can deliberate, doubt and 
waffle before making a choice. Yet, it is expected that eventually the agent assertively 
determines what they want to do and act intentionally. Think again of our example. Mr. 
A imagines a few options of what he could do, he takes stock of these scenarios, and 
then he decides to make a cup of tea. One may say, “This option is the best in this 
situation, and I do not need any other alternatives” (Dennett, 1984, p. 133; Wolf, 1990, 
p. 55).  
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There is even some evidence that the controversy between compatibilist and 
incompatibilist intuitions has psychological roots. One study, for example, has found 
the link between individual differences and a free will intuition (Feltz & Cokely, 2009). 
Those subjects who possessed a strong extraversion trait were inclined to select 
compatibilist answers to questions about free will, whilst those low in extraversion 
preferred incompatibilists answers. One implication of this research is that it may be 
natural for people to produce different intuitions about free will. Extending these 
findings to our discussion, it may be natural for people to have different perspectives on 
the nature of free choice. The results of this research suggest that, if true, then the 
controversies around the debate of free will could be always intractable. The cause is 
simply psychological. 
Whether there is a psychological cause or not, the point is that the idea of free 
choice can be understood differently by people. If a writer uses the verb “to choose”, it 
does not necessarily mean that he or she refers to an incompatibilist account of choice. 
Relatedly, it is unlikely that Freud understood the ability of choice in the incompatibilist 
sense. At any rate, it is hard to find any unambiguous passage in which Freud would 
declare that he adheres to this vantage point. Hence, we can assume that evidently Freud 
understood the idea of choice in the compatibilist sense. If correct, then it might never 
occur to Freud that the usage of choice phrases could prompt any inconsistency with the 
concept of psychical determinism.  
2.2.5. Freud’s conundrum revisited 
If anybody opens the psychoanalytic corpus, one can get a feeling that Freud was 
extremely inconsistent with regard to the subject of free will. It is easy to notice that in 
some texts Freud directs fire against the possibility of free will, but elsewhere Freud 
seems to recant. Many commentators recognize this as a major paradox of Freud’s 
thought (Meissner, 2003, p. 97; Wallace, 1985, p. 124). Tauber, for example, notes: 
“[The] very structure of Freudian psychoanalysis sits on a deep fault line, namely, the 
paradox of inferred psychic determinism and the governing conviction of choice and 
liberation” (2010, p. 144). Wallwork agrees: “[There] is a paradox that deserves further 
consideration: for, while the drift of Freud’s determinist-sounding statements appears to 
be that all behavior is causally determined in a sense that rules out there being any 
freedom or moral responsibility, the goal of therapy is to augment the patient’s 
decision-making and action-taking freedom” (1991, p. 52). 
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I argue, however, that Freud’s inconsistency is only seeming. We can incriminate 
Freud only an equivocal style of writing, which omits the need to give any definitions of 
the used terminology. A close investigation reveals, however, that there is a discernible 
difference between the terms used by Freud. We can resolve Freud’s conundrum once 
we introduce the distinction between a libertarian and compatibilist types of free will. It 
proves that Freud discards only a libertarian free will in some of his texts, while 
favoring a compatibilist type of free will in other texts. In sum, we can infer that 
Freud’s standpoint on free will is consistent. 
Speaking of Freud’s view on free will on the whole, I can see two options. One 
possibility is that Freud was always a compatibilist in disguise, but he articulated this 
position only in the late period of his theorizing. Another possibility is that Freud 
plotted psychoanalysis initially as a hard determinist project, but then he gradually 
moved towards compatibilism. The idea of compatibilist free will, as I emphasized 
earlier, had distinctly surfaced only with the development of the structural model of 
mind. It is not implausible that Freud recognized the value of the concept of human 
freedom only in the second half of his life.  
This is not the place to examine why this may have happened, as this chapter is 
not entirely committed to historic inquiry. I should just share with the reader one 
educated guess for some further elaboration. One possible reason why Freud veers 
toward the compatibilist kind of free will in the late period of his work could be 
connected to Freud’s collisions with some of his exponents and detractors during this 
time (e.g., Adler, Jung, Pfister, to name just a few). Even some confirmed 
psychoanalysts argued that Freud was advocating a rather dark and pessimistic 
ideology, depreciating any positive features of culture, human nature and religion 
(Pfister, 1928). Freud’s recourse to the idea of the ego’s freedom, choice and moral 
responsibility in the late period of his work may be a certain attempt to counterbalance 





2.3. Towards a theory of free will 
I have started the previous chapter with a premise that Freud never laid out a coherent 
view on free will. But this can be changed. Our first task was to determine whether 
psychoanalysis allowed free will at all. And my argument has been that psychoanalysis 
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is implicitly committed to compatibilism. We can now take it one step further and 
propose a theory of free will for the purposes of psychoanalysis. 
My contention is that psychoanalysis (as well as Rogers’s theory) fundamentally 
leans towards source views on free will. I also suggest that it is worth considering 
Watson’s theory (1975), an identification theory, in this case. Not only will it help us 
with psychoanalysis, but it will also stand us in good stead in respect of Rogers’s 
theory.  
I should start this analysis with Frankfurt’s theory, as it will help us understand 
the advantages of Watson’s approach. And after that, we will move on Watson and 
psychoanalysis. 
 
2.3.1. Frankfurt’s theory 
 
Frankfurt is the author of the first identification (mesh) theory of free will (1971, 
1987), and it makes sense to explain it first, given the fact that Watson suggests his 
approach as an alternative to Frankfurt’s.  
Frankfurt distinguishes two types of desire (first and second order) and two types 
of volition (first and second order) (1971).  
A first-order desire is a desire to do a certain thing. First-order desires may 
concern objects, events, states of affairs or behavior. Suppose Peter desires to go 
travelling (1 first-order desire). Or let’s say Peter desires to finish work earlier today, to 
meet friends and to go to a pub (3 first-order desires).   
A second-order desire is a to desire (or not) to have a certain desire (to have a 
first-order desire). Peter, for example, may desire to have a desire to go out more often. 
In other words, Peter desires to be a person who is more sociable. 
Volition (also will sometimes) is a desire (first-order) that results into action. Note 
that people can have multiple desires at once. One may want to hang out with friends, 
while also wanting to finish some work first. A first-order desire that eventually moves 
the agent to action becomes effective. It becomes one’s will.   
A second-order volition is a desire that a certain desire becomes effective 
(becomes one’s volition). In short, it is a desire to have a certain will. Sometimes people 
may just want to have a certain desire (i.e., a second-order desire) for its own sake, but 
they do not really want this desire to come true. Frankfurt suggests, for example, that a 
physician may want to have a desire for drugs in order to understand his narcotic 
patients better; but he does not really want this desire to result in any real behavior. But, 
frequently enough, people want that their desires lead to real behavior. Peter, for 
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instance, may not only want to desire to go out more often. But he actually wants to act 
on this desire, he wants it to motivate him to action, understanding that it would be good 
for him. 
The concept of second-order volition is the cornerstone of Frankfurt’s theory. For 
a start, a second-order volition is one of the distinctive features of being a person. 
Unlike animals, people can care about what they wish, they can self-reflect and identify 
themselves just with one particular want (to form a second-order volition). Thereby, 
people can navigate (relate or withdraw) their “true-self” in terms of different urges. 
Creatures who are not able to form second-order volitions Frankfurt dubs “wantons”. A 
wanton is indifferent what first-order desire moves them to action. Wantons include 
some animals, infants, people with mental disorders.  
Now turn to freedom. Based on Frankfurt’s theory, we can distinguish between 
freedom of action and freedom of the will. Volition is what we need to have freedom of 
action. When I want something and then can do it – I have freedom of action. This 
resembles, more or less, Hume’s view on “liberty”: “if we choose to remain at rest we 
may; if we choose to move, we also may” (1748, Sec. VIII, Part 1). One important fact 
is that freedom of action is available both to people and animals. 
A second-order volition, however, is what we need for free will. In short, free will 
means to have the will you want to have. Free will requires that we step back from our 
first-order desires, critically reflect on them, identify with one of these desires and then 
form a second-order volition, concluding which of our first-order desires should be 
fulfilled. You can notice that free will involves a certain mesh or conformity: between 
the second-order volition (the desire you want to be effective) and the will (first-order 
desire that is effective).  
Frankfurt gives us a contrast between an unwilling and willing drug addicts. The 
willing addict takes drugs gladly and intentionally. The man enjoys the fact that drugs 
are a part of his life. By contrast, the unwilling addict wants to abstain but takes drugs 
anyway under compulsion. What one really wants to do is to quit, but one fails to cope. 
According to Frankfurt, the willing addict is the only one who acts out of his own free 
will. The fact is that the willing addict has a second-order volition: one has the will one 
wants to have. But it does not happen in the second case. The unwilling addict is unable 
to form a second-order volition: one is moved against one’s will. The agent, essentially, 
experiences two first-order desires: to take drugs (because of addiction) and to abstain. 
Ultimately, the desire to take drugs has the upper hand and becomes effective, as it 
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proves to be much stronger. But it means that the agent does not act of his own free 
will, as he is moved by the desire that he does not want to have. 
Notice that both addicts are unable to do otherwise. In fact, there is only one 
alternative open: to take drugs. This is due to physiological addiction that compels two 
agents to seek a dose.11 In other words, it is inevitable that two agents will take drugs at 
some point. Nonetheless, to Frankfurt, alternate possibilities are irrelevant. The only 
fact that truly matters is whether the agent has the will he wants to have. Even if the 
willing addict was able to act differently, he would still choose drugs. An alternate 
scenario would simply run counter to his will. 
Frankfurt’s account suggests that free will is compatible with determinism. In the 
deterministic world, it is possible that people can do what they want to do (freedom of 
action) and have the will they want to have (free will). It is not to deny, however, that 
sometimes people may fail in this enterprise. But the fact remains: at least sometimes 
people have the power to conform their will and second-order volition and translate this 
into action. 
 
2.3.2. Watson’s theory 
 
Watson suggests an alternative theory, which I find more resonating with Freud 
and Rogers (1975, 1987). Watson shares with Frankfurt the idea that free will requires a 
conformity between certain internal elements of the mind. But Watson rejects the type 
of conformity proposed by Frankfurt. 
One worry that Watson notes is that Frankfurt’s theory stumbles on the problem 
of infinite regress. If it is possible to form second-order desires and volitions, why is not 
it possible to form yet higher orders: third, fourth, fifth and ad infinitum? One might 
want to reflect on one’s second-order desire on a higher level, and thus form a third-
order desire about second-order, or fourth-order about the third-order and so 
indefinitely. Why should the person stop at the second order? What is the special status 
of second order? There is no reason to believe that the second-order desire captures 
one’s “true self” better than the third-order desire. Frankfurt acknowledges this regress 
problem even in his initial paper, pointing out that regress stops when a person decides 
to identify herself with one desire rather than another (1971, p. 16). “Decisive 
commitment” makes it unnecessary to refer to higher orders anymore. Watson points 
                                                          
11 Frankfurt mentions that addicts cannot act otherwise because of addiction (1971). But it is good to 
know that some authors contest the view that addiction is a sort of disorder that fully impairs 
behavioural control and strips people of the ability to do otherwise (Pickard, 2015). 
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out, however, that this decision seems to be ultimately contingent. “It is unhelpful to 
answer that one makes a ‘decisive commitment,’ where this just means that an 
interminable ascent to higher orders is not going to be permitted. This is arbitrary” 
(1975, p. 218).  
One problem is that Frankfurt does not enquire why the agent identifies with one 
desire rather than another. It is hard to understand what type of desire (of what order) 
would truly reflect one’s self and why. This is one of the reasons why Watson decides 
to reject the analysis of orders of desires and moves to the distinction between desires 
and values. 
Watson distinguishes between the motivational and valuational systems. The 
motivational system refers to human motives and desires. The valuational system 
represents the cognitive domain of mind or agent’s reason. It makes judgements about 
the world, categorizes life phenomena based on their worth, and it holds beliefs about 
what ought to be done. As a matter of fact, Watson invokes Plato’s concept of mind, 
which draws a line between Reason and Appetite. 
More needs to be said about the difference between desires and values. Both 
desires and values imply wanting. That is, when people desire or value something, they 
express a want in respect of some object or activity. They try to obtain it. However, 
values embrace both the wanting and the judgement. That is to say, when a person 
values something, they both want this object, and they believe that this object is good. 
Values always incorporate a belief that a certain object is worthwhile. In contrast, 
desires are indifferent in respect of the judgements. A person may desire irrationally or 
desire things that are harmful. “Desires are mute on the question of what is good” 
(1975, p. 208).  
Watson basically suggests that desires and values (or motivational and valuational 
systems) represent two sources of human motivation. Desires reflect things that people 
want to do or to have, while values refer to things that people most want to do or to 
have. 
Sometimes desires and values can coincide. A person can put the value on an 
object that they also desire. For example, one may have a physiological desire to 
breathe, but one can also value breathing because it is a pleasant activity. However, 
desires and values can also diverge. A person may not value something but, 
nonetheless, have a strong desire with regard to it. A celibate, for example, may not 
value sexual intercourse but still have a sexual urge. 
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Turn now to freedom. We can make a contrast between two types of behavior. It 
seems right that people are free if they act on their desires, i.e., when they do what they 
want to do (Hume’s approach). However, Watson argues that this standpoint fails to 
distinguish between intentional actions and free actions. When people do what they 
want to do, they act intentionally (they have “freedom of action” in Frankfurt’s terms). 
Yet, whenever people act intentionally, they do not always act freely. An example 
would be the behavior of kleptomaniacs, people with OCD, drug addicts. Even though 
these agents act intentionally, they obviously lack some considerable extent of control 
over their behavior. 
According to Watson, free will requires the mesh between one’s valuational 
system and motivational system. To put it differently, an action must cohere with one’s 
values. A free agent must be able to judge what they consider to be valuable or good 
and then conform their behavior to their judgements about what is worth doing.  
Accordingly, a person does not act freely, if they are unable to ascribe values to 
life events or do something other than what they value or most want. The valuational 
system can be either undeveloped as in the case of young children or animals, or it can 
be impaired as in the case of some mental disorders. Alternatively, the valuational 
system can be disrupted by the opposing urges of the motivational system, making 
people act contrary to what they value. 
Frankfurt and Watson are unanimous that free will requires some reflective 
evaluation. But Watson’s approach seems to reflect better the process of practical 
judgement. Normally when people think of their actions, they ask, “what is best to do?” 
or “what would be the best course of action” rather than “what desire (first-order) 
should I have and act on?” 
We can also see that Watson’s account sheds some light on why people make a 
“decisive commitment” to a certain course of action. If there is any “identification”, it 
has to do with the work of valuation system. The thing is that values represent a certain 
internal authority for people, which gives a clear command about what is worth doing. 
In Frankfurt’s theory, however, the decision to identify with one second-order volition 
rather than another seems to be an ungrounded or arbitrary choice.  
 
2.3.3. Upgrading Psychoanalysis 
 
There are two main reasons why Watson’s theory might be relevant. First and 
foremost, both Freud and Watson use Plato’s concept of mind. Talking of human mind 
Plato distinguishes between Reason and Appetite. Following this view, Watson 
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distinguishes between valuational and motivational systems. In a similar vein, Freud 
differentiates between the ego and the id. Overall, Freud and Watson concur that human 
behavior can be caused either by reflective or by instinctive parts of the mind. The fact 
that two authors are committed to the same concept of mind gave me the primary 
motivation to refer to Watson’s theory. We cannot find Plato’s concept, for example, in 
Frankfurt’s theory. 
Second, both Freud and Watson associate a free action with the operation of 
Reason. Watson holds that a free action originates from the valuational system. By 
analogy, I have argued that psychoanalysis presupposes that a free action flows from the 
ego. Though Watson and Freud differ in terminology, they share the same view that a 
free action can be initiated only by a reflective part of the mind.     
Though Watson’s theory can be adopted for the needs of psychoanalysis in its 
initial form, I should note that some additions or amendments might be appropriate. 
Watson distinguishes only two systems: motivational and valuational. Freud, by 
contrast, distinguishes three systems: the id, the super-ego and the ego. According to 
Watson, it is the valuational system that makes judgments, attaches values to things and 
categorizes life phenomena. But according to psychoanalysis, both the ego and the 
super-ego can perform these cognitive functions. The difference between the two 
systems is that the ego is based on conscious mental process, while the super-ego is 
predominantly unconscious. A person may not be aware of the values or judgements 
stored in their super-ego. Had they known these values, they might not even have 
considered them as worthy. For many values are learnt in childhood under the influence 
of significant others, and they may be inadequate for a mature and autonomous adult 
life. The ego, by contrast, introduces conscious process in terms of one’s behavior. It 
sheds light on one’s values, their origin and relevance. It makes judgments considering 
the current situation, being open to the new data. If necessary, the ego is able to 
reconsider the old values of the super-ego and adopt new ones.  
Thus, based on psychoanalysis, the valuational system consists of two sub-
systems: the ego and super-ego. Both sub-systems can whisper what is worth doing. But 
according to psychoanalysis, the person should primarily rely on the ego. It is the ego 
that suggests what is really worth doing in a current situation. It refers both to one’s 
learnt beliefs, values of the super-ego and takes into account the realities of the external 
world. Out of this complex pondering, the ego can discover the best course of action. In 
Watson’s terms, it is the ego that helps a person to discover the option which the agent 
would want the most.  
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While instinctive parts of the mind produce various urges, and the unconscious 
parts of the mind generate reasons for a particular action, the ego should remain in 
charge of the final decision. It evaluates the urges, the reasons, the values, the new data, 
and it picks the best option all things considered. Here is what Freud writes about the 
end of the therapy: “and if, having grown independent after the completion of their 
treatment, they decide on their own judgement in favour of …, we feel our conscience 
clear whatever their choice” (1916–17, p. 434). There are two points in this sentence 
which command my attention. First, it is said that a person can “grow independent”. I 
take it that by independence Freud assumes the increase in the power of one’s ego. 
Minimally, a person becomes aware of the origin of their behavior and their motives. At 
most, the ego manages to overcome the bondage of unconscious influences and takes 
command over the behavior. Second, it is said that the client can use their “own 
judgement” when making a choice. It is inviting to think that by judgements Freud 
means specifically conscious judgements; that the agent gets used to leading a 





2.4. Free will in the psychoanalytic therapy 
I have done some exegetic work to adjust the idea of free will in the psychoanalytic 
theory. But psychoanalysis is not just a theory, it is also a therapeutic method. 
Therefore, we need to know not only what the view is, but how it can be reflected in the 
clinical practice. Without this understanding, any interpretation on the matter will be 
incomplete.  
Psychoanalysis can be comprehended as a theory that first and foremost uncovers 
challenges to free will related to the hidden workings of human mind and as a therapy 
that provides methods how to overcome these challenges. 
One of the key challenges to human free will, according to psychoanalysis, is the 
impact of unconscious processes. Some compatibilist theories point out that a person 
acts freely if they act according to some particular desires (Frankfurt, 1971). Other 
theories propose that a person acts freely if they act on their values (Watson, 1975). 
                                                          
12 This argument aligns with the findings of the research in folk intuition. A set of studies examined the 
interrelation between conscious causation and the perception of free will (Shepherd, 2012). Participants 
were prone to judge actions as free, when consciousness controlled decision-making. On the other hand, 
participants were reluctant to ascribe free will and moral responsibility when behavior was caused by 
unconscious processes.  
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Psychoanalysis, however, unveils that people can be either conscious or unconscious 
concerning their desires or values. But unconscious desires or values do not seem to 
manifest real freedom.  
First and foremost, one worry is that the agent can be ignorant of the genealogy of 
their behavior (choices, desires, goals, values). Sometimes when a person makes a 
thoughtful choice, they claim or reassure others that they know well the reasons behind 
their choice. Psychoanalysis, however, suggests that human motives are not always 
transparent. The real motives can be hidden from one’s awareness, being deeply 
suppressed into the realm of unconscious. It follows that an individual may not know 
how and why they come to want what they want. Or they can be simply deluded by 
their defense mechanisms. All in all, it is hard to deem an act free if the real reason for 
the action remains unbeknown.  
According to psychoanalysis, there are minimally two sources which can 
stealthily determine one’s behavior. First, the things that a person wants can be 
preconditioned by environment. A person can automatically replicate the behavior they 
learnt once under the influence of their significant others. If caregivers valued 
aggressive behavior, for instance, a child could learn this attitude and then replicate it in 
the future. Second, a person can blindly reproduce behavior determined by some 
emotional traumas. For instance, a person can act due to some unresolved insults, 
events, experiences undergone in childhood. A soldier, for example, may claim that he 
wants to protect people and peace in the service, but, in reality, he may be motivated by 
the desire to displace his aggressive urges, which exist because of some unresolved 
conflicts with his father.  
Hospers gives a few good examples that illustrate how unconscious can pose a 
threat to human free will (1952). Example 1 describes a person who is preoccupied with 
cleanliness. The man values cleanliness, and he makes a voluntary choice to wash his 
hands regularly. But the problem is that he does not know the real causes of his 
behavior. He does not know about his repressed fears, which fuel his desire to maintain 
order. And he is not aware of the strict rules of his super-ego, which commands him to 
fight with dirt and, thus, constantly wash his hands.  
 
“A man has wash compulsion. He must be constantly washing his hands. Asked why he 
does this, he says… “They feel dirty anyway, I feel better when I wash them”… He “freely 
decides” every time; he feels that he must wash them, he deliberates for a moment perhaps, 
but always ends by washing them. What he does not see, of course, are the invisible wires 
inside him pulling him inevitably to do the thing he does: the infantile id-wish concerns 
preoccupation with dirt, the superego charges him with this, and the terrified ego must 
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respond, “No, I don’t like dirt, see how clean I like to be, look how I wash my hands!” 
(1952, p. 566). 
 
 
Example 2 describes a woman who is picking a new boyfriend. She has 
alternatives: some men are kind, while others are mean. But the woman eventually 
decides to date a mean man. On the face of it, the woman seems to act freely. Her 
choice is willing and deliberate. Nobody compels her. But, on another level, this woman 
does not seem to be free at all. One pitfall in this case is that this woman is not aware of 
the real hidden motives of her choice. She is not aware what unconscious urges drive 
her into valuing a mean man over a kind man. Because of this, she acts blindly and 
automatically. Another downside is that this woman is deluded. If asked, she can report 
reasons for her choice. But not knowing her real motivation, she cannot report the real 
reasons for her choice.  
 
“A woman has married and divorced several husbands. Now she is faced with the choice for 
the next marriage: shall she marry Mr. A [normal, well-adjusted, kind], or Mr. B [leech, 
impostor], or nobody at all? She may take considerable time to “decide” this question, and 
her decision may appear as a final triumph of her free will. Consciously, she will of course 
“give the matter due consideration”…To the psychoanalyst all this is irrelevant chaff in the 
wind – only a camouflage for the inner workings about which she knows nothing 
consciously. If she is a certain kind of masochistic strain, as exhibited in her previous set of 
symptoms, she must choose B: her superego, always out to maximize the torment in the 
situation, …, compels her to make the choice she does, and even to conceal the real basis of 
the choice behind an elaborate façade of rationalizations” (1952, p. 565).  
 
 
Psychoanalysis, however, does not only reveal the challenges to human freedom. 
Properly understood, it also points the way how people can acquire their freedom of the 
will.  
One recipe offered by psychoanalysis is that people should insert consciousness in 
their behavior as a necessary and intermediate variable. Many people who lie on the 
couch for the first time can be influenced by various unconscious processes, such as the 
impact of the id, super-ego and defense mechanisms. A psychoanalytic method, 
nonetheless, intends to help people enhance the operation of their conscious mind and 
notice when automatic or unintentional behavior start to take over. Note the phrase: “[a 
patient] has to acquire the extra piece of mental freedom” [jenes Mehr von seelischer 
Freiheit zu erwerben] (GW 10, 1915a, pp. 319–20; SE 12 1915b, p. 170, emphasis 
added). This quest for freedom implies taking the plunge into self-understanding, 
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excavating the truths people usually do not want to know about themselves, analyzing 
the ins and outs of one’s decision-making, retrieving some painful memories concerning 
one’s past relationships, and even discovering hostile feelings to those one claims to 
love. Though the therapy may be tough and challenging, it is designed to help and be 
rewarding at the end of the day. Ideally, the agent becomes more self-aware, realizes the 
genealogy of their wanting and potentially starts a more mindful way of life. 
It seems implausible that human behavior can become influence-free. But the 
determinants of human behavior can be exposed to light. People can reduce the degree 
of blindness of their choices and automaticity of their actions. They can critically 
examine what they want and why they come to want it. Thus, people can become more 
self-aware and free in their life overall. Psychoanalysis, on its part, represents one of the 






In this Chapter, I have argued that psychoanalysis leaves a door ajar for free will after 
all. I pointed out that Freud had used different terms related to freedom and did not 
make a negative case for all of them (see § 2.2.). I gave suggested that psychoanalysis 
rejects only a libertarian type of free will, while remaining open to a compatibilist type 
of free will. Freud clearly urged scepticism concerning a libertarian kind of freedom, 
which presupposed any indeterminism in human mind or behavior. Freud’s 
compatibilist understanding of free will implies that the agent acts freely insofar as the 
agent acts consciously. 
One good way to make sense of Freud’s view on free will would be to refer to 
Watson’s mesh theory (see § 2.3.). Watson argues that the agent acts freely if there is a 
conformity between their valuational system and behavior. I interpret that essentially 
psychoanalysis implies a very similar thought. Freud could have said that the one acted 
freely if there was a conformity between the ego and one’s final behavior. 
The compatibilist interpretation allows us to overcome the constraints of two 
previous readings. Unlike the hard determinist reading, we have now a coherent 
position, which can explain how Freud can endorse both determinism and moral 
responsibility (and free will). Unlike the libertarian reading, we have much more textual 
and direct evidence which points that Freud maintains a compatibilist understanding of 
free will rather than libertarian. Anyhow, the ideas of determinism and free choice are 
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present in the psychoanalytic theory, but neither the hard determinist nor libertarian 
interpretations allow us to preserve both ideas. While the hard determinist reading turns 
back on the possibility of free will at all (not to mention that it disregards moral 
responsibility), the libertarian interpretation invalidates the status of determinism. By 
contrast, the compatibilist reading enables us to bring about a smooth rapprochement 
between determinism and free will. 
Hopefully this chapter gives us a chance to eye psychoanalysis from a rather 
unconventional angle. There is a widespread conviction that Freud’s theory promotes a 
rather passive and pessimistic ideology. A person seems to be regarded as an 
unfortunate victim of the past or as a powerless puppet of unconscious drives. 
Nonetheless, the things are not as straightforward as it is widely believed. A closer 
inspection indicates that Freud’s psychoanalytic theory is implicitly committed to the 
existence of free will.  
Moreover, properly understood, psychoanalysis represents one of the methods 
how people can foster their free and moral behavior in ordinary life. One of the main 
goals of the psychoanalyst is to coach clients to recognize the unconscious underpinning 
of their behavior, which may originate from childhood or previous relationships, and to 
make choices consciously (see § 2.4.). 
I should note, just for the record, that I leave one argument against a compatibilist 
interpretation of psychoanalysis outstanding. In the defense of his libertarian reading, 
Wallwork affirms that compatibilism fails to give a satisfactory account for how people 
can be morally responsible for their actions in the deterministic world. I will respond to 
this argument in due time in Chapter 7 after covering all necessary themes. 
The next chapter stays the course and moves on to free will in Rogers’s theory. 
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It is commonly accepted that Freud and Rogers promote rather opposing views on free 
will. But is that really so? 
Rogers is well-known as an adamant advocate of freedom in psychotherapy and 
psychology overall (Demorest, 2014). By extension it is generally accepted that Rogers 
also believes in the existence of free will (Fairholm, 2012).  
Although there can be no doubt that Rogers is committed to various freedom-
related ideas that are common in a democratic society, there can be serious concerns 
whether Rogers’s theory maintains the concept of free will. Rogers employs a rather 
loose term “freedom” in his writing, which does not necessarily designate the concept 
of free will. Some interpreters take it, for example, that Rogers’s term “freedom” 
implies the idea of “autonomy” in the context of education (Abinun, 1975). Among 
other things, Rogers paid much attention to the question of liberal reform in the field of 
education, which intended to give students more opportunities to be proactive and 
participate in their learning process (Rogers, 1969). Rogers’s term “freedom” in this 
context can be interpreted as the idea of “negative freedom”, viz., freedom from various 
obstacles in the form of rules or prohibitions, which students encounter in schools and 
universities. However, elsewhere Rogers declares himself that by “freedom” he 
understands primarily the experience of freedom (1964). Though people can live in the 
deterministic world, they still can have the experience of freedom and benefit from it. 
But the experience of freedom is again a different notion, as compared to the concept of 
free will. Paradoxically, in our encounter with Rogers we face the very same problem 
which we had in the case of Freud – it is not obvious at all that the author is committed 
to the existence of free will.  
The primary aim of this chapter is to reveal whether Rogers’s theory supports the 
existence of free will at all. My argument will be that not only is the client-centered 
theory committed to compatibilism, but Rogers and Freud maintain basically identical 
views on free will.  
In § 3.2., I investigate whether Rogers believes in free will at all. The difficulty of 
understanding Rogers’s position is connected to the fact that Rogers tends to conflate 
distinct freedom-related themes. I discover that Rogers’s loose term “freedom” veils at 
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least three distinct subjects: negative freedom, the experience of freedom and free will. 
The section concludes that Rogers supports a compatibilist thesis and understands free 
will as a voluntary, personal choice. In § 3.3., I argue that Rogers’s perspective 
fundamentally relates to hierarchical views on free will. Just as in the case of Freud, one 
good way to make sense of Rogers’s standpoint would be to refer to Watson’s mesh 
theory (1975). In § 3.4., I explain how the idea of free will (aka personal choice) can be 





3.2. A compatibilist reading of Rogers 
Rogers is the author of the so-called client-centred (also sometimes called person-
centred) psychotherapy and one of the founders of the humanistic school of personality 
psychology (Barrett-Lennard, 1998). Rogers was at the forefront of the so-called Third 
Force, the movement that sprang up during the 1960s as a démarche against two the 
most influential schools of personality psychology at that time: psychoanalysis and 
behaviourism (Maslow, 1962). Both psychoanalysis and behaviourism painted rather 
pessimistic pictures of human nature. Psychoanalysis, on the one hand, lays stress on 
the irrational and unconscious components of human mind, suggesting that people are 
the puppets of instinctive and unconscious forces. Behaviourism, on the other hand, 
puts emphasis on the environmental influence on human behavior, arguing that people 
do only what environment once determined them to do. Ideologically, the Third Force 
includes humanistic, phenomenological, existential and cognitive theories of personality 
and psychotherapy. In all these theories, it is possible to find a certain protest against the 
pessimistic view on human nature and support of the idea of human freedom. In the 
early 1960s, Rogers makes a counter-declaration in response to behaviourism and 
psychoanalysis, proclaiming that psychology needs to adopt a new “philosophy of 
man”: “Man has long felt himself to be but a puppet in life – molded by economic 
forces, by unconscious forces, by environmental forces … But he is firmly setting forth 
a new declaration of independence. He is discarding the alibis of unfreedom” (1963, p. 
89). 
Rogers, however, tends to lump together a few distinct freedom-related topics, 
which complicates the interpretation of his theory. The thing is that Rogers uses only 
one broad term “freedom” whenever he talks of any freedom-related question. A 
consequence is that the theme of freedom becomes extremely blurred, and it is hard to 
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grasp whether there is any a room for free will in Rogers’s theory at all. My contention 
is that Rogers’s broad term freedom touches at least three distinct subjects: negative 
freedom, the experience of freedom and free will.  
3.2.1. Negative freedom 
The first sense of the term freedom used by Rogers refers to the idea of positive and 
negative freedom. The distinction between these two types of freedom can be traced 
back to Kant (1785), but it received careful examination by Berlin (1969). 
Negative freedom is often described as “freedom from” or “passive freedom”. It 
means the absence of constraints, impediments, compulsions, pressure from outside or 
manipulation. Negative freedom can be provided by other individuals (parents, teachers, 
counsellors, government), nature (laws of nature), circumstances (situation) etc. To a 
certain degree the negative freedom of every person is limited. For every person 
inevitably faces a number of constraints produced by social rules or various laws. It is 
forbidden, for example, to drive on footways. 
Positive freedom is often characterized as “freedom to”. It means having the 
resources or the means to perform a certain action. Simply put, it is the ability to do 
something or the ability to achieve a certain goal. Positive freedom may involve any 
type of resource: mental capacities, time, knowledge, material goods, money, tools etc.  
Sometimes the agent may lack one of the types of freedom. Suppose Anna wants 
to bake a cake. She has a lot of negative freedom, since nobody or nothing stands in her 
way to cook. But she lacks positive freedom, as she does not know the recipe, which 
would instruct her what to do. Another example would be a liberal, wanting to 
participate in the political life of a totalitarian state. The man has a great deal of positive 
freedom, as he has necessary knowledge, education and time to do politics. But the man 
does not have any negative freedom, as the totalitarian state prohibits citizens to express 
and propagate liberal beliefs.  
It can be noticed that Rogers refers to negative freedom in the context of 
psychotherapy. In talking of the therapeutic relationship, Rogers mentions that a 
counsellor should give the client “the freedom to experience his own feelings and those 
of others without being threatened in doing so” (Rogers et al., 1989, p. 181). To put it 
differently, service users should not face any constraints to experience their complex 
feelings during the therapy.  
Rogers also mentions negative freedom when he talks about the conditions which 
could foster creativity in people. As he says: “When a teacher, parent, therapist, or other 
67 
 
facilitating person permits the individual a complete freedom of symbolic expression, 
creativity is fostered. The permissiveness gives the individual complete freedom to 
think, to feel, to be, whatever is most inward within himself” (1961, p. 358). Again, in 
these sentences freedom is understood as freedom from some external restraints. Rogers 
argues that creativity can be nourished only if the individual does not face any external 
barriers and thus is free to move in any direction they want. 
Finally, Rogers refers to both negative and positive freedom when he addresses 
the subject of education. Rogers argues that the values of democracy, such as freedom, 
are often ignored in schools. Students do not take part in choosing their curriculum or 
type of working. Teachers often cannot choose their educational policy. Rogers 
summarizes: “While being taught that freedom and responsibility are the glorious 
features of our democracy, students are experiencing themselves as powerless, as 
having little freedom, and as having no opportunity to exercise choice” (Rogers et al., 
1989, p. 325). This passage suggests that students lack both negative and positive 
freedom. They are not free in the negative sense as they face rules, which prohibit them 
to participate actively in their educational life. And they are not free in the positive 
sense, since they do not have sufficient resources (economic, political, psychological) to 
make a change. As the result, they find themselves powerless.  
There is no doubt that psychotherapy can and should facilitate both negative and 
positive freedoms. A client can become free from their obsessions, neurotic symptoms 
and adverse patterns of behavior. Equally, one can obtain mental resources to achieve 
one’s objectives and lead a desired and good life. 
We should also know, however, that negative and positive freedoms do not 
designate free will. These are relatively distinct concepts. One may have negative 
freedom (e.g., be free of external threat), but it does not mean that one also has free will 
(e.g., leeway choice).  
Indeed, negative and positive freedom may be considered as necessary elements 
of free will. The negative element of free will refers to the absence of external obstacles 
and internal compulsions. The positive element of free will means that the agent has a 
certain ability to act freely (e.g., the ability to choose). However, more frequently, the 
negative and positive freedom appear outside the context of free will. They tend to 
occur in the discussion of politics, economics, democracy, human rights and justice 
(Bavetta et al., 2014; Pettit, 2014). Negative freedom is associated with the liberation 
from the dominance, rule, oppression, customs, traditions or delusions. Positive 
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freedom relates to the access to economic, social and political resources to pursue one’s 
goals. 
3.2.2. The sense of freedom 
The second sense of the term “freedom” used by Rogers refers to the idea of the 
experience of freedom. In the paper “Freedom and Commitment”, Rogers proclaims 
unambiguously that he is interested in the impact of the sense of freedom on people 
(1964).  
Rogers acknowledges the findings of behaviourism concerning the experiments 
on behavioural control and admits that human behavior is fully determined (1961, p. 
192). This situation begs a natural question: “How exactly can people be free?” “What 
kind of freedom can be compatible with determinism” Rogers then proposes to define 
freedom as the experience: 
 
“[T]he freedom that I am talking about is essentially an inner thing, something which exists 
in the living person quite aside from any of the outward choices of alternatives which we so 
often think of as constituting freedom. It is the realization that “I can live…by my own 
choice”…[W]e are first of all speaking of something phenomenological rather than 
objective, but nonetheless to be prized” (1964, p. 63; emphasis added).  
 
 
Rogers points out that there is no contradiction between the experience of freedom 
and determinism. People can live in the deterministic world but still acquire and 
cultivate the experience of freedom. As he puts it: “this experience of freedom… exists 
not as a contradiction of the picture of the picture of the… universe as a sequence of 
cause and effect, but as a complement to such universe” (1964, p. 63). 
To be more exact, Rogers associates the experience of freedom with the sense of 
choice. Here is how he describes the experience of freedom: “It is the realization that “I 
can live myself, here and now, by my own choice” (1964, p. 63). 
Rogers points out that his view is very close to the standpoint of Viktor Frankl 
(1969, p. 268).13 Frankl, being a psychiatrist, one of the founders of the existential 
school of psychotherapy and a Holocaust survivor, was one of the first psychologists 
                                                          
13 There are good reasons to think that Frankl was committed to compatibilism (1965, p. 54; 1978, p. 47; 
1986, p. 75). Frankl points out, for example, that determinism can be well compatible with free choice: 
“Regarding the problem of free choice, it [interdisciplinary research] prevents us from denying, on the 
one hand, the deterministic and mechanistic aspects of the human reality, or on the other hand, the human 
freedom to transcend them. This freedom is not denied by determinism but rather by what I am used to 
calling pan-determinism [it appears that Frankl means hard determinism here]. In other words, the 
alternatives really are pan-determinism versus determinism, rather than determinism versus 
indeterminism” (1978, p. 48). 
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who described a rewarding effect of the sense of freedom. It is noteworthy that Frankl – 
like Rogers – tends to associate the experience of freedom with the sense of choice. The 
basic idea is that a person can be robbed of choice alternatives in the external world, be 
compelled to do something, but one can preserve the ability to choose one’s attitude to 
this adverse situation. Frankl argues that the experience of internal freedom was one the 
main factors that helped him and other prisoners to survive a concentration camp 
(1959). As he depicts it:  
 
“Man can preserve a vestige of spiritual freedom, of independence of mind, even in such 
terrible conditions of psychic and physical stress. We who lived in concentration camps can 
remember the men who walked through the huts comforting others, giving away their last 
piece of bread. They may have been few in number, but they offer sufficient proof that 
everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms—to 
choose one's attitude” (1959, p. 74f). 
 
 
At the moment, we can neither confirm nor debunk that the experience of freedom 
includes the sense of choice. The thing is that currently there is no general agreement 
concerning what the experience of free will (or the sense of freedom) consists of.14 But 
we do not need to dive into this question deeply, as we are primarily concerned with 
free will rather than with phenomenology of freedom. 
There are a few reasons that supposedly motivated Rogers to pay attention to the 
sense of freedom. First off, Rogers, as a phenomenologist and humanist, was disposed a 
priori to attach great value to any human experience. Second, Rogers came to realize at 
some point that the sense of freedom could exert a positive effect on mental health of 
people and therapeutic work. As he puts it: “I would be at a loss to explain the positive 
change which can occur in psychotherapy if I had to omit the importance of a sense of 
free and responsible choice on the part of my clients. I believe that the experience of 
freedom to choose is one of the deepest elements underlying change” (1964, p. 62). 
                                                          
14 There are two distinct groups of views to the phenomenology of free will. The attribute view posits 
that there is a certain extra positive experience associated with free will (Deery et al., 2013; Horgan & 
Timmons, 2011; Nahmias et al., 2004). This extra experience notifies an agent of an act being free, while 
the absence of such experience signals of unfree action (e.g., acts fulfilled under compulsion). There are 
four candidates for a phenomenological token, or “attribute” of free will (Nahmias et al., 2004; Paglieri, 
2013). These are (1) the sense of alternate possibilities (aka being ability to do otherwise), (2) the sense of 
causation (aka authorship), (3) the sense of agency (aka control), (4) and the sense of choice. By contrast, 
the default view objects that the experience of free will contains any extra distinguishing sense (Paglieri, 
2013). The default view argues that the feeling of free will is simply an ordinary continuous cluster of 
senses, unless there is a sense of coercion. So, to feel free an agent just should not experience coercion. 
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Rogers shares his observation that as the therapy progresses the service users gradually 
move from feeling controlled towards feeling free (in Kirschenbaum, 1989, p. 83).  
We cannot currently bear out the assumption that the sense of freedom has a 
considerable positive impact, as today there is a modicum of studies that investigate the 
experience of freedom per se. But it is safe to talk about the positive outcomes 
connected to the belief in free will (Baumeister & Monroe, 2014). It is vastly 
documented that attenuating the belief in free will leads to various negative 
consequences, such as undermined sense of agency (Lynn et al., 2014), increased self-
alienation (Seto & Hicks, 2016), decrease in counterfactual thinking (Alquist et al., 
2014), decrease in perceived meaningfulness of life (Crescioni et al., 2015), reduction 
of helpfulness and increase in aggression (Baumeister et al., 2009), to name just a few. 
One research, for example, indicates that the belief in free will is related to taking 
autonomous actions (Alquist et. al., 2013). Experiments show that disbelievers in free 
will were significantly more apt to conform, while those who espoused free will belief 
inclined towards autonomy. Researchers conclude that a disbelief in free will 
discourage people to think for themselves, which results in mindless going along with 
the group. In contrast, the belief in free will elevates the motivation for autonomous 
contemplation. Free will believers were willing to exert mental effort, be creative and 
thus depart from the norms and opinions of others.15  
In view of these findings, it seems appropriate to know how to acquire and 
reinforce the belief in free will during psychotherapy (Young, 2016). 
It should be noted, however, that the experience or belief in freedom does not 
guarantee that people have free will in reality. A person can believe in free will or even 
have a strong experience of freedom, but one can lack any capacity of free will in the 
meantime. The beliefs and experiences are not always veridical and can be misleading. 
The sense of freedom may delude a person concerning the abilities they might have or 
not. For example, a person may believe or feel that they can do otherwise, but it can be 
an illusion (Caruso, 2012; Wegner, 2002). An example would be people who believe 
                                                          
15 Some research on belief in free will must be interpreted with caution. Some studies may be flawed, as 
researchers in some experiments appear not only to undermine the belief in free will, but also induce the 
belief in fatalism (Miles, 2013). It is important to distinguish between determinism and fatalism. Fatalism 
implies that the event will happen anyway, no matter what the person does. Human choices, essentially, 
make no difference, as the outcome will be the same. Determinism, on the other hand, posits that events 
are caused by preceding events. The future is the natural outcome of specific sequence of events that 
happened earlier. This suggests that human choices do make the difference under determinism, as each 
choice will lead to a unique outcome.  
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that they have initiated some action consciously, while, in fact, the action was triggered 
off by some unconscious mechanisms preceding conscious awareness (Libet, 1999). 
I also hear an echo of Wallwork’s remark that if psychotherapy induces only the 
belief or feeling of freedom (no matter how useful it is), but it does not provide any real 
free will, this could be a highly cynical attitude towards the client (1991, p. 81).16 
3.2.3. Free will  
I argue, however, that the third sense of the term “freedom” used by Rogers refers to the 
concept of free will.  
First off, discussing the theme of freedom Rogers sometimes addresses the 
question of interrelation between “freedom” and “determinism”, which hints that 
Rogers is interested in the metaphysical discussion of free will. For example, Rogers 
points out that determinism embraces “every thought, feeling, and action”, and, thus, 
from this point of view, there is “no such thing as freedom” (1961, p. 192).  Rogers 
does not seem to be concerned, in this context, with the question whether people can 
have the experience of freedom or negative freedom. It is more plausible that Rogers 
raises the question whether people can have any true free will, provided determinism is 
true. 
Second, Rogers consistently employs a phrase “freedom to choose” (1961, pp. 
164, 181, 216, 390, 391, 392). On the one hand, the ability to make a choice is often 
associated with free will in the philosophical literature (Timpe, 2017). On the other 
hand, when talking about “freedom to choose”, Rogers once notes that “It has to do with 
the age-old issue of “free will” (Rogers et al., 1989, p. 417). This seems to be the only 
case when Rogers uses the term “free will” at all. 
The theme of choice emerges regularly and explicitly throughout Rogers’s 
writing. For example, Rogers proclaims: “I have come to place a high value on 
personal, subjective choice. My experience in psychotherapy confirms … that such 
choice, made openly by an individual … is highly significant” (1989, p. 267). 
The term “choice” has quite nebulous borders, however, as we remember. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2 on Freud, people may understand the nature of free choice 
differently. Our task, therefore, is to determine what kind of choice Rogers has in mind.  
                                                          
16 Some can probably disagree with Wallwork’s remark about cynicism. I suppose that illusionists can 
respond that it would be far better to live with the illusory belief in free will, rather than without it. 
Illusionism is a view that free will does not exist, but we should maintain the illusion of free will, as 
disenchanting would lead to severe consequences for society (Smilansky, 2000).  
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There are all reasons to think that Rogers is committed to a compatibilist 
understanding of choice rather than to a libertarian choice. First, Rogers never mentions 
that he is committed to any form of indeterminism, which is a necessary condition for a 
leeway choice presupposed by libertarianism. Second, Rogers declares himself that he 
supports the thesis of “complete determinism” in his research and therapeutic practice. 
As he puts it: “[A]s we enter this field of psychotherapy with objective research 
methods, we are, like any other scientists, committed to a complete determinism. From 
this point of view every thought, feeling, and action of the client is determined by what 
preceded it” (1961, p. 192; emphasis added). Third, Rogers points out elsewhere that he 
does not regard a choice and determinism as conflicting and mutually exclusive 
phenomena. As he says: “I have even come to see that freedom of choice is not 
necessarily antithetical to the determinism” (1953, p. 306). Lastly, Rogers helpfully 
notes that even when a person makes a free choice, this choice remains determined. As 
he writes: “The fully functioning person… freely, and voluntary chooses and wills that 
which is absolutely determined” (1961, p. 193; emphasis added).  
Our second step is to identify in virtue of what Rogers considers the choice as 
free. Rogers provides the most explicit explanation of how he understands a free choice 
in the section called “A New Perspective on Freedom and Determinism” (1961, p. 192). 
According to this section, a free choice includes two characteristics: a) the agent finds 
this choice as “the most deeply satisfying”, and b) and the agent is able to fulfil this 
choice. Simply put, people act freely provided they can fulfil the most appealing course 
of action. Accordingly, a choice is unfree if people act contrary to their desires, or if 
they are unable to translate their desires into action.  
To understand this contrast, Rogers proposes to consider the distinction between 
two types of people: a healthy individual (a “fully functioning person”) and an 
unhealthy individual (a “defensively organized individual”): 
 
 “[The fully functioning person] wills or chooses to follow the course of action which …will 
be most deeply satisfying. But this is the same course of action which from another vantage 
point may be said to be determined by all the factors in the existential situation… [A 
defensively organized person] wills or chooses to follow a given course of action, but finds 
that he cannot behave in the fashion that he chooses. He is determined by the factors in the 
existential situation, but these factors include his defensiveness, his denial or distortion of 
some of the relevant data. Hence it is certain that his behavior will be less than fully 
satisfying. His behavior is determined, but he is not free to make an effective choice…” 





The point is that the unfree person cannot do what he really wants, he cannot 
realize his choice. He “wills or chooses to follow a given course of action” (ibid.), 
however, he is unable to commit the action physically. The choice does not fall in line 
with one’s behavior. One makes a try, but his neurotic defenses stand in a way and 
prevent the action.  
It is reminiscent of Frankfurt’s example of two drug addicts (1971). Frankfurt 
makes a comparison between a willing addict and unwilling one. Both addicts live in 
the same determined world, and they are determined to act in particular ways. However, 
there is a certain discrepancy between these two individuals in terms of free will. The 
willing addict takes drugs voluntary, whereas the unwilling addict succumbs to drugs 
unwillingly because he is addicted and acts under compulsion. The unwilling addict 
desperately wants to quit, but he is unable to stop. The pull of the drug is utterly strong. 
Every time the addiction precludes to withstand. Frankfurt concludes that although the 
unwilling addict acts fundamentally on one of his own desires, he does not act out of his 
free will. His will is crippled and paralyzed. One is unable to fulfil his true paramount 
desire to quit drugs.  
Both Rogers and Frankfurt make a very similar point. Both the defensively 
organised individual and the unwilling addict are unable to act the way they truly desire. 





3.3. Towards a theory of free will  
It would be premature, however, to form our impression of Rogers’s view. Rogers 
appears to fail to include all necessary information concerning the nature of a free 
choice in the section that draws a line between the defensively organized individual and 
fully functioning person (1961, p. 192).  
As it stands, the most apparent but false option would be to relate Rogers’s view 
to classical compatibilism (also known as the minimalist view on free will). The 
minimalist view holds that free will is the ability to do what one wants to do without 
encumbrance. The agent does not have free will if the agent is unable to perform a 
desirable action because of some internal or external impediments in their way or 
because they are forced to act contrary to their will. The minimalist account of free will 
involves both negative and positive aspects of freedom. The positive freedom 
presupposes that the agent has the power to do what they wish to do. The negative 
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freedom implies that the agent acts in the absence of any impediments or compulsions 
in their way. According to the minimalist view, free will is well compatible with 
determinism. There is no doubt that at least sometimes people can act unimpeded and 
do what they wish to do in the deterministic world. Therefore, people can be both 
determined and act freely. The agent can, of course, contemplate about hypothetical 
alternate possibilities. That is, one can perform a conditional analysis of the situation 
and one’s actions. For example, one can think: “I could have acted otherwise, if 
something was different (my desires, knowledge, or environmental situation)” 
(Grünbaum, 2013, p. 87f; Mill, 1865, p. 285). The minimalist view is basically the first 
compatibilist view on free will. It can be found in the works of Hobbes, Hume and 
Edwards. For example, Hume defines liberty [free will] as “a power of acting or not 
acting, according to the determination of the will: that is, if we choose to remain at rest, 
we may; if we choose to move, we also may… This hypothetical liberty is universally 
allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains” (1748, Seci. VIII, 
Part 1).  
It is very inviting to infer that Rogers’s view relates to classical compatibilism. To 
Rogers, the agent acts freely when they can act on the option which they find the most 
“satisfying”, even though this option can be said to be absolutely determined. Rogers 
also points out that free will is violated if the agent encounters some obstacles on their 
way, which impede their free action (1961, p. 193). Taken together, Rogers seems to 
amount free will to the action on one’s desire without encumbrance.  
Though it is very tempting to relate Rogers’s view to classical compatibilism, it 
would be a false way to go. I argue that Rogers’s position, fundamentally, seems to 
relate to hierarchical views on free will.  
Hierarchical (mesh) theories belong to the second generation of the theories of 
free will, and they overcome the limitations which are common for the minimalist view. 
One limitation of the minimalist view is that it fails to explain how human agency 
differs from animal agency. Some animals can also act unencumbered and do what they 
wish to. But we do not consider animals as morally responsible agents. That is, unlike 
people, we neither blame nor praise animals for what they do or wish to do. Another 
shortcoming is that the minimalist view does not explain how the agency of a healthy 
individual differs from the agency of a neurotic individual. A person suffering from a 
mental disorder can sometimes do what they want to do and act unencumbered. But 
again, we do not ordinarily consider a neurotic or a psychotic person as a free or 
morally responsible agent. To overcome these constraints, mesh theories relate free will 
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to some characteristic human cognitive abilities, which can be absent among animals or 
crippled among psychotic individuals. For example, some abilities enable people to 
reflect on alternative paths in the future, to be aware of moral implications of one’s 
choices, to form a hierarchy of desires or to resist some unacceptable urges.  
Rogers, in fact, supports the view that there should be some characteristic human 
abilities that make free will possible. It is worth taking a closer look at the phrase “the 
most deeply satisfying choice”. As mentioned earlier, Rogers holds that a free choice 
should be “the most deeply satisfying” for the person (1961, p. 192). The problem is 
that Rogers does not explain this phrase at all in the section related to free will. Given 
this, it can be tempting to think that Rogers simply means that free will requires a 
voluntary action without encumbrance. But after examining all Rogers’s corpus, we can 
discover that the phrase “the most deeply satisfying choice” contains much more 
meaning. 
Rogers returns to the idea of the most satisfying behavior when he describes the 
characteristics of people who complete the therapy (1961, p. 118). It is noted that not 
every choice can be the most deeply satisfying. People tend to face a wide range of 
alternatives every day. Shall I have a cup of tea or have a cocktail? Shall I go out or stay 
in? Shall I walk or take a bus? According to Rogers, people often fail to determine the 
option which they would find as the most deeply satisfying for them. Then Rogers 
suggests that one good way to detect the best option is to refer to one’s organism and 
learn to trust it.  
If we examine closely this process of reference to one’s organism, we can notice 
that this evaluative process involves a range of special human cognitive and experiential 
capacities: 
 
“To the extent that this person is open to all of his experience, he has access to all of the 
available data in the situation, on which to base his behavior. He has knowledge of his own 
feelings and impulses, which are often complex and contradictory. He is freely able to sense 
the social demands, from the relatively rigid social "laws" to the desires of friends and 
family. He has access to his memories of similar situations, and the consequences of 
different behaviors in those situations. He has a relatively accurate perception of this 
external situation in all of its complexity... He is better able to permit … his conscious 
thought participating, to consider, weigh and balance each stimulus, need, and demand ... 
Out of this complex weighing and balancing he is able to discover that course of action 
which seems to come closest to satisfying all his needs in the situation, long-range as well as 





The distinguishing feature of the aforesaid paragraph is that it mentions a few 
abilities which mesh theories would regard as characteristic human abilities that are 
necessary for free will. The main point made by Rogers above is that the person needs 
to engage in a complex thinking process in order to detect the choice which would count 
as the most deeply satisfying. This thinking process includes, in particular, the 
participation of “conscious thought”, “weighing and balancing” impulses and social 
rules, being responsive to “social demands” and understanding the “consequences of 
different behaviors” (ibid.). Out of this complex deliberation, the person can discover 
what would be the most satisfying course of action at a given situation.  
When Rogers talks about this complex internal process of deliberation, he 
apparently refers to the concept of organismic valuing process. In Rogers’s theory, the 
organismic valuing process is an inborn internal mechanism that evaluates human 
experiences and detects which things are good for the organism and which are not 
(1959, 1961). As he puts it: “[Using the organismic valuing process] we аrе able to test 
objects and events in terms of our own experiencing and саn gauge the values they have 
for enhancing us оr for being destructive in our experience” (in Kirschenbaum, 1989, p. 
120). The organismic valuing process, for example, can inform that loud sounds, bitter 
tastes, sexual abuse should be avoided, for these things can cause physical and mental 
discomfort. By extension the organismic valuing process is apparently used to detect 
“the most deeply satisfying” choice.  
Curiously, we can again refer to Watson’s theory to make sense of the view under 
consideration (1975). As discussed earlier, Watson distinguishes between motivational 
and valuational systems. While the motivational system produces various urges and 
behavior, the valuational system generates analysis of the situation and identifies what 
is really worth doing. A free action requires the match between what one most wants to 
do (the valuational system) and how one acts (the motivational system). Rogers appears 
to be after the same kind of view. He does not relate free will to the action on some urge 
or desire that could be produced by the organism (aka motivational system). Free will, 
instead, requires the realization of the “most deeply satisfying” want (aka what one 
most wants), which can be identified by the complex reasoning or by the organismic 
valuing process (aka the valuational system). To put it differently, the agent acts freely 
if there is a mesh between the agent’s valutional system (judgements about what is 
valuable and ought to be done) and motivational system (desire and behavior). 
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The analysis of the last two chapters shows that there is much in common 
between Freud and Rogers.17 Both authors maintain a compatibilist thesis. Both 
associate free will with rational choosing. More importantly, two perspectives can 





3.4. Free will in the Rogerian therapy  
Since Rogers’s theory is not just a theory, but it is also a therapeutic practice, it is 
relevant to say a few words about how the idea of free will can be implemented in 
Rogerian counselling practice. It is also possible to illustrate, thereby, that the concept 
of free will is not something extraneous, but it has a tangible and central role in 
Rogerian therapy. 
Rogers’s therapeutic process pivots around the idea of personal choice (viz., free 
will). First, the therapy facilitates a client to recognize that they make a choice at every 
turn of their life. This can be perceived in the form: “It is up to me what I do next”, “I 
am the one who chooses”. 
Second, the therapy helps the person realize that they can make choices that 
would be the most deeply satisfying to them. Often people make choices that bring only 
some contentment, but they are not totally enjoyable. A maladjusted individual often 
focuses on immediate gratification of their basic needs and fails to consider alternatives 
which would satisfy their needs in the long run.   
It is not easy to make the most satisfying choice, though. The person can be 
bewildered by different options. Even if the agent thinks well before deciding, there is 
no guarantee that they will not make a mistake. The therapist, thus, explains that it is 
normal to make mistakes. People are in no way infallible creatures. And one should not 
be discouraged by this fact. It may take time before the person gets the hang of how to 
make the most satisfying choices swiftly. The more one practices, the easier it gets. 
Additionally, the therapist explains that mistakes are correctable. The more the person is 
open to their experiences, the quicker they can detect the choice that is in error. After 
that, they can make all necessary corrections and adjustments in their behavior. 
                                                          
17 Rogers’s and Freud’s views seem to dovetail more or less with folk intuition of free will. One research 
shows, for example, that laypeople associate belief in free will with making choices (Feldman et al., 
2014). It was also found that the stronger people believed in free will, the more they enjoyed and valued 
their ability to make choices. 
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Finally, the therapy makes it clear that every person makes one fundamental life 
choice: a) to be oneself (to be one’s real self), or b) to be someone else (to wear a 
mask). Many people conform to some external criteria and standards because of intense 
social pressure. For example, plenty of women and men have plastic surgeries in order 
to approach a standard of beauty created and propagated by popular culture. Many want 
to look like celebrities, movie stars and top models. In other words, they decide to 
become someone else; to be someone who is approved and adored by society. The 
downside of this situation is that the person often ends up alienated from their own 
individuality. The person is concerned only with the question what they should be: how 
they must feel, look, behave and think in order to fit in and please others. In this quest 
for approval, the agent, however, often ignores what their real self is: their own 
experiences, talents and genuine desires. Ultimately, the agent can come to feel that 
they do not have individuality at all. Their existence comes down to the goal to get 
approval, to meet the expectations and demands of others. 
In contrast, Rogers’s therapy promotes the philosophy of self-direction, the choice 
to be oneself (1961, pp. 108, 111, 114, 358). One of the goals of the therapy is to help 
people to “become themselves”. This means that the individual drops social masks, 
imposed desires and reconnects with their real convictions, wishes and experiences, 
which hide underneath. As Rogers puts it: “It seems to me that at bottom each person is 
asking, "Who am I, really? How can I get in touch with this real self, underlying all my 
surface behavior? How can I become myself?" (1961, p. 108). 
I take it that, from Rogers’s perspective, the choice to “become oneself” facilitates 
or underlies the ability to make “the most deeply satisfying” choices in one’s ordinary 
life. We can deduce that the main reason why a person experiences a free choice as the 
most deeply satisfying is chiefly because the agent expresses their real self in this 
choice. The choice becomes the most deeply satisfying simply because the agent acts 
according to their true desires, genuine experiences, true beliefs and gratifies their own 
needs. Rogers confirms this thought in the following passage: “Less and less does [the 
healthy individual] look to others for approval or disapproval; for standards to live by... 
He recognizes that it rests within himself to choose; that the only question which 
matters is, "Am I living in a way which is deeply satisfying to me; and which truly 
expresses me?" (1961, p. 119). 
The choice to become “someone else”, by contrast, may impede the process of 
making “the most deeply satisfying” choices. If the agent chooses to be someone else, 
conforming to the crowd or significant others, they run the risk disconnecting from their 
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own genuine needs and desires. Subsequently, the agent may find it hard to make a 
choice which would be the most deeply satisfying for them. The main reason is that the 
agent is not trying to gratify their real needs, which are brushed under the carpet. As the 
result, the agent makes choices which might bring some pleasure indeed, but which 
could not be judged as the most deeply satisfying.  
As the therapy progresses, the person gradually recognizes that they have the right 
to be themselves. They have the power to reject the common roles, drop deceptive 
fronts and lay aside social masks. They are not compelled to do what others want them 
to do. They come to a new realization that they can choose their own way. As an 
example, we can consider an excerpt of Rogers’s interview with one of his clients. A 
young woman reveals that she tends to wear a certain mask in her interactions. She is 
not pleased with it and wonders what her real self is.  
 
“I was thinking about this business of standards. I somehow developed a sort of knack, I 
guess, of-well-habit-of trying to make people feel at ease around me, or to make things go 
along smoothly. There always had to be some appeaser around, being sorta the oil that 
soothed the waters. At a small meeting, or a little party, or something -I could help things go 
along nicely and appear to be having a good time... In other words I just wasn't ever-I mean, 
I didn't find myself ever being set and definite about things... I just didn't stand up for my 
own convictions, until I don't know whether I have any convictions to stand up for. I haven't 
been really honestly being myself, or actually knowing what my real self is, and I've been 
just playing a sort of false role” (1961, p. 109). 
 
 
Over the therapy people can become more knowledgeable of themselves, their 
needs and feelings. They can become more confident to stand up for their judgements 
and convictions. They can discover the values close to them and choose the meaning 
toward which they wish to move. One can pay less attention whether others approve or 
disapprove of what they do, and one can become more attentive to their own evaluations 
and judgements. Was this choice the most satisfying to me? Have I done something that 
reflects my own thoughts? In sum, the people can become more their “isness”, their 
“uniqueness” and “potentiality” (Rogers & Stevens, 1967, p. 48f). Thereby, the agent 
manages to transcend to some degree the standards and demands imposed on them by 
environment: by significant others, social groups and culture overall.  
The realization that one can choose to be oneself, however, can be a terrifying 
experience. Often the reason is that some people associate conformity with safety. The 
agent does what others do, and, thus, does not risk being disapproved. The agent also 
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gets support from those who direct them. And one can always displace the sense of 
personal responsibility, blaming others for their orders and false guidance.  
In conclusion, I should capture in a few words the process of the therapy itself. 
Essentially, Rogers’s therapy belongs to indirect therapies. This means that the therapist 
does not instruct the client what to do and how to do it. This also means that the 
therapist does not say what choice would be the most deeply satisfying. The therapist 
simply cannot know this, as this information is highly idiosyncratic. Only the clients 
themselves can discover what they should do listening closely to their own experiences.  
The therapist, however, intends to create a safe and facilitating environment. It is 
suggested that people can move towards themselves only if they feel absolutely secure. 
The therapist, thus, creates the climate of unconditional acceptance, which would avoid 
any hint of external pressure and critical judgement. The therapist also facilitates the 
client in their search for their personal choice. One can help to shed the light on the 
options the client observes or complex feelings the client experiences. But the therapist 
does not push or pull the client in any direction. Even if the therapist understands that 
the client does not make a sound choice, one should not intervene or prevent it. If the 
therapist interferes, they virtually do not allow the client to exercise fully their freedom 
to choose, which the therapist aims to nurture in the client in the first place. We will 






It is widely believed that Rogers promotes the idea of freedom and free will. However, 
it is not apparent at all that Rogers is committed to the concept of free will. For one, 
Rogers declares himself that he is interested primarily in the theme of the experience of 
freedom. Though Rogers does not really disclose the theme of free will, I have argued 
that Rogers’s theory has deep commitment to the compatibilist thesis of free will.  
Rogers’s broad term “freedom” has minimally three distinct senses: negative 
freedom, the experience of freedom and free will (see § 3.2.). Free will, in particular, is 
denoted by the phrase “freedom to choose”. On Rogers’s view, free will is understood 
as the ability to make the most satisfying choice. We have also revealed that the idea of 




The central pillar of Roger’s view is the idea of “the most deeply satisfying” 
choice. Not every act on desire can be the most satisfying. To identify the most deeply 
satisfying course of action, one needs to engage in complex contemplation and 
evaluation of the situation. I infer that, as in the case of Freud, one good way how to 
make sense of Rogers’s view would be to refer to Watson’s mesh theory (see § 3.3.). 
Essentially, a free action requires the engagement of thinking process which helps to 
identify not only what the person wants, but what one most wants. 
I have argued that Rogerian therapy represents another method how people can 
acquire and enhance their free will (see § 3.4.). On the one hand, Rogerian therapy 
trains clients to make choices on one’s own rather than let others decide for them and to 
conform. On the other hand, this kind of therapy helps individuals to distinguish 
between their various internal and social motives and recognize their real wants.  
The last two chapters suggest that Freud and Rogers, in fact, have very similar 
views on free will, and these views even can be easily blended together. In fact, we have 
already partly reached one of the goals of the thesis, which concerns the integrative 
project. By adopting Watson’s theory, not only can we make Freud’s and Rogers’s 
views more explicit, consistent and robust, which seems essential for a coherent 
personality theory and transparent psychotherapy, but we can also achieve full 
theoretical integration between two theories with regard to free will. 
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The previous chapters have largely focused on the theoretical questions; trying to 
determine the meaning of free will and its place in the therapies of Freud and Rogers. 
But more needs to be said about the instrumental value of free will in psychotherapy. 
What are the benefits of choosing?  
Rogers notes elsewhere that the act of choice (aka free will) is highly 
“significant”. As he writes: “I have come to place a high value on personal, subjective 
choice. My experience in psychotherapy confirms me in the belief that such choice, 
made openly by an individual … is highly significant” (1989, p. 267). By way of 
example Rogers cites the case of his work with a patient who laboured under 
schizophrenia and remained inert for a long period of treatment (1964, p. 62). One day 
this patient noticed some recovered patients leaving the hospital. He remained silent for 
the rest of the session, but as he was leaving the room, he uttered, “If some of them can 
do it, maybe I can too” (ibid.). According to Rogers, this phrase reflected essentially a 
statement of personal choice: the man made a decision to work on his own 
improvement. Reportedly, after a while this patient demonstrated a considerable 
therapeutic progress and was eventually discharged.  
One way to understand this remark is to suggest that the capacity of free will 
(understood as rational choosing in Rogers’s and Freud’s terms) can be conducive to 
mental well-being and psychotherapy. The main limitation of Rogers’s argument about 
the significance of choice, however, is that it is based mainly on Rogers’s subjective 
observations from his own therapeutic work, which can be false. Rogers does not 
provide empirical evidence that there is a direct causal link between the act of choice 
and any positive outcome. Even if the client had demonstrated any progress during the 
therapy, as Rogers reported, we had no guarantee that this outcome had been caused by 
the act of personal choice. It could have been anything. 
The objective of this chapter is to examine Rogers’s observation about the 
significance of choosing. More precisely, I aim to establish whether choosing (aka the 
exercise of free will) can have any positive impact on human welfare.  
In § 4.2., I review some studies on the impact of personal choice on human 
agency. The section reveals that there is much documented evidence that the act of 
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choice predicts many positive outcomes, such as increased intrinsic motivation, better 
task performance and enhanced mental well-being. In § 4.3., I overview the studies 
which reveal the negative effects related to choosing. Some studies suggest that the 
benefits of choice fade away once the choice becomes more complex and emotionally 
laden. The overview suggests that though the provision of choice generally results in 
positive reactions, there are some exceptions, and therefore it can be beneficial to 
restrict choice under certain conditions. In § 4.4., I investigate Skinner’s argument 
against Rogers’s position about the merit of choosing. Skinner contends that social 
thriving can be achieved under complete external control over people as opposed to 
letting individuals make personal choices, which are often wrong and debilitating. I 
argue that though some external control is desirable and unavoidable, establishing total 
control is unlikely to guarantee social welfare. The main worry is that if people had to 
surrender personal choice, there would be a risk of losing positive mental implications 





4.2. The value of choice  
Intuitively it rings true that choice has a positive impact on one’s mental health. Choice 
is what enables people to approach to what they want and thus feel satisfaction from 
meeting one’s needs and desires. It also allows to be in control by directing one’s life in 
the desired direction and to make positive changes if necessary.  
More importantly, the assumption about the value of choosing can draw support 
from empirical research. It was consistently found that individuals afforded even small 
choices exhibited dramatic increase in motivation, adjustment, task performance, 
positive emotions and mental health; whereas those deprived of choices demonstrate the 
decrement in engagement, performance, life satisfaction and mental well-being 
(Cordova & Lepper, 1996; deCharms, 1977a; Dember, Galinsky, & Warm, 1992; Isard 
& Szalma, 2015; Langer, 1975; Langer & Rodin, 1976; Ryan & Deci, 2017; Stotland & 
Blumenthal, 1964; Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, & Deci, 1978). What is more, even the 
provision of illusion of choice proved to predict positive outcomes, such enhanced 




To shed light on some details, it makes sense to start with the seminal work of 
DeCharms on the concept of personal causation. 18 DeCharms suggested that the sense 
of personal causation represented a continuum, which consisted of the origin and the 
pawn experiences at the ends (1968). First, it was suggested that origins and pawns had 
different degrees of the sense of personal causation. Origins have relatively strong sense 
of personal causation: they feel themselves as causes that bring about the action, 
achieve a desired outcome and change environment. It is the feeling that “I have 
originated the behavior” (1977a, p. 444f). Pawns, by contrast, have comparatively little 
or no sense of personal causation: they experience their behavior being determined by 
external factors, circumstances or other people. “[A] Pawn is a person who perceives his 
behavior as determined by external forces beyond his control” (1968, p. 273f). Second, 
it was suggested that origins and pawns differed in the sense of personal choice. Origins 
feel that they make choices, they feel that they can steer their life by their own will. As 
DeCharm states, “An Origin is a person who perceives his behavior as determined by 
his own choosing…” (1968, p. 273f). And elsewhere: “An Origin … is a person who 
feels that he directs his own life, that what he does is the result of free choice” (1977b, 
p. 297). Pawns, in contrast, have an impaired sense of personal choice and control. They 
experience that what they do is imposed on them. “When people feel like pawns, they 
feel pushed around, they feel that they are puppets and someone else pulls the strings” 
(1977a, p. 444f).  
It would be erroneous to think that people have always either origin or pawn 
experience. The experience of origin can fluctuate depending on circumstances. As 
DeCharm puts it: “A person feels more like an Origin under some circumstances and 
more like a Pawn under others” (1968, p. 274). For example, having to await a delayed 
flight an individual is likely to feel as a pawn. Although nobody can always stay as an 
origin or a pawn, people can spend more time in one of the states. Some people prefer 
wearing a pawn’s glasses most of the time of their life, whereas others cultivate the 
origin’s outlook as their personal philosophy.   
DeCharm’s main proposal was that personal causation represented a 
“motivational propensity”. This means that people are generally motivated to 
experience personal causation, that a normal person “strives to be a causal agent, to be 
                                                          
18 The term “personal causation” can be traced back to Heider (1958). Heider proposed that behavior 
could be perceived either as personally caused (intentional) or impersonally caused (nonintentional). 
Personal causation is marked by the experience of intentionality and control regarding one’s behavior and 
the outcome. Impersonal causation, by contrast, refers to the lack of initiation, motivation, and control 
over one’s behavior. 
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the primary locus of, causation for, or the origin of, his behavior; he strives for personal 
causation” (1968, p. 269).  
In 1967, DeCharm started a longitudinal school study to lend weight to his 
conjecture (1976). The premises of this study were: (a) a pupil should be motivated to 
learn and to achieve; (b) motivation can be enhanced by the feeling of personal 
causation; (c) it is better to have the origin experience than the pawn experience; (d) 
origin and pawn experiences are acquired, not inherited. The conjecture of the study 
was that the increase in the origin experience would boost motivation and achievements 
among pupils. The procedure was as follows. First, a group of teachers underwent a 
week-long personal causation training before the start of the academic year. The 
teachers were instructed to implement the acquired techniques in the work with their 
pupils during the whole year. Second, researchers collected motivation and achievement 
measures among the pupils prior to the start of the study. The research followed two 
groups of pupils during three years of study (from fifth till eights grade). The first group 
of pupils was subjected to an ordinary curriculum. The second group was exposed to the 
methods of personal causation. For example, as one of the methods, the origin teachers 
advocated the idea of personal choice. In order to become an Origin a person must make 
choices. However, very rarely do pupils have a choice in their school life. As a rule, 
pupils do what curriculum demands them to do. Besides, teachers, ordinary, do not 
consider it as their duty to give choices to their pupils. By contrast, the origin teachers 
were instructed to make choices available as far as it was possible. A teacher started off 
with some small choices. For example, it could have been a choice between two home 
assignments. However, there were some reservations. The choices should be (a) 
between at least two options, (b) simple, (c) personal, (d) within the strength of the 
pupil, and (e) be satisfactory for the goals of the module (teacher) (deCharms, 1977b, p. 
299). Thus, teachers did not let pupils do everything they wanted. Too many choices, 
for instance, could equally be a problem. A pupil can feel lost or overwhelmed, which 
might result in the pawn feeling. Later on, pupils were encouraged to propose 
alternatives themselves. The method of choice was considered meaningful in several 
respects. For one, having a choice a person feels some personal influence and value. 
Additionally, the possibility of choice prompts to think about the future outcome. A 
person understands that whatever their choice is they will be held accountable for the 
consequences. DeCharms suggests that the origin students engage in the so-called “plan 
– choose – act – take responsibility” sequence. Throughout the study various measures 
were regularly collected. One measure was the Origin-Pawn survey. The second 
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measure was the academic achievement test. The results of the study were as follows. 
First, the trained pupils increased consistently on the Origin measure, while non-trained 
pupils did not display any change. The trained pupils also reported a positive climate 
change in the classroom. Second, the trained pupils demonstrated a significant increase 
in academic achievements, as compared to the control group. Prior to the start of the 
study the achievements of the pupils of the fifth grade in this school were behind 
national grade norms by one half year. The decline continued in the control group. By 
the eighth grade non-trained pupils were falling further behind by one year. Yet, the 
downstream trend was reversed in the experimental group. The trained pupils displayed 
high scores on academic tests. Performance soared invariably throughout three years of 
the study. Class attendance was also enhanced. The results confirmed the initial 
conjecture. The experiments illustrated that the pupils in the origin condition achieved a 
considerable increase in academic performance and learning motivation. This suggests 
that the experience of personal causation exerts a substantial impact on behavior and 
motivation. In addition, the experiment provides some evidence that personal causation 
is an acquired experience. It was shown that the style of teaching affected greatly how 
students felt. Offering and encouraging choice, in particular, fostered the feeling of 
origin-ship. 
Subsequent research lent support and development to these findings. The work of 
DeCharms was subsequently incorporated in the Self-determination theory (SDT) by 
Ryan & Deci (2017). SDT has, however, different terminology and distinguishes 
between autonomous behavior (aka origin) and controlled behavior (aka pawn).19  
 The main development is that Ryan & Deci have suggested that personal 
causation is not just a motivational propensity as DeCharms assumed, but it is a 
psychological need, which they call the need for autonomy.20 As the authors put it: 
“People have a psychological need to feel like an origin in order to function effectively 
and to remain healthy” (2017, p. 67). The need for autonomy “describes the need of 
                                                          
19 Autonomous actions are experienced as volitional, self-endorsed, and freely chosen. Autonomous 
actions are congruent to what one wants or values. Additionally, when autonomous, people feel 
ownership and self-regulation over their actions (2017, p. 86). “[B]ehaviors are experienced as emanating 
from, and an expression of, one’s self” (2017, p. 14). Autonomy is contrasted with heteronomy (or 
control). When heteronomous (controlled), people feel their behavior as externally controlled, coerced, 
induced, or manipulated. Heteronomous actions are also experienced as alien with regard to the person’s 
self. The reasons one acts a certain way is because of some external or internal pressure. People feel that 
“the source for the initiation and regulation of their actions is external to the self [that]… they merely 
comply with forces that are pressuring them” (2017, p. 97). 
20 SDT holds that there are three universal psychological needs: the need for competence, autonomy, and 
relatedness (Ryan & Deci, 2017). It is suggested that human mental health depends on the level of the 
satisfaction of each of these needs. 
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individuals to experience self-endorsement and ownership of their actions – to be self-
regulating” (2017, p. 86). There were some good reasons to reconsider the idea of 
personal causation as a need. It was found that experience of personal causation affected 
not only motivation but mental well-being on the whole. This suggests that failure to 
satisfy the need for autonomy results in various ill-being outcomes, such as anxiety, 
depression and impoverished functioning. The satisfaction of the need for autonomy, on 
the other hand, is predictive of life satisfaction, vitality and general thriving.  
A set of studies, for example, examined the relationship between autonomy need 
satisfaction and psychological well-being in sports (Bartholomew et al., 2011). The 
conjectures of this research were the following: (h1) the perception of autonomy-
supportive behavior is associated with autonomy need satisfaction; (h2) the perception 
of controlling behavior is associated with autonomy need thwarting; (h3) the autonomy 
need satisfaction predicts psychological well-being; (h4) the autonomy need thwarting 
predicts diminished psychological functioning. The study examined the relationship 
between athletes’ perception of coach behavior, need satisfaction and mental health. As 
indicators of mental health, researchers considered eating disorders, depression and 
vitality. Athletes were asked to complete a set of questionnaires, which assessed (1) 
athletes’ perception of their coaches’ autonomy supportive behavior (e.g., “My coach 
gives me choices and alternatives”); (2) athletes’ perception of their coaches’ 
controlling behavior (e.g., “My coach intimidates me into doing things he/she finds 
necessary”); (3) autonomy need satisfaction (e.g., “I have a choice in what I do”); (4) 
autonomy need thwarting (e.g., “I feel forced to do the things I do”); (5) eating 
disorders; (6) depression. The findings were as follows. First, the perception of 
autonomy-supportive behavior correlated with autonomy need satisfaction, whereas the 
perception of controlling behavior predicted need thwarting (h1 and h2). Second, 
vitality correlated positively only with autonomy need satisfaction, while depression 
and eating disorders were associated only with autonomy need thwarting (h3 and h4). In 
summary, the results of this research lend weight to SDT’s main assumption. The 
satisfaction of the need for autonomy indeed predicts psychological wellness, while 
autonomy need thwarting is associated with abnormal or maladaptive outcomes. 
Another study investigated the link between autonomy satisfaction and well-being 
of nursing-home residents (Kasser & Ryan, 1999). The elderly residents were instructed 
to rate the perception of autonomy support provided by the staff, family and friends. 
After that the participants responded to questionnaires, which assessed their 
psychological health. It was found that perceived autonomy support was associated with 
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various positive outcomes. Perceived autonomy support positively correlated with 
vitality, subjective wellness and life satisfaction. It was also negatively associated with 
mortality and depression.  
A longitudinal research surveyed the link between autonomy satisfaction and 
wellness of students in two different law school over three years (Sheldon & Krieger, 
2007). Students at both schools diminished in need satisfaction and psychological 
wellness over a three year span. Yet, the decline was not equal. Students were asked to 
report on the level of autonomy support in their faculties. Students who reported greater 
autonomy support demonstrated a less radical decrease in need satisfaction. In turn, 
these students showed higher subjective well-being, better academic performance and 
enhanced motivation to pursue a career in law after graduation. By contrast, students 
who perceived their school as more controlling exhibited a more serious decline in need 
satisfaction. As expected, these students demonstrated diminished well-being, poorer 
graded performance and reduced career motivation.  
Rogers’s theory appears to square perfectly with the work of DeCharm and SDT. 
First, the distinction between an origin (autonomous behavior) and a pawn (controlled 
behavior) seems to be close to Rogers. As he puts it elsewhere: “Unless as individuals 
and groups we choose to relinquish our capacity of subjective choice, we will always 
remain persons, not simply pawns” (Rogers & Skinner, 1956, p. 1064). I take it that by 
“persons” Rogers might mean the idea of being an “origin”, that is, the agent who 
aspires to make personal choices. Second, all mentioned authors make the same 
supposition that a free (autonomous) action predicts a positive outcome for agency and 
mental health. 
Importantly, we can fill an empirical and evidential gap in Rogers’s theory that 
choosing exerts a beneficial impact on people. If the findings of SDT are correct, then 
people basically gratify their psychological need for autonomy whenever they manage 
to make a choice they wish to make. The role of clinicians, in this context, is to create 
conditions so that it becomes habitual for clients to make personal choices inside and 





4.3. The burden of choice 
It would be a mistake, however, to associate choice solely with favourable implications. 
A growing body of research reveals that as a choice involves psychological distress, the 
89 
 
positive impact of choosing diminishes and even obtains a detrimental effect (Botti & 
Iyengar, 2006). This suggests that the provision of choice could thwart mental well-
being sometimes. The available studies highlight three major detriments of choice: 
preference uncertainty, negative emotions and numerous options. 
 
Choice types Description Outcomes 
 
Hesitant choices There are several equally 
attractive options 
 
Hesitation, choice deferral  




Overloaded choices An increased amount of 
options 





The first detriment of choice is preference uncertainty. This means that the agent 
faces a choice situation without having any robust preference what option actually to 
choose. Paradoxically, choice between a few attractive options can be extremely 
difficult. There are compelling advantages to select each option, but it is possible to 
pick just one. A number of studies suggest that preference uncertainty leads to choice 
deferral (Greenleaf & Lehmann, 1995; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). That is, when people 
are in two minds, they simply decide not to choose. One reason is that the agents want 
to conduct some further search of information about the offered alternatives, to make 
trade-offs or to identify some third superior alternative. 
A series of studies, for example, examined the relationship between preference 
uncertainty and decision-making (Dhar, 1997). The research predicted that preference 
would result in choice deferral. Participants were presented with four choice sets with 
different composition. The first set included only single appealing option (control 
condition). The second and the third sets consisted of several equally appealing options. 
And the fourth set involved both attractive and inferior options. Participants were 
informed that they could both pick the option they want or to defer a choice in order to 
wait for new alternatives. It was found that choice deferral increased significantly when 
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subjects had to choose from among two equally attractive alternatives. Subjects, by 
contrast, were willing to make a definite choice when they easily identified a single 
attractive option as opposed to others. Consistent with the initial conjecture, the 
research shows that people tend to defer choice if they have to deal with a few equally 
attractive alternatives. This also suggests that it is possible to manipulate human 
decision-making. By adding a comparatively attractive option to the choice set one can 
increase the tendency to defer a choice. On the other hand, by adding an inferior option 
it is possible to decrease the desire to delay a decision.  
The second detriment of choice is negative emotions. It has been suggested that 
the benefit from choosing depends much on decision-making context (Botti & Lyengar, 
2004). When faced with appealing options, choosers are disposed to feel much 
satisfaction. Partly choosers understand that the offered set of options fits their 
preferences and can gratify their needs. They also imagine the desirable outcome, 
ponder the advantages of alternatives and thus entertain a lot of positive thoughts. Non-
choosers, on the other hand, find themselves in worse place under the same conditions. 
Minimally, they do not engage in positive thoughts connected to favourable alternatives 
and outcomes. However, this situation runs the other way around when we have the 
negative context. When confronted with aversive options, choosers end up dissatisfied 
and even frustrated. One reason is that choosers need to think of disadvantages of 
options, which enhances rather unpleasant experience connected to choosing. 
Conversely, non-choosers prove to be safer and better off under the same negative 
conditions. Non-choosers simply escape psychological discomfort of thinking about 
drawbacks of the situation and avoid the need to select any aversive alternative.  
In testing this assumption, the study examined the link between choosing 
satisfaction and different decision-making contexts (Botti & Lyengar, 2004). Research 
predicted that the satisfaction from personal choosing would be associated only with 
choices made from appealing options. Participants were assigned to different choice 
conditions. Preferred choice condition was composed of four delicious dishes. Non-
preferred choice condition consisted of four more or less detestable dishes. Choice 
condition meant that participants could select dishes on their own. And in no-choice 
condition participants imagined others choosing the dish for themselves. After being 
assigned to a particular scenario, participants were asked to complete questionnaires to 
rate their satisfaction with the scenario and outcome. The findings were as follows. 
First, when faced with both attractive and unattractive options, participants prefer 
making their own choices as opposed to having others choose for them. This confirms a 
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common view that people strive for self-made choices rather than foreign-made choices 
(externally imposed). Moreover, individuals would prefer making a personal choice 
even when having a selection of unattractive options. Second, choosers predict higher 
satisfaction with the outcome of their own choice, as compared to the outcome of choice 
made by others. Participants anticipated, in particular, that they would be much happier 
if they chose pasta for themselves as opposed to the scenario when their roommates 
picked pasta dish for them. Third, choosers proved to be more satisfied with the 
outcome than non-choosers only when they were selecting from attractive options 
(preferred choice condition). However, choosers proved to be less satisfied than non-
choosers when they had to pick from among undesirable alternatives (non-preferred 
choice condition). The findings confirmed the initial conjecture. Satisfaction from 
choosing proved to be restricted to choices made from the set of appealing options. 
Other studies found that, when faced aversive options, people experienced 
psychological distress and preferred to avoid making decisions (Beattie et al., 1994). 
Participants were asked to imagine the following situation. Suppose you have twins 
who will die without a bone marrow transplant. But you can save only one child, as 
there is only one transplant, and you need to decide who gets the procedure. 51 out of 
62 participants indicated that they would like to relinquish decision and let others decide 
(e.g., fate). Some commented that this would be the worst choice possible, and they did 
not want to have to choose. The factors that averted decision seeking were guilt, regret 
and psychological pain. 
The third detriment of choice is increased number of options (Iyengar & Lepper, 
2000). Roughly speaking, when having too many options, people find it difficult to 
digest information, sift through the options, and they become paralyzed by the choice 
dilemmas.  
One classical study examined the link between the number of choice options and 
consumer decision making (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). The experiment was conducted in 
a grocery store and involved the display of jams. Researchers set up two tables: the first 
table had six flavours of jam (limited-choice condition), whereas the second table had 
24 varieties of the same jam brand (extensive-choice condition). The tables were 
changed hourly to diminish time-of-day effect. The shoppers could try as many samples 
as they wanted, they were given one dollar off coupon, and they could purchase the jam 
they liked afterwards. The experiment revealed two findings. First, the large display of 
jams attracted more customers (60%) than the small display (40%). Second, shoppers in 
the limited-choice condition, however, bought much more jam (30%) than shoppers in 
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the extensive-condition (only 3%). The findings suggested that a small and large set of 
options had a different impact on subsequent motivation of people. Even though a large 
set of options proves to be more enticing, customers fail to purchase the product 
subsequently. But when exposed to a limited array of choices, customers turn out to be 
much more eager to make a purchase. This suggested that there was such thing as “too 
much choice”, which could undermine human motivation to make a subsequent action. 
A similar study examined the link between the number of 401(k) retirement plans 
and the decision of employees to invest in 401(k) retirement plans (Iyengar et al., 2004). 
Employees were presented either with a set of 10 or 30 options. Consistent with the 
earlier findings, the research revealed that the participant rate was much higher when 
employees were presented with a limited plan options. As the number of saving plans 
increased, the rate of participation declined.  
Taken on the whole, expanded choices are associated with the following negative 
outcomes. First, with the increase of options people tend to defer decision or opt not to 
choose (Dhar, 1997; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). It is explained by the fact that it becomes 
harder to identify the most attractive option in the set which would have the highest 
value. Second, people feel less satisfied with their decisions if they had to deal with 
extensive choice set (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz et al., 2002). One reason is that 
the agent can fixate on the past, thinking of “what could have been if”, and feel regret 
and even self-blame towards forgone options. Third, as set of options enlarges, people 
are prone to apply simplified decision-making strategies, such as selecting the default 
option (Johnson et al., 1993), using elimination strategies (Timmermans, 1993), picking 
simple and less risky options (Iyengar & Kamenica, 2010). One general explanation is 
that the increase of alternatives leads to the increase of information to be processed. 
People, however, have cognitive limits on the amount of information they can absorb 
and digest. With the rise of options, it becomes increasingly hard and even impossible at 
some point to analyse the offered options and to make a sound choice. Taken together, 
the findings of these studies challenge a common economic assumption that the more 
choice the better. 
It was suggested that too many options could result in three types of costs for 
decision-making (Loewenstein, 1999). Time costs means the increased amount of time 
needed for a choice. As options increase, one needs to wade through this flow of 
possibilities before making an informed decision. And the more time one spends on one 
activity, the less time remains for the rest of important activities. Error costs is the 
possibility of making an error when choosing. As options expand, it becomes harder to 
93 
 
identify the best option all things considered and to make a rational choice. Psychic 
costs refer to emotional and mental efforts associated with decision-making. When 
offered a plethora of options, the agent needs to spend more effort to analyse them. In 
addition, the agent can feel much anxiety and regret afterwards, thinking that some 
other option that was on the table could have been better. These feelings could intensify 
if the selected option turns out to be bad.  
It was also suggested that some cognitive abilities could be important factors that 
affect the ability to manage a vast choice set. A few studies indicate that younger adults 
cope better with multiple options than the elderly (Hanoch et al., 2009; Hibbard et al., 
2001; Wood et al., 2011). Several studies found that it was numeracy that affected how 
people performed when presented with many options (Tanius et al., 2009; Wood et al., 
2011). Numeracy is the ability to reason with numbers – to comprehend mathematical 
concepts, to process information, to weight up different options. One study found that 
while subjects who were confronted with a large choice set (24 options) were less likely 
to make a correct choice, nonetheless numeracy was a significant predictor of choice 
performance among participants (Tanius et al., 2009). In keeping with these finding, 
another study confirms that large choice set predicts few correct answers, but higher 
numeracy skills correlates with more correct answers (Hanoch et al., 2010). However, it 
was also found that even people with high numeracy skills performed worse as options 
increased. This suggests that at some point a large option-size undermines the ability to 
make a sound choice even among intelligent and numerate individuals. 
From these facts, we can conclude that it is important to get the balance right and 
shy away large choice sets. Yet, it is not very clear what number of options would be 
ideal for smooth decision making. According to some studies on consumer decisions, 
the optimal number ranges from 2–16 options. One study – which studied the link 
between choice set size and enrolment in Medicare plans – found that offering 15 or 
fewer options predicted increased enrolment, while 15–30 options were associated with 
the decline (McWilliams et al., 2011). Another study – which examined the tension 
between choice set size and choosing prescription drug plans – revealed that while the 
increase of options made decisions more difficult and costly for people, people reported 
high satisfaction with their choice plan when picking from 10 options (Bundorf & 
Szrek, 2010).  
It is also possible, however, that the hardship of decision-making is not always 
connected to large numbers. It can be also about the implications of choice. Think of 
choices that involve high-stakes: education, career path, investment, mortgage, marriage 
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etc. A choice of this kind, which may involve only two options, might be extremely 
laborious and mentally depleting. Such choices can take years and drain all emotional 
resources.  
It should be remembered, however, that sometimes it might be impossible to 
avoid a large choice set. In any such case, it is important to know methods that could 
lessen the level of mental work needed to process large amount of information and help 
individuals to manage extended choice sets. Counsellors, for example, could help 
clients to filter information and limit the available options 
There is no denying that choice can enhance the quality of one’s life. Yet, 
counsellors as well as policy makers ought to be mindful that not all choices are 
invigorating. It turns out that there are circumstances when personal choice may become 
debilitating. This suggests that it can be beneficial not only to encourage choices in 
individuals but also to restrict them on certain occasions. In addition, it could be helpful 
to remove choice detriments when it is possible. A clinician, for example, can 
encourage the service user to choose only from a small range of options. Plus, it is 
desirable to make sure that the client has a strong preference to make a particular 
choice. Instead of pushing the person to choose at all cost, extra work could be done to 
stop and think, to weigh alternatives, to overcome hesitation and to nail down the best 





4.4. Beyond and back to choice 
It would be a serious neglect not to mention Skinner in this discussion, who was one of 
the main opponents of Rogers. Two authors were at loggerheads on many issues, 
including the question of freedom, responsibility and choice (Kirschenbaum, 1989; 
Rogers & Skinner, 1956).  
Contrary to Rogers, Skinner noticeably turned his back on the significance of 
personal choice (1948, 1971). Skinner’s most known argument is that choice is an 
illusion, as every bit of human behavior is determined by environment. His strong 
conviction is that behavior is fully determined, and what the person does is the result of 
specifiable causes that can be discovered and controlled (1953, p. 6). Behavior, values, 
beliefs, interests and goals are all the products of the environmental influence. People 
are molded by their social class (working, middle or upper), government (liberal, 
conservative, authoritarian etc.), religion (Christian, Muslim, Buddhism etc.), cultures, 
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families and period of history. Thus, the “choices” that people make cannot be free; 
they are determined. If we knew everything that influenced the agent earlier, we could 
well predict what they would choose to do in any situation. 
Rogers interpreted that Skinner rejected the existence of choice and repeatedly 
invoked the following quote by Skinner by way of example (Rogers & Skinner, 1956):  
 
“Man's vaunted creative powers, his original accomplishments in art, science and morals, 
his capacity to choose and our right to hold him responsible for the consequences of his 
choice - none of these is conspicuous in this new self-portrait. …. He could initiate action 
and make spontaneous and capricious changes of course. ... But science insists that action is 
initiated by forces impinging upon the individual, and that caprice is only another name for 
behavior for which we have not yet found a cause" (Skinner, 1955, p. 52f; emphasis added). 
 
 
Rogers also retorted that there was some internal contradiction in Skinner’s view, 
as behavioral scientists could not escape making choices in their work: 
 
“When he [Skinner] suggests that the task for the behavioral sciences is to make man 
"productive," "well-behaved," etc., it is obvious that he is making a choice. He might have 
chosen to make men submissive, dependent and gregarious, for example. Yet by his own 
statement in another Context man's "capacity to choose," his freedom to select his course 
and to initiate action - these powers do not exist in the scientific picture of man. Here is, I 
believe, the deep-seated contradiction or paradox” (1961, p. 392). 
 
 
It appears that there was a huge misconception between Rogers and Skinner on 
the score of choice. The misunderstanding was caused by the fact that two authors did 
not distinguish between libertarian and compatibilist kinds of choice. Skinner – similar 
to Freud – seems to be arguing only against the possibility that behavior could be 
undetermined and that people could have a libertarian kind of choice. Notice that in the 
afore-said quote Skinner is sceptical only about the idea of “caprice”. He questions that 
people can “make spontaneous and capricious changes of course” (ibid.). But this 
position should be absolutely fine with Rogers’s own view. We remember that Rogers 
was a determinist to the same extent as Skinner, and hence he should be equally 
incredulous about the possibility of spontaneous events. Rogers, on the other hand, is 
right that Skinner does not notice that behavioral scientists, in fact, make some sort of 
free choices in their life. The problem is that Rogers fails to communicate to Skinner 
that this kind of free choice does not contradict to determinism. It is very likely that 
Skinner would be fine with the idea of compatibilist kind of choice. In summary, I infer 
96 
 
that the theme of free choice is not really a bone of contention between two authors. As 
a matter of fact, Skinner, Freud and Rogers are all on the same page that human choices 
are determined and not influence-free.21 
Skinner’s second argument concerning choice is that the act of “choice” and belief 
in personal freedom could lead to harmful consequences. Skinner makes a contrast 
between “the literature of freedom” and the control of behaviour (1971). The literature 
of freedom comprises of views and ideologies that promote the priority of human 
freedom and oppose any oppression. The goal of literature of freedom is to achieve the 
state when people feel free, do what they want to do, and they are liberated from any 
aversive rule. When these conditions are met, no further action is prescribed. Basically, 
the literature of freedom underlies the ideology of modern Western democracies, and it 
crops up when people revolt against authoritarian regimes.  
Skinner concedes that the literature of freedom has made a lot to liberate people. 
Nonetheless, these measures are not sufficient to achieve true freedom. The literature of 
freedom struggles against open oppression and direct aversive consequences. That is, it 
fights against the negative conditions that happen here and now. If someone wants to 
suppress us, we oppose this action. However, overt oppression is not the only source of 
human problems. The literature of freedom overlooks the fact that non-aversive 
influence can produce deferred aversive consequences. Non-aversive influence means 
methods of positive reinforcement (e.g., praise, treat, money etc.), whereas the deferred 
aversive consequences imply repercussions that will become apparent only in some 
time. Suppose parents indulge their children unduly (positive reinforcement). This is 
done simply because parents love their offspring. But this treatment can breed 
unexpected fallouts, as spoilt children can grow up as egocentric and malicious adults 
(deferred aversive consequences). Similar examples can be found within the whole 
society. Some companies, for instance, striving to increase profit urge customers to buy 
products or services by huge discounts or attractive advertisements (positive 
                                                          
21 The real considerable controversy between Rogers and Skinner was about the role of experiences in the 
study of people and in psychotherapy. While Rogers attached great importance to subjective life and 
introspection, Skinner regarded experiences as irrelevant for effective scientific inquiry and cherished 
objective empirical research. As Rogers puts it: “[M]an lives a subjective life as well as being a sequence 
of cause and effect. It seems to mе this has an importance which you [Skinner] don’t acknowledge” (in 
Kirschenbaum, 1989, p. 99). And elsewhere: “As I listen, the message I get, …, is that you [Skinner] аrе 
saying, “I'll talk at аnу length about how оnе influences or controls behavior from the outside, but аnу 
comments оn whether man's subjective view of himself has аnу importance whatsoever, that I don't wish 
to get into” (ibid, p. 96). At some point, Rogers even enquired whether his counterpart had any subjective 
experience of life at all. Skinner admitted that he was living “a very emotional life” (p. 110). Nonetheless, 




reinforcement). Yet, sometimes these products or services entail great harm at the end 
of the day, such as gambling, obesity, cancer, alcoholism, low self-esteem (deferred 
aversive consequences). 
There are several problems related to the non-aversive influence. First, positive 
reinforcers go unnoticed or unchallenged. People are naturally apt to accept a treat if it 
makes them feel good. Second, the deferred aversive consequences become visible only 
after a while. At that point, the harm is present, but the controller (one who caused the 
harm) may be already gone. One can take actions just to eliminate the fallouts. Finally, 
even if a society decides to change the practice that entails deferred aversive 
consequences, the victims themselves can oppose this initiative. The literature of 
freedom teaches people that freedom is a priority. So, if the government decides to 
restrict some freedoms even for common good, this decision may automatically beget 
protest and counteraction. As Skinner puts it: “these measures may be strongly opposed 
by those whom they are designed to protect. The gambler objects to anti-gambling laws 
and the alcoholic to any kind of prohibition; and a child or prostitute may be willing to 
work for what is offered” (1971, p. 41).  
A more moderate example, I suppose, would be smokers who understand the 
harm of smoking but continue buying cigarettes. A more technological example would 
be the data scandal around Facebook. Personal details of 50 million Facebook users 
were passed to Cambridge Analytica, which used them to influence the outcome of the 
2016 US presidential election. When revealed, this brought about a huge social outrage 
and even a Congress hearing. Though many users quitted the platform following the 
scandal, some users also reported that despite being angry at Facebook they also found 
themselves in a way “addicted” to the use of social network and could not wean them 
off (Brockes, 2018). 
Long story short: the argument is that choosing what one wants to do is simply 
not enough to achieve true flourishing. It is easy to lose track of choices that could chain 
people in the long run. In view of these reasons, Skinner argues that people need to go 
“beyond freedom” towards external control. We need to leverage techniques of 
behavioural control to regulate intelligibly social practices and personal choices. By 
these measures it would be possible to preclude deterred aversive consequences. 
The strategy of behaviorist therapy, in short, is to use the techniques of control, 
intending to re-determine, re-program the ineffective patterns of human behavior. As 
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John Watson, the founder of classical behaviourism,22 famously declared in his seminal 
work on behaviourism: “Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed and my own 
specified world to bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and 
train him to become any type of specialist I might select – doctor, lawyer, artist, 
merchant, chief and, yes even beggar man and thief, regardless of the talents, penchants, 
tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors” (1924, p. 104). 
Skinner points out that every society, in fact, applies consistently various 
techniques of control to determine the behavior of its citizens (Rogers & Skinner, 1956). 
If a person behaves in a desirable manner for the community, the group responds to this 
behavior with a positive reinforcement. This can be praise, admiration, fame, money, 
scholarship, love, interviews, awards etc. These positive reinforcements, in turn, 
increase the likelihood that the person will continue behaving in the same fashion. But if 
the person behaves in an unacceptable way to the community, the group responds to this 
behavior with negative reinforcement. This can include criticism, blame, indignation, 
sanctions, censorship, bullying, punishment or imprisonment. The aim of these actions 
is to reduce the occurrence of certain undesirable behavior in the future. The techniques 
of social control are very subtle. Because of this, people often fail to see the extent to 
which they are controlled and manipulated. Skinner’s point is that since every society 
resorts to the controlling techniques anyway, it would be more favorable for society if 
scientists took an active part in the control of human behavior. Nowadays, there is a sort 
of laissez-faire attitude to this question without any deliberate planning. But it would be 
far more effective to approach this question consciously and intelligently, if we are to 
build a more thriving society. 
By way of example Skinner proposes the model of effective social engineering in 
the work “Walden Two” (1948, p. 279). Skinner describes a utopian community that 
applies behaviourist techniques of control for individual and social thriving (1948, p. 
279). The community is organized basically on two levels. On one level, there are 
people who engineer the community, called “Planners”. They make policies which 
                                                          
22 Technically, behaviourism can be divided into three directions or periods: classical behaviourism, 
radical behaviourism, and neo-behaviourism. Classical behaviourism was the first wave and promoted the 
method of classical conditioning (i.e., the formation of conditional reflexes) (Watson, 1924). Radical 
behaviourism emerged subsequently and employed mainly the techniques of operant conditioning (i.e., 
shaping behaviour via different types of reinforcement) (Skinner, 1953). Lastly, neo-behaviourism started 
referring not only to the behaviour, but also to cognitive variables (Tolman et al., 1946). Early 
behaviourists, like Watson, believed that people did not significantly differ at birth. Metaphorically 
speaking, the mind of new-borns represents a blank slate. There are no innate abilities, inherent skills, 




include the behavioural techniques of control. Planners determine the conduct of 
inhabitants so that the latter could be highly effective, upright and generally happy. On 
another level, there is a population of the community itself that leads an ordinary life 
(“Managers”, “Workers”, “Scientists”). Inhabitants have a possibility to act how they 
want to. As Skinner puts it, “Their behavior is determined, yet they’re free” (1948, p. 
279).23 24 
To understand Skinner’s argument better, we need to throw some light on what 
control really means. Rogers makes a helpful distinction between three types or extents 
of control: 
 
“(I) The setting of conditions by B for A, A having no voice in the matter, such that certain 
predictable behaviors then occur in A. I refer to this as external control.  
 
(II) The setting of conditions by B for A, A giving some degree of consent to these 
conditions, such that certain predictable behaviors then occur in A. I refer to this as the 
influence of B on A.  
 
(III)The setting of conditions by A such that certain predictable behaviors then occur in 
himself. I refer to this as internal control” (Rogers & Skinner, 1956, p. 1061).  
 
 
It can also help to think about who actually makes a choice. If a person makes a 
choice on their own, without the interference of others, we can judge that the agent 
exercises internal control or self-control over their behavior. But if the person allows 
someone else to make a choice for them, then the agent allows external control over 
them exercised by the will of others. 
Rogers’s therapy is clearly committed to the concept of internal control: when 
clients are given the freedom to think for themselves, to draw their own conclusions and 
to take personal choices about what to do next. Rogers reports, for example, that one of 
the trends in his therapy is the shift of the locus of power from outside to inside the self. 
                                                          
23 As in the case of Freud, there is some controversy concerning Skinner’s position on free will. The most 
widespread view is that Skinner was a hard determinist, who rejected both free will and moral 
responsibility (e.g., Begelman, 1978). But some associate Skinner’s position with compatibilism. Kane, in 
particular, argues that Skinner’s view is an epitome of hard compatibilism (Kane, 1996, p. 67). Hard 
compatibilism posits that free will is compatible with both determinism and methods of covert non-
constraining control. Skinner’s “Walden Two” can be regarded as a perfect example of hard compatibilist 
society. We have people who have been covertly and deliberately controlled by others, but this does not 
prevent them to enjoy various freedoms: positive and negative freedoms, as well as a possibility of 
compatibilist type of free will (e.g., to act on one’s desires). 
 
24 There have been a few attempts to build Walden Two in reality (Kuhlman, 2005). Some real-life and 
existing examples include Twin Oaks Community in Virginia, US and Loc Horcones in Hermosillo, 
Mexico, though they turned away from some of Skinner’s original ideas. 
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As he puts it: “Another trend which is evident [in a person emerging from therapy] 
relates to the source or locus of choices and decisions, or evaluative judgments. The 
individual increasingly comes to feel that this locus of evaluation lies within himself… 
He recognizes that it rests within himself to choose” (1961, p. 119). Nonetheless, 
Rogers does not seem to oppose the possibility and value of influence. Hardly is it 
possible to escape the impact of other people while living in society overall or the 
impact of the counsellor while undergoing a therapy.  
Skinner, on the other hand, noticeably gravitates towards the concept of external 
control. All major decisions about the life in Walden Two are made by Planners with 
the help of Scientists, while all other ordinary people have to conform to the externally 
imposed agenda, taking it for granted.  
The primary limitation of Skinner’s argument, however, is that it does not take 
into account the research on the importance of personal choosing or self-control. We 
have already covered some research on choosing, so there is no need to repeat this. In 
addition, it should be mentioned that there is also a mountain of research on the 
importance of perceived internal control. It was repeatedly demonstrated that 
individuals provided with personal control were found to have better performance, 
increased vitality and happiness, whereas those deprived of personal control showed 
considerable deterioration of mental and physical states (Langer & Rodin, 1976; 
Lefcourt, 1973; Rotter, 1966; Schulz & Hanusa, 1978; Taylor, 1979; Taylor, Lichtman 
& Wood, 1984).25 
Skinner is right that society exercises external control over its members, and he 
makes a good point that social control should be intelligent. But the problem is that it 
does not seem possible to secure mental well-being only by means of external control. If 
some Planners established a total control over people (either in a therapeutic room or 
                                                          
25 It is worth distinguishing between studies that examine the impact of the exercise of self-control and 
studies that investigate the impact of the belief or experience of self-control. Generally, the available 
research shows that people benefit both from the exercise and experience of self-control. One example of 
the latter is a well-known theory of locus of control by Rotter (1966). Locus of control characterizes the 
extent to which an individual believes that they exercise control over their life and the outcome of future 
events. Internal locus of control captures high belief in personal control, while external locus of control 
refers to the belief in uncontrollability. People with internal locus of control (internals) believe that they 
have a firm grip on their own lives and determine the outcome of events. By contrast, people with 
external locus of control (externals) believe that some external forces control their lives and determine the 
future outcome. External forces may include fate, God, heredity, nature, luck, government, parents (we 
can also fairly add determinism in this list). Rotter points out that extreme beliefs in internal or external 
control are maladaptive (Rotter & Hochreich, 1975). Partly because these beliefs are unrealistic. People 
cannot control everything in the Universe, nor are they deprived of any control. However, it was also 
found that moderate internal locus of control produced, tellingly, more positive outcomes in performance, 
health, social interactions etc. (Avtgis, 1998; Ponto, 1999; Schmitz et al., 2000; Shepherd et al., 2006). 
One explanation is that internals put their achievements down to their own work, and, therefore, they try 
harder. Externals, on the other hand, tend to rely on luck or others, and thus they put less effort. 
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within a society), and thus they robbed people of the chance to make personal choices 
and experience personal control, they would also automatically eliminate many positive 
implications associated with the exercise of personal decision-making and self-control.  
It might be possible, however, to preserve positive implications connected to 
personal choosing, if the external control of Planners remained hidden and citizens had 
an illusion that they make choices on their own and navigate their lives as they want to. 
A fantastic example would be the Matrix movie,26 which depicts the world when people 
live unknowingly in a simulated reality created and controlled by artificial intelligence.  
But if we return to the real life, it might be hard to keep the lid on any kind of 
manipulation forever. There is always a possibility that Planners’ conspiracy leaks out. 
And as soon as it is revealed that someone makes decisions for everyone, this would 
apparently take its toll on those whom Planners sincerely wanted to help.  
From the arguments presented in this discussion, we can conclude that people are 
the creatures who are simply born to make choices and to exercise personal control in 
order to function well. This is not to deny that people can make wrong choices and 
bring about negative outcomes. And this is not to deny that policy makers cannot 
intelligently influence the agents in order to prevent harmful decisions. A good therapist 
in this context should be flexible enough and strike the balance between the idea of 
internal control and helpful influence. Sometimes it can be effective not to intrude and 
let the client come to some insights and decisions themselves. But on other occasions it 
could be necessary to influence the clients, by giving a piece of advice or pointing out 
possible negative consequences of their behavior, so that they manage to make informed 






The chapter has set out to verify Rogers’s observation about the significance of 
choosing (aka free will) for mental health. Rogers reported that the act of choice was 
associated with positive outcome during therapy. But this view based on Rogers’s own 
subjective observations and lacked any empirical substance.  
We have established that, according to numerous studies, offering personal choice 
indeed correlates with a number of positive outcomes, such as increased intrinsic 
                                                          
26 “The Matrix”, 1999, directed by L. and A. Wachowski. 
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motivation, greater life satisfaction, better performance and enhanced vitality; whereas 
removal of choice predicts negative reactions (see § 4.2.). One explanation, according to 
Self-determination theory, is that people have a psychological need for autonomy and 
thus strive for self-governance and personal choosing. If correct, by offering choice 
during psychotherapy counsellors create a condition for people to meet their need for 
autonomy and thus to satisfy one of the main human psychological needs. This can 
explain and lend support to Rogers’s clinical observations. 
However, we have also determined that the act of choice does not always 
guarantee welfare (see § 4.3.). A number of studies point toward the idea that the 
benefit of choice depends on context, complexity and evoked emotions. As choices 
become more difficult or aversive, people are prone to experience distress and suffer 
from various cognitive costs. In addition, as Skinner points out, when making choices, 
people can overlook the long-term outcomes of their decisions and inflict negative 
implications (see § 4.4.). These facts help us reappraise the view about the absolute 
value of choosing suggested by Rogers and paint a more informed picture.  
This chapter has also gone some way towards reconciling Rogers and Skinner 
(see § 4.4.). I have argued, in particular, that there was a big misunderstanding between 
Rogers and Skinner concerning the meaning and existence of choice. As a matter of 
fact, Rogers, Skinner and Freud equally urge skepticism about the possibility of 
libertarian kind of choice, but they remain open in respect of compatibilist choosing. 
The discussion from this chapter suggests that the capacity for free will 
(understood as being able to choose a preferred option) can be a significant determinant 
of mental well-being. A consequence of this is that the provision of choice during 
psychotherapy can apparently contribute to treatment and mental health. However, this 
overview also suggests that choosing may result in ambivalent outcomes. Counsellors, 
thus, should not blindly encourage choosing at all cost. Rather, one should differentiate 
situations when it would be beneficial to motivate choosing, when it would be important 
to simplify decision-making, and when it would be more helpful to restrict choosing at 
all. 
Another implication is that even if libertarian choice does not exist, there is no 
good reason to reject or to depreciate the significance of compatibilist choice. Under 
determinism, people can still analyse potential alternatives and select the best option all 
things considered. Even though this kind of choice cannot be influence free, it carries 
multiple merits for human life. These include mental benefits from the process of 
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decision-making, the ability to direct one’s life in the desired direction, the possibility of 
achieving one’s goals and satisfying one’s needs. 
Incompatibilists can possibly agree with the view that the compatibilist choice has 
practical merits and can foster the quality of one’s life. But while agreeing that the 
compatibilist choice has some instrumental value, one can also affirm that this kind of 
choice cannot render people morally responsible for their actions. It can be argued that 
moral responsibility requires only leeway choice. This means that people can be blamed 
or praised for their actions only if they could have done differently. Minimally it could 
be expected that one could have refrained from the performed action.  
The point about alternate possibilities is actually raised by Wallwork, and we will 
return to this issue in Chapter 7. Part 2 will focus exclusively on the problem of moral 
responsibility, and one of the questions that we will examine in detail is how the 
compatibilist kind of choice can leave a door open for moral responsibility. 
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One of the primary postulates of Rogers’s theory is that people are responsible agents. 
As he puts it: “I’ve had a role in initiating the person-centered approach… meaning a 
person seeking help was not treated as a dependent patient but as a responsible client” 
(Rogers et al., 1989, p. 377f). Rogers promoted the idea of responsibility both in the 
context of psychotherapy and in the system of education. Counsellors should encourage 
service users to take responsibility for their everyday decisions and for the outcome of 
psychotherapy. Extended to the field of education, teachers are supposed to share 
responsibility with their students for the learning process. 
It is not hard to determine that the idea of personal responsibility has a central 
place in Rogers’s theory. However, it is not very clear what meaning and what function 
this idea has in Rogers’s theory. To start with, Rogers does not attempt to explain what 
he means by responsibility. It is noteworthy that the term responsibility is a complex 
one, similar to the terms freedom and free will. Responsibility has different meanings 
and uses in and out of law (Corlett, 2001). Importantly, Rogers does not explain the role 
and purpose of responsibility in his therapeutic practice. Why should a counsellor 
motivate a client to shoulder responsibility? 
The purpose of this chapter is to reveal the meaning and the function of the 
concept of responsibility in Rogers’s therapy.  
In § 5.2., I will introduce Hart’s taxonomy, which distinguishes four senses of the 
term responsibility: role-responsibility, causal responsibility, capacity-responsibility and 
liability-responsibility. My proposal is that Hart’s taxonomy can help us to determine 
the nature and purpose of the term responsibility both in Rogers’s and Freud’s theories. 
In § 5.3., I will argue that by the term responsibility Rogers primarily means the sense 
of role-responsibility. That is, Rogers basically draws clients’ attention to the fact that 
they have some obligations in their lives. Over the therapy the clients are encouraged 
either to recognize their obligations in case they overlooked them or to take some extra 
duties if this could increase their personal control over a particular situation. In § 5.4., I 
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will examine the implications of role-responsibility for mental well-being and 
psychotherapy. The overview of empirical research suggests that role-responsibility is 
generally associated with positive outcomes for mental health, but the effects are not 
uniform. Increased role-responsibility – especially combined with competitive character 
traits – may result in stress and anxiety. This suggests that the clinical goal should be to 






5.2. On responsibility 
Similar to the term free will, the term responsibility is a slippery one. When people state 
that someone is responsible, they might mean absolutely different things. This can be 
well exemplified by Freud and Rogers. Though two authors equally say that service 
users should take responsibility for their actions, the authors mean two absolutely 
different things. 
For a better understanding of Rogers and Freud, I propose to attend to the 
distinctions between different senses of responsibility. It will be helpful to build on the 
well-known taxonomy by Hart, which distinguishes four senses of the term 
responsibility (Hart, 1968):  
 
1. role-responsibility 
2. causal responsibility 
3. capacity-responsibility  
4. liability-responsibility 
a. legal liability-responsibility 
b. moral liability-responsibility 
 
Hart’s main point is that when someone says that the agent is responsible or 
morally responsible for something, this could mean a variety of things. “John is 
responsible for” in a role sense simply means that John has a certain task or duty to 
perform. “John is responsible for” in a causal sense stands for that John produced a 
certain outcome by his behavior. “John is responsible” in a capacity sense designates 
that John has a range of capacities of a normal and mature adult, such as self-control. 
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“John is responsible” in a liability sense denotes that John is considered culpable, that 
he deserves blame, punishment or praise. I give more details about each sense below. 
Role-responsibility means that the agent has a certain duty or an obligation in 
respect to others. Being a mature member of society inevitably involves having various 
roles to fulfil: as a student, as a friend, as a father, as a worker etc. These roles, in turn, 
presuppose specific duties or tasks that should be delivered. The duties can be either 
attached to the agent by agreement or undertaken voluntarily. As a parent, for example, 
the agent has a duty to look after their children. Or as an office manager, the agent has 
projects to be finished on time. Another way to put it would be to say that the agent is 
responsible for taking care of their children, or that the agent is responsible for finishing 
their project. Role-responsibility involves such common phrases as a “responsible 
individual”, “behave irresponsibly” etc. The meaning of phrases like these is that the 
individual takes their role seriously, fulfils their duty with care and diligence, or acts 
with negligence. Role-responsibility is the first necessary condition for blameworthiness 
(liability). People are usually considered blameworthy only if they break their 
obligations. 
Causal responsibility implies that there is a causal connection between the X and 
Y (e.g., between the resultant harm and the behavior of the agent). X would not have 
happened if it was not for Y. In this sense, the term “responsible for” basically amounts 
to the words, such as “caused”, “brought about”, “resulted in”, “contributed to” etc. 
Causal responsibility can be attributed to any causally effective variable: people, 
animals, behavior, omission, events, inanimate objects, forces, states, conditions etc. 
This is because plenty of things can be involved in the production of a certain outcome. 
An example would be: “The dense fog was responsible for the long traffic jam this 
morning”, “Johnson was responsible for the penalty miss”, “the global economic 
meltdown was responsible for a high rate of inflation in the country”. Causal 
responsibility can appear inside and outside moral context. First, it can have a neutral 
sense, meaning simply the idea of causation. It can be a phrase like: “the dog is 
responsible for the noise” or “the president is responsible for the change of internal 
policy”. It is important to note that any such phrase does not imply that anyone deserves 
blame or praise for what they do. These phrases simply establish the fact that X caused 
Y. Second, causal responsibility can be used in moral context and considered as another 
necessary condition for blameworthiness (liability). That is, people usually attribute 
blame or praise only if this agent had a direct or indirect causal relation to the outcome. 
Suppose Mike spills coffee all over the table, thus causing damage to Ann’s documents. 
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Ann then responds with blame, as it was Mike who caused this trouble. However, 
causal responsibility does not constitute a sufficient condition for blameworthiness. An 
agent can cause an event, but sometimes it might be inappropriate to assign any censure 
or praise for this act. For example, it can be Ann’s toddler who spills coffee and ruins 
her papers. Of course, Ann can be very frustrated with this situation, but if she is a 
reasonable and loving parent, then she would decide to withhold her blame towards her 
child. She might understand that the child does not yet have necessary capacities to 
control their behavior or to distinguish right from wrong. 
Capacity-responsibility (also known sometimes as answerability) means that the 
agent has certain capacities which make them eligible for moral relations. On Hart’s 
view, there are three basic capacities necessary for moral relations: 1) the ability to 
understand the requirements of laws, legal norms and moral rules; 2) the ability to 
reason and make a choice in relation to these requirements; 3) to conform to one’s 
choice and control one’s conduct (1968, p. 227). Sometimes the above-mentioned 
capacities can be impaired or even absent. A person, thus, may lack the ability to 
control their behavior or to understand moral implications of their actions. This may 
happen due to a mental disease, trauma, young age, hypnosis. It is common to discharge 
a person for a culpable action under these conditions. A mentally unwell person, for 
example, can be placed to hospital instead of prison. A person suffering from 
somnambulism can be released from criminal punishment or moral fault. Any such case 
is qualified as a case of diminished responsibility. Capacity-responsibility can be 
considered as a third necessary condition for liability. There is a silent consent that 
people must have certain capacities to be qualified as praiseworthy or blameworthy. It is 
assumed that some unique human capacities empower people to understand what is 
required, to foresee harm, to comprehend the consequences of one’s behavior, to guide 
one’s behavior in the light of legal norms and to avoid transgressive behavior. 
Liability-responsibility pertains that the agent is challenged with punishment or 
blame for their misdeeds. To be liable implies that someone is an appropriate candidate 
(liable) “to pay” for what they did. The agent is considered culpable and punishable. In 
this case, the individual needs to answer or rebut charges and accusations. Hart divides 
liability into legal and moral. Legal liability means that the agent satisfies all necessary 
conditions to be found legally responsible for their actions. In this case, the agent can be 
imprisoned, fined, made pay compensation etc. Moral liability signifies that the 
individual meets all necessary conditions to be found guilty for their actions. In this 
case, the agent is considered to deserve blame and bound to make amends in their 
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behavior. According to Hart, people take into account minimally three conditions when 
they establish liability. First, one considers psychological criteria, such as mental 
capacities (aka capacity-responsibility) and mens rea (i.e., whether one acts with 
intention or knowledge to commit a crime) etc. Second, one determines whether there is 
a causal connection between a harmful outcome and the actions of the agent (aka causal 
responsibility). Third, one enquires whether there are any personal relationships 
involved in the case (aka role-responsibility). Hart holds that liability is a primary 
meaning of the word responsibility. Thus, responsibility and liability are often used 
interchangeably as equivalents. 
Hart gives an example of a drunken sea captain to illustrate different senses of 
responsibility put together. This story also exemplifies how ambiguous the term 
responsibility can be in ordinary discourse:  
 
“As captain of the ship, X was responsible (1) for the safety of his passengers and crew. But 
on his last voyage he got drunk every night and was responsible (2) for the loss of the ship 
with all aboard. It was rumoured that he was insane, but the doctors considered that he was 
responsible (3) for his actions. Throughout the voyage he behaved quite irresponsibly (1), 
and various incidents in his career showed that he was not a responsible (1) person. He 
always maintained that the exceptional winter storms were responsible (2) for the loss of the 
ship, but in the legal proceedings brought against him he was found criminally responsible 
(4a) for his negligent conduct, and in separate civil proceedings he was held legally 
responsible (4a) for the loss of life and property. He is still alive and he is morally 




I have attached subscripts (1-4a, b) in the above-mentioned example whenever the 
word “responsible” is used. The subscripts refer to different senses of the term 
responsibility according to Hart’s taxonomy. The table below makes a summary. 
 









The agent has a duty to deliver. The captain undertakes a duty 
to secure safety of his 
passengers (viz., the captain is 






There is a causal connection 
between the agent and the 
outcome. 
  
The captain was causally 
implicated in the production 
of the loss of property and life 
(viz., the actions of the 







The agent possesses mental 
and physical capacities to be a 
subject of moral and legal 
relations. 
 
The capacities of the captain 
allowed him to attend to his 
duties, to avoid the harm. The 
doctors did not detect any 
pathologies.   
(viz., the captain is qualified 





The agent faces accusations 
and charges. If established, the 
agent is liable to have 
punishment inflicted on him. 




(b) Moral liability: 
blameworthiness, public 
shaming, indignation (moral 
responsibility). 
 
The jury did not find excuses 
or justifications which could 
rebut the captain’s culpability. 
The captain is found guilty for 
his negligent behavior  
(viz., the captain is considered 
both morally and criminally 
responsible for the harm).  
 
 
I will draw on the above-mentioned taxonomy consistently throughout Part 2. My 
first argument will be that though both Rogers and Freud claim that people ought to 
shoulder responsibility, two authors mean different things by that. While Rogers 
predominantly talks about role-responsibility (see Chapter 5), Freud mainly refers to the 
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idea of causal-responsibility (see Chapter 6). We will examine separately why service 
users might be encouraged to take either role or causal responsibility during 
psychotherapy and what could be the practical implications for mental health and 
treatment in each case. My second major argument will be that Rogers and Freud, as 
psychotherapists, intentionally avoid the sense of liability-responsibility, even though 
liability is the primary meaning of responsibility in law and ethics (see Chapter 7). I 
explain this by pointing out that the idea of blame is essentially incompatible with the 
non-judgemental therapeutic attitude advocated both by Rogers and Freud (see Chapter 
8). Both therapists concur that the effective therapeutic work is possible only when 
counsellors suspend blame attitudes towards their clients (see Chapter 9). But we should 
move step by step. Our first task will be to establish the meaning and function of 





5.3. Psychotherapy and role-responsibility  
Rogers never wrote an individual essay on moral responsibility, but responsibility-
related ideas occur regularly and vividly virtually in every Rogers’s text. An individual 
is usually prompted to assume or to share responsibility if involved in a particular 
process. I infer that Rogers uses the term responsibility primarily in the role sense of the 
term. That is, Rogers essentially encourages the agent to recognize and undertake a 
certain duty or obligation in different situations. 
It is possible to find one relevant example in Rogers’s discussion of education. It 
is noteworthy that Rogers wrote a few essays on education and was keen to implement 
some aspects of his theory in the educational process (Rogers, 1969). Rogers notes that 
students tend to be left with no control and choice over the process of their education. 
The control over the educational policy is in the hands of teachers, counsellors, 
administrators, parents, local community or a government. Rogers’s stand, however, is 
that students should obtain considerable decision-making power in the question of their 
education. Hence, it is desirable that teachers share responsibility with their students. As 
he puts it: 
 
“The facilitative teaches shares with the others – students, and possibly also parents or 
community members – the responsibility for the learning process. Curriculum planning, the 
mode of administration and operation, the funding, the policy making, are all the 
responsibility of the particular group involved. Thus, a class may be responsible for its own 
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curriculum, but the total group may be responsible for the overall policy. In any case, 
responsibility is shared” (Rogers et al., 1989, p. 327). 
 
 
It seems uncontroversial that by the term “responsibility” mentioned above 
Rogers means specifically the sense of role-responsibility. That is, he defends a view 
that students and community members should receive some duties and tasks related to 
the process of education. As a matter of fact, Rogers mentions a number of tasks and 
duties that can be shared, such as curriculum planning, administration, funding and 
policy making.  
Another similar example would be Rogers’s description of his workshops. Rogers 
describes that during a workshop based on person-centered approach participants are 
encouraged to share the power, authority and responsibility (for a detailed review of the 
organization of person-centered workshop see Rogers, 1977). As Rogers puts it: “One 
final statement about the way we function: We are a thoroughly open staff, with no 
leader and no hierarchical organization. Leadership and responsibility are shared. We 
have become a very close team, living our relationship in the most person-centered 
manner we know” (1980, p. 188). Rogers seems to refer here again to the idea of duties. 
There is no special person in the workshop who would be in charge of everything. 
Every participant, instead, has a duty to contribute to the work of the group. 
Rogers also seems to use the role meaning of responsibility in his transcripts, in 
the work with his clients. The first transcript represents a phonographic recording with 
one of Rogers’s clients, Arthur, a psychology student.  
 
Transcript 1: 
“C. I don’t think that I know very much how you happened to come in – I 
mean, I don’t know whether someone suggested you come to see me or 
whether you had some things on your mind that you were disturbed about 
and wanted some help with. 
S. I talked with Miss G. at the Arts office and she suggested that I take the 
course. Then my instructor told me I would see you, so I came. 
C. That’s how you came to take the course, because it was suggested to you. 
S. Mm-hm. 




C. … I don’t know – you might tell me a little bit more about how you 
happened to take 411 [course in Psychology] – I believe because Miss G. 
suggested it to you. 
S. Yes, Miss G suggested it to me. She didn’t think my study habits were 
good… 
C. So that – your purpose in taking it is to satisfy Miss G. 
S. That’s right. No, it isn’t that. It is for my own improvement.  
C. I see. 
S. Dust off my study methods and habits and better use of time and how to 
concentrate. 
C. Mm-hm. 
S. I’m just taking – She suggested it to me and I’m taking it for my own 
benefit. 
C. I see. So that you got into it partly because she suggested it, but part of it 
was your own desire to get into something like that, is that it? 
S. I thought I needed it, so I signed up. (Laughs.) 
C. Well, now, I’m more interested in why you thought you needed it than 
why Miss G. thought you needed it. Why did you think you needed it?” 
(Rogers et al., 1989, p. 64f). 
 
Some individuals are prone to detach from their decisions, depreciate their 
responsibility or displace it to some third parties. Rogers suggests that in the above-
mentioned interview we can notice a few stages of how the client comes to recognize 
his “responsibility” (ibid.). In the opening, Arthur is not determined to assume 
responsibility for what he does: neither for taking the course in Psychology nor for 
coming to therapy. He exhibits distinctly much dependence on the will and guidance of 
Miss G (“I talked with Miss G. … and she suggested that I take the course… so I 
came”). Then, Arthur drifts towards the recognition of shared responsibility (“She 
suggested it to me and I’m taking it for my own benefit”). And lastly, Arthur moves on 
to accept full responsibility for his choice (“I thought I needed it, so I signed up”).  
Rogers then points out that there is a considerable difference between the situation 
when a client assumes responsibility for coming to therapy and when he overlooks this 
responsibility. As he puts it: “If it is implicit that the counsellor or some third person is 
responsible for the student’s being present in the counselling situation, then suggestion 
or advice are almost the only avenues of approach open. If the client himself accepts 
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responsibility for bringing himself, he also accepts responsibility for working upon his 
problems” (Rogers et al., 1989, p. 65).  
It looks that Rogers primarily talks about the role sense of responsibility here. 
Rogers appears to suggest that Arthur should recognize his own obligation or task to 
work on his issues in a therapeutic room as well as his own duty to choose a subject of 
interest in the university. When it comes to therapy, Rogers’s main point is that the 
therapy becomes more productive when it is not only the counsellor who undertakes the 
task to work on the problems of the client, but when it is also the client who recognizes 
his own duty (responsibility) to work on his issues. It is natural to expect that the 
therapy achieves a greater input when both the counsellor and the client contribute to 
the process.  
The second transcript illustrates Rogers’s dialogue with one of his clients 
concerning the time of their next appointment.  
 
Transcript 2: 
“S. I think maybe the next time I come in to see you, it will be something 
different. Maybe I’ll have a little bit better idea what to talk about by them. 
C. Would you like to come in next Friday at this time? 
S. Yes, it’s all right with me. 
C. It’s up to you. 
S. It’s up to me? 
C. I’m here. I’d be glad to do anything I can do for you. 
S. All right, sir, I think I’ll be there” (Rogers et al., 1989, p. 66).  
 
Rogers suggests that this brief except illustrates how the therapeutic situation “is 
often defined in terms of actual responsibilities, no matter how minor they may be” 
(ibid., p. 67). In the opening, the client goes along with the suggested date and time of 
the next appointment, disregarding his own initiative and responsibility. As Rogers puts 
it, “[the client] feeling this is the usual meaningless gesture, leaves responsibility with 
the counsellor by saying, “Yes, it’s all right with me” (ibid., p. 67). The counsellor, 
however, reminds the client that he can decide when they meet next time. After that, the 
client responds in a more determined and thoughtful manner, “I’ll be there”. To Rogers, 
this last phrase indicates a genuine acceptance of responsibility (ibid.).  
 Rogers’s phrase “actual responsibilities, no matter how minor they may be” again 
seems to refer to the idea of duties, which can be major or minor. The point of this 
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conversation is to remind the client that he has an active role in the therapeutic process. 
One does not have to go along with everything the counsellor says. The client should be 
proactive, make choices, take tasks, and thus control the process. 
The final transcript provides an excerpt from Rogers’s interview with a young 
woman, a graduate student. Earlier sessions revealed that the client relied considerably 
on external guidance, wanting others to tell her what to do. She also blamed others if 
they failed to give her enough support and direction. For example, she complained that 
her tutors never taught her anything good and valuable. As the therapy advanced, the 
client began to realize gradually that she was much dependent on others.  
 
Transcript 3:  
“C: Well now, I wonder if I've been going around doing that, getting 
smatterings of things, and not getting hold, not really getting down to things.  
T: Maybe you've been getting just spoonfuls here and there rather than really 
digging in somewhere rather deeply. 
 C: M-lun. That's why I say - (slowly and very thoughtfully) well, with that 
sort of a foundation, well, it's really up to me. I mean, it seems to be really 
apparent to me that I can't depend on someone else to give me an education. 
(Very softly) I'll really have to get it myself.  
T: It really begins to come home - there's only one person that can educate 
you -a realization that perhaps nobody else can give you an education.  
C: M-hm. (Long pause - while she sits thinking) I have all the symptoms of 
fright. (Laughs softly)  
T: Fright? That this is a scary thing, is that what you mean? …  
C: M-hm. I am feeling that. For instance, I’m feeling it internally now -a sort 
of surging up, or force or outlet. As if that's something really big and strong. 
And yet, uh, well at first it was almost a physical feeling of just being out 
alone, and sort of cut off from a support I had been carrying around.  
T: You feel that it's something deep and strong, and surging forth, and at the 
same time, you just feel as though you'd cut yourself loose from any support 
when you say it.  
C: M-hm. Maybe that's -I don't know - it's a disturbance of a kind of pattern 
I've been carrying around, I think.  
T: It sort of shakes a rather significant pattern, jars it loose.  
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C: M-bm. (Pause, then cautiously, but with conviction) I, I think -I don't 
know, but I have the feeling that then I am going to begin to do more things 
that I know I should do.... There are so many things that I need to do” (1961, 
p. 121f). 
 
According to Rogers, in this transcript we can observe the client come to the 
recognition of her responsibility. One manifestation of this is the phrase: “It's really up 
to me. I mean, it seems to be really apparent to me that I can't depend on someone else 
to give me an education. I'll really have to get it myself” (ibid.). 
As before, we can interpret that here we have another example of role-
responsibility. The client basically recognizes that she has a task to look after her 
education. It is not only tutors who have a duty to educate their students, it is also 
students who have a task to participate actively in the educational process, by choosing 
relevant subjects, communicating with teachers, showing initiative during the classes, 
asking questions and doing extra work.  
From the above transcripts, we can conclude that the idea of role-responsibility 
dominates in Rogers’s clinical practice. I do not claim, however, that other senses of the 
term responsibility are absolutely alien to Rogers.  
It seems, for example, that on some level Rogers was also much interested in 
capacity-responsibility, and he wanted to show his clients that they possessed all fully-
fledged capacities of normal mature adults, such as choice and self-control. Probably, 
one of the goals was to show the clients (especially those who are used to conformity) 
that they make choices all the time, and that they can do this more effectively. 
It is also safe to say that Rogers did not deny the liability sense of responsibility in 
general. For instance, writing about client-centered approach in the system of education, 
Rogers notes: “Person-centered education is threatening to the student. It is much easier 
to conform and complain than to take responsibility, make mistakes, and live with the 
consequences” (Rogers et al., 1989, p. 329). It is plausible that by the word 
“consequences” Rogers means moral and legal consequences, such as blame, sanctions 
and punishment. The general point is that students are often reluctant to take extra 
duties (become role-responsible) because they are afraid of being blamed for making 
wrong choices (become liable-responsible). Though Rogers may not reject liability 
generally, this theme is not particularly present in his writing and counselling practice. 
It will come as no surprise once we learn that Rogers advocates a non-judgmental type 
of therapeutic relationship, which is incompatible with the idea of blame. 
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We will discuss the reasons for non-judgementalism at length in Chapter 8. But to 
give you just a preview, I should mention that one of the reasons to shun blame is 
connected to the aim of creating a climate of emotional safety in the counselling room. 
Individuals become disposed to self-disclosure and honest communication only if they 
feel secure with their interlocutor. In therapy, counsellors can achieve this level of 
safety by explaining that their clients will not be judged or evaluated whatever they say 
or do. The counselling room is a safe zone, which has no place for moralization or 
condemnation. 
In this context, it is instructive to notice what steps Rogers takes to lead Arthur to 
the recognition of his obligations/ responsibility (see transcript 1 above). Rogers does 
not push Arthur to assume responsibility, nor does he lecture how important it is. He 
only uses the method of clarification. That is, he repeats and summarizes the words he 
hears from Arthur, asking whether he understands him right. For example: “That’s how 
you came to take the course, because it was suggested to you… So that – your purpose 
in taking it is to satisfy Miss G… I see. So that you got into it partly because she 
suggested it, but part of it was your own desire to get into something like that, is that 
it?” (1989, p. 64f). Having his words mirrored, Arthur finds it easy to understand his 
attitude, his “role”. Eventually he comes to realize that there is something inert in his 
behavior, that he takes a submissive role in relationships with others. After this insight 
Arthur makes a personal decision to veer over to a more determined and autonomous 
role: “I thought I needed it, so I signed up” (ibid.).  
We can see that there is no apparent blame in Rogers’s communication with 
Arthur. I construe that this non-judgemental attitude helps to achieve two major goals in 
this example. First, as Arthur does not experience threat from Rogers, he maintains 
communication, and the therapeutic work continues. Second, as there is no pressure, 
Arthur gets a chance to reflect on his own behavior, to realize some of his obligations 
and to show his commitment. To put it differently, Arthur makes up his mind to become 
role-responsible in respect of some aspects of his life, pointing out that it was not just 
Miss G, but it was his own initiative to enrol on the psychology module and embark on 
therapy.  
This suggests that when the counsellor takes a non-judgemental attitude and thus 
avoids blame (liability-responsibility), it serves not only to build rapport with the client, 
but it also facilitates the individual to become a responsible agent (in the role sense). 
Paradoxically avoiding blame can prompt people to become more responsible. I suspect 
that Rogers could have triggered a completely opposite reaction if he had hinted to 
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Arthur that the latter was in any way blameworthy for his indecisive behavior. Even 
under minor criticism a service user can become vulnerable and hurt, and one of the 
defensive reactions would be to quit therapy.  
Another example of non-judgementalism we can notice in transcript 3 mentioned 
above. Rogers’s client experiences a bunch of mixed and complex feelings. Partly she 
feels invigoration and internal strength, as she realizes that she can exert some control in 
terms of her education. But she also feels some fear and vulnerability, as she recognizes 
that she may be “just being out alone” and “cut off from a support” whenever she makes 
a next choice (1961, p. 121f). This situation can be explained by the fact that many 
individuals are just not prepared for a proactive kind of life. They are not used to taking 
on obligations, making personal choices, coping with turmoil of decision-making, 
dealing with the repercussions of their choices, and so forth. But this situation can 
become less intimidating if the counsellor creates an environment of support where 





5.4. The pragmatic question 
One important question that needs to be asked in this discussion is: “What is the benefit 
of taking role-responsibility?” Since we deal with the mental health of people, we need 
to know not only what a counsellor does from a theoretical point of view, but also 
whether it is a helpful enterprise.  
It seems true that Rogers associates role-responsibility with some positive 
outcomes for people. Why would he promote responsibility in his therapy otherwise? 
But Rogers does not give us any evidence for the value of role-responsibility, which 
would make his approach more grounded.  
To be fair, there is not much empirical research that attempted to investigate 
purely the aspect of role-responsibility (aka undertaking some tasks or obligations). Yet, 
the available data suggests that role-responsibility can produce both a positive and 
negative impact on people.  
It is worth starting with the classical and influential experiment by Langer & 
Rodin (1976). The study examined the impact of choice and enhanced personal 
responsibility on the wellness of nursing home residents. The premise of this research 
was that ageing was negatively related to the sense of personal control and personal 
responsibility. With ageing people often lose jobs, social roles, status and health. 
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Perception of these changes can undermine the sense of confidence, control and 
responsibility. The conjecture was that inducing the sense of personal responsibility and 
choice would result in enhanced vitality. Ambulatory adults were divided into two 
groups. The experimental group was given a communication which emphasized the role 
of personal responsibility. The subjects were told that it was their primary responsibility 
to make their stay happy. They should decide how they wanted to spend their time, how 
they wanted their rooms to be arranged, when to visit friends, when to watch TV. After 
that, the subjects were offered an opportunity to take a plant for their rooms. The 
subjects had two options: to accept or to reject a plant, at first; and then to pick a plant 
they liked. The subjects were informed that it was their responsibility to look after these 
plants. The control groups, by contrast, received a communication which stressed the 
responsibility of the nursing staff. The subjects were told that it was the responsibility 
of the staff to make them happy. They were informed that the rooms were arranged as 
nice as it was possible. If the residents had any complaints, they should address the staff 
to get the problem fixed. The movie time was scheduled on Thursdays and Fridays. 
Also, the residents were given plants as presents. The nurses were instructed to water 
and care for these plants. In three weeks, researchers assessed the participants. The first 
questionnaire measured the success of responsibility inducement. The tests were 
conducted one week before and three weeks after the communications. Participants 
rated how much control they felt over their lives. They also reported how happy and 
active they were. The second questionnaire examined the behavioural measure. Nurses 
who were unaware of the experiment rated the behavior of the residents. They reported 
how active, happy, sociable, healthy the residents were. The results lent support to the 
initial conjecture. As forecast, the participants in the responsibility-inducement group 
communicated a considerable increase in perceived control, happiness and interpersonal 
activity. Researchers also registered an improvement in the level of alertness, 
commitment and general well-being. The control group, on the other hand, 
demonstrated the decrease in happiness, alertness and general wellness. 
With the completion of the first study, researchers examined the long-term effects 
of the original study (Rodin & Langer, 1977). Reassessment in 18 months revealed that 
the trend continued. The experimental group managed to preserve high psychological 
functioning and wellness. Furthermore, the rate of the mortality in the experimental 
group was lower, in comparison with the control group. The follow-up research has 




A similar study examined the impact of increased responsibility and taking a task 
to care for bird feeders among nursing home residents (Roush & Banziger, 1983). The 
participants were randomly divided into three groups: 1) those who got a responsibility 
message and a bird feeder (responsibility condition); 2) those who received a 
dependency message and no bird feeder (dependency condition); 3) those who got no 
message and no bird feeder (control condition). The study replicated some procedure of 
Roding & Langer to induce responsibility. The responsibility group was informed that 
the residents were expected to show initiative to make their stay comfortable and happy. 
Plus, they were given a chance to take responsibility for caring for bird feeders (e.g., 
checking seed levels). The dependency group was not given an option to have a bird 
feeder and was informed that the staff were there to solve all their problems. After a 
while, the researchers compared the pre-test and post-test measures of vitality and 
mental health among the participants. It was found that the responsibility group reported 
a significant increase in life satisfaction, happiness, activity scores and perceived 
control; whereas the dependency and control groups did not show improvement. 
A more recent study investigated the bond between taking personal responsibility 
and birth satisfaction (Howarth et al., 2011). First time mothers were interviewed about 
their behavior during pregnancy and birth experience. Personal responsibility was 
defined as the desire to be in charge of one’s pregnancy and birth process. Responsible 
subjects were actively engaged in all stages of pregnancy, wanting to prepare 
themselves for their birth and motherhood. This was reflected in the following behavior: 
active information seeking about pregnancy and labour; mental and physical preparation 
for birth; choosing the place of birth; increase in personal control, which embodied 
informed decision making and pain management. It was revealed that those participants 
who were committed to personal responsibility felt better informed, prepared and 
confident to cope with their birth experience.  
In addition to the previous findings, one research identified personal responsibility 
as one of the factors associated with prosocial behavior (Michel, 2007). One conjecture 
of the study was that the belief in personal responsibility to help others would be 
associated with volunteerism. The experiment followed the Hurricane Katrina in the 
US. The researchers asked the subjects a few questions to measure their belief in 
personal responsibility and volunteer behavior. The responsibility question was: “Do 
you feel that you have a responsibility to aid the victims of Hurricane Katrina?” The 
volunteer question was: “Did you donate any time helping those affected by Hurricane 
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Katrina?” It was revealed that perceived personal responsibility to help others in need 
correlated with hours spent volunteering to aid the victims of the hurricane.  
A few studies, however, suggest that role-responsibility could also have an 
adverse impact on people. One revealed detriment is that tasks related to complex work 
and grave consequences can elicit considerable mental stress. 
One study investigated the impact of high cost responsibility and high attentional 
demand on mental well-being of workers (Martin & Wall, 1989). Attentional demand 
involved close concentration on the work, regular checking of the process and quick 
response to possible issues. Cost responsibility embodied operating expensive devices 
and possibility of making costly harm to production. It was found high attentional 
demand coupled with high cost responsibility caused elevated psychological strain. 
Employees found under these conditions reported the increase in stress, pressure, 
anxiety and job-related depression.  
Another research studied the impact of personal responsibility on Type A and B 
personalities during task performance (Iwanaga et al., 2000). Consistent with Martin’s 
& Wall’s study, it was assumed that personal responsibility would be associated with 
the increase in psychological stress. But it was also hypothesized that individual 
differences could mediate this outcome, and there would be a difference between Type 
A (competitive, ambitious, impatient) and Type B individuals (relaxed, non-aggressive). 
During the experiment Type A and B participants were assigned to high and low 
responsibility conditions. It was found that Type A individuals in high responsibility 
condition demonstrated a marked increase in heart rate, as compared to others. This 
finding corroborates the conjecture that some individuals can become more stressed by 
personal responsibility than others. While being highly competitive and feeling the 
burden of responsibility, Type A individuals are apparently prone to put too much effort 
in task performance, which in turn results in physiological and psychological strain. 
High responsibility, thus, may underlie the risk of heart disease common for Type A 
personalities.  
It is time to make a summary. On the plus side, there is some evidence that role-
responsibility could be helpful for treatment and enhancing mental well-being. Taking 
even small obligations (e.g., caring for plants) can predict a marked increase in vitality, 
as some studies show. One possible explanation is that role-responsibility involves the 
possibility of making personal choices and exercise personal control, which, as we have 
reviewed earlier, are all associated with positive outcomes for human mental health. If 
the individual takes role-responsibility for something, they automatically become more 
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in personal control over this situation. On one level, the agent exercises much 
prospective control. That is, the agent determines a goal they want to achieve in the 
future, think in advance of the possible consequences of their choices and exercises 
control to achieve a desirable state of affairs. On another level, the agent can also 
exercise retrospective control. One can analyse the consequences of one’s choices with 
regard to the past, learn from one’s mistakes and make necessary adjustments to one’s 
behavior in order to prevent the same errors in the future.  
But, on the negative side, it would be wrong to associate role-responsibility just 
with positive implications, as role-responsibility can result in some debilitating 
outcomes under certain conditions. Due to some character traits people can put 
overzealous efforts when they take on obligations, which elicits physical and 
psychological strain. Plus, as a task becomes more risky or consequential, individuals 
find feelings themselves highly stressed out. Think of jobs which involve 
responsibilities for the life of other people. Air-traffic controllers and surgeons, for 
example, are generally found to suffer from heavy distress and high level of burn-out 
syndrome (Balch et al., 2009; Jou et al., 2013).  
This suggests that role-responsibility can have a polar impact on human well-
being. It can either heal or choke. The clinical task, therefore, is to differentiate 






It is quite widely accepted that Rogers promotes the idea of responsibility. But Rogers 
does not really explain the meaning and the function of the concept of responsibility in 
his theory and therapeutic practice. To achieve clarity on the matter, I have introduced 
Hart’s taxonomy, which marks out four senses of the term responsibility: role-
responsibility, causal responsibility, capacity-responsibility and liability-responsibility 
(see § 5.2.).  
After that I have argued that by the loose term responsibility Rogers chiefly 
means the sense of role-responsibility, which implies the exercise of a certain duty (see 
§ 5.3.). Basically, the term “responsibility” in the most instances of Rogers’s writing 
can be replaced by the terms “duty”, “obligation” or “task”. Thus, Rogers in essence 
encourages his clients to recognize their obligations if they overlook them or to 
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undertake some duties in case this could increase the agent’s personal control over the 
situation and decrease the dependence on the will of others.  
Lastly, I enquired about the link of role-responsibility and mental health (see § 
5.4.). Some empirical studies show that the sense of role-responsibility can indeed 
contribute to psychotherapy and mental well-being. Participants who take even small 
obligations report better health, as compared to the rest. But there are also exceptions. 
Risky or complex obligations can result in considerable distress. 
In fact, we can draw the same conclusion both in relation to our discussion of 
choosing (Chapter 4) and role-responsibility. There are two sides of the coin really. 
Though both role-responsibility and choice can produce positive outcomes, there are 
exceptions, there is a dark side in each case. This echoes a famous principle formulated 
by Paracelsus with regard to toxicology: “All things are poison and nothing is without 
poison; only the dose makes a thing not a poison” (Hayes & Kruger, 2014, p. 14). It 
means that any good thing – such as medicine, food, freedom or responsibility – can 
take a toll if we exceed the dose.  
In summary, though decision-making can be helpful, it is important that the 
therapist does not blindly encourage people to take any opportunity to make a choice by 
all means. Similarly, while taking tasks can do good, one should not bombard the 
individual with duties and obligations. For those who take on too much on themselves it 
would be more beneficial to give up a portion of their duties or share them with others.  
The next chapter moves on to the analysis of responsibility in Freud’s theory. 
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Responsibility-related ideas occur from time to time throughout the whole Freud’s 
psychoanalytic corpus. The distinguishing feature of Freud’s writing on the matter is 
whether people should assume responsibility for unconscious and unintentional events 
or actions, such as dreams and parapraxes. The most comprehensive account on this 
subject can be found in Freud’s short essay called “Moral responsibility for the content 
of one’s dreams” (1925, pp. 132ff). 
It is clear-cut that Freud defends the view that people ought to take responsibility. 
Yet, we can see the very same problem that we came across in the case of Rogers. First, 
Freud does not explain what he means by responsibility. Should people lay the blame 
on themselves whenever they perform some shameful unconscious actions or events? 
Second, Freud does not clear up the function of responsibility in his therapy. Why 
should the counsellor advise the client to take responsibility? What is more, Freud’s 
position on responsibility is much more intricate, as compared to Rogers’s. The main 
problem is that Freud runs together a set of distinct questions that deserve individual 
attention. For example, if we look closely at the essay “Moral responsibility for the 
content of one’s dreams”, we can discover a bundle of subjects lumped together. Freud 
starts off with the question whether people should take responsibility for the evil 
content of their dreams, which seems to be a normative question. Then Freud poses a 
rhetorical question about the use of taking responsibility, which appears to be a 
therapeutic or pragmatic question. Without giving any answer, Freud goes off on a 
tangent to tell that people can assume responsibility under the influence of conscience, 
which appears to be a descriptive question bearing on the psychoanalytic theory. After 
that, Freud reports that the therapists should allow jurists to construct an appropriate 
concept of responsibility, which looks to be a legal question. In sum, we have a 
“bundle” of diverse responsibility-related subjects without any sufficient explanation of 
any of them.  
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the meaning and the function of the 
concept of responsibility in Freud’s theory. I will argue that Freud runs together four 
distinct subjects related to responsibility: causal responsibility, the use of causal 
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responsibility, culpability for unconscious events and the feeling of responsibility. All 
four themes are pertinent to the therapeutic work. 
For the sake of transparency, I discuss each theme touched by Freud in separate 
sections. In § 6.2., I start with the theme of causal responsibility. My interpretation is 
that when Freud states that the person should assume responsibility for the bad content 
of their dreams he means that the person should recognize that it is them who cause 
those dreams. In § 6.3., I consider the question of the use of taking causal-
responsibility. Though Freud poses a question about the merit of taking responsibility 
for one’s dreams, he does not provide any account on this matter. My argument is that 
the counsellor can use the idea of causal responsibility to help his or her clients to 
increase self-awareness, to augment self-control and to maintain the unity and 
continuity of the mind. In § 6.4., I examine the conditions under which a person might 
be held culpable for their unconscious, unintentional and harmful actions. I suggest that 
one reason why a person could be held blameworthy for their unconscious actions is 
because this person was negligent to prevent these unconscious actions in advance by 
conscious means. In this context, I infer that there is a further “moral” use of causal 
responsibility: by taking causal responsibility, a person can consciously intervene into 
one’s behavior and prevent some unconscious and harmful events, and thus one can 
promote moral relationships with others. In § 6.5., I investigate the theme of feeling of 
responsibility. I interpret that Freud essentially means that the individual can assume 
responsibility (e.g., for an evil dream) under the influence of moral feelings, such as 
guilt. I suggest that the clinical task is to explain clients that individuals can unfairly 
hold themselves responsible because of guilt, and therefore one should learn to 
distinguish between a feeling and fact of being responsible.  
 
 
    
 
6.2. Psychotherapy and causal responsibility  
A few times Freud raises the question whether the person should take responsibility for 
a wicked dream they may have sometimes (e.g., an act of misdeed, a scene of 
perversion etc.) (1900, 1925). Freud’s answer is affirmative each time: the individual 
should assume responsibility. In one of the early works, Freud states flatly: “There 
seems to be nо justification for people’s reluctance in accepting responsibility for the 
immorality of their dreams” (1900, p. 620). In the later work, Freud reiterates: 
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“Obviously one must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses of one’s dreams. 
What else is one to do with them?” (1925, p. 132ff).  
 It would be useful to glance over the text in which Freud outlines his 
standpoint on the matter: 
 
“[T]he problem of responsibility for the immoral content of dreams no longer exists for us 
as it formerly did for writers who knew nothing of latent dream-thoughts and the repressed 
part of our mental life. Obviously one must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses 
of one’s dreams. What else is one to do with them? Unless the content of the dream 
(rightly understood) is inspired by alien spirits, it is a part of my own being. If I seek to 
classify the impulses that are present in me according to social standards into good and 
bad, I must assume responsibility for both sorts; and if, in defence, I say that what is 
unknown, unconscious and repressed in me is not my ‘ego’, then I shall not be basing my 
position upon psycho-analysis... I shall perhaps learn that what I am disavowing not only 
‘is’ in me but sometimes ‘acts’ from out of me as well.  
 
It is true that in the metapsychological sense this bad repressed content does not belong to 
my ‘ego’ - that is, assuming that I am a morally blameless individual - but to an ‘id’ upon 
which my ego is seated. But this ego developed out of the id, it forms with it a single 
biological unit, it is only a specially modified peripheral portion of it, and it is subject to 
the influences and obeys the suggestions that arise from the id. For any vital purpose, a 
separation of the ego from the id would be a hopeless undertaking” (1925, p. 133ff). 
 
 
As it was explained in the previous chapter, people could mean different things by 
the term “moral responsibility”. Therefore, it makes sense to determine what Freud 
means exactly by responsibility from the outset.  
There is one passage that could indicate that Freud talks about liability-
responsibility in the above-mentioned passage. One of the sentences contains the word 
“blameless”, and, as we remember, the idea of blame is one of the attributes of liability-
responsibility. As Freud puts it: “It is true that in the metapsychological sense this bad 
repressed content does not belong to my ‘ego’ – that is, assuming that I am a morally 
blameless individual – but to an ‘id’…” (ibid.). But there is a potential for the 
misinterpretation here. In the original, the phrase “blameless individual” is written as 
“moralisch untadeliger Mensch”, which literally denotes “morally impeccable person” 
(GW 1925, p. 567).27 The important point is that nothing is said about blaming oneself. 
What Freud says essentially is that people should not think of themselves as virtuously 
perfect creatures, who are unable to have any egocentric or devilish impulses. Since 
                                                          
27 “Im metapsychologischen Sinne gehört dies böse Verdrängte allerdings nicht zu meinem „Ich“, — 
wenn ich nämlich ein moralisch untadeliger Mensch sein sollte, — sondern zu einem „Es“, dem mein Ich 
aufsitzt” (GW 1925, p. 567). 
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people have the id, they are disposed by their nature to have some impulses which they 
might dislike, or which would run counter to moral codes.  
In addition, the question of blame for one’s dreams appears misguided. For one, 
people do not choose the dreams which they are going to have. Not to mention that 
people do not choose to have repelling dreams. Dreams simply happen, regardless of 
human preferences, will or intention. 
It is my understanding that the loose terms “responsibility” [die 
Verantwortlichkeit] and “moral responsibility” [sittliche Verantwortung] used by Freud, 
in fact, refer to the sense of causal responsibility. Freud does not want to say that people 
should blame themselves for the vile content of their dreams (to hold oneself liable-
responsible). Rather, Freud appears to mean that one should recognize that dreams – 
even nasty dreams – are caused by people themselves (to hold oneself causally 
responsible). 
It is easy to notice that the central point of the above-mentioned paragraphs pivots 
on the idea of causality. For example, Freud writes: “Unless the content of the dream 
(rightly understood) is inspired by alien spirits, it is a part of my own being” (ibid.). 
Another way to put it would be to say that unless some external force induced the agent 
to have a dream, the dream is caused by the individual themselves or by the character 
[das Wesen] of the individual.28  
The person can retort, however, that a bad dream is not caused by their values or 
conscious mentation. One could argue that the dream was brought about by the id. 
Freud agrees with this point, but he also reminds us that the id is still a part of the 
individual. In fact, the id is the biggest part of the human character. Given this, people 
should not disjoin themselves from the id or disown the impulses coming from it. As he 
puts it: “I shall perhaps learn that what I am disavowing not only ‘is’ in me but 
sometimes ‘acts’ from out of me as well” (ibid.).  
All in all, Freud apparently tries to show that it is the individuals themselves who 
cause (aka who are responsible for) their unconscious events, such as dreams. 
Sometimes an event can be repelling, and the person can argue that it does not reflect 
their true self, their values, ideals or principles. While it can be true, one should not lose 
sight of the fact that humans are not morally flawless creatures. Apart from lofty moral 
ideals, people are also endowed with the instinctive nature. There are aggressive urges, 
                                                          
28 In the German original text, the word “being” has a counterpart “Wesen”, which could also be 
translated as “nature” or “character”. “Wenn der – richting verstandene – Trauminhalt nicht die 
Eingebung fremder Geister ist, so ist er ein Stück von meinem Wesen” (GW 1925, p. 567). 
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sexual drives, egocentric impulses which sometimes can manifest themselves in human 





6.3. The pragmatic question  
Continuing the discussion of dreams, Freud then suddenly poses a pragmatic question 
about responsibility. What would be the use of taking responsibility for the dark content 
of one’s dreams? 
 
“For any vital purpose, a separation of the ego from the id would be a hopeless 
undertaking. Moreover, if … I might disregard the evil in the id and need not make my 
ego responsible for it, what use would that be to me?” (1925, p. 132f). 
 
 
This is a very good question, as we need to know what function responsibility 
performs in the psychoanalytic counselling practice. But Freud does not give us any 
answer and jumps in to the next topic in which he discusses emotions that prompt the 
person to assume responsibility (see next section).  
I have argued in the previous section that we deal with the sense of causal 
responsibility in Freud’s writing on dreams. Therefore, strictly speaking, Freud’s 
pragmatic question should be: “What would be the use if the person takes causal 
responsibility for their wicked dream?”  
When discussing the value of role-responsibility (see Chapter 5), I availed myself 
of some empirical studies that illuminated this aspect. It would be ideal to use the same 
strategy again, but the link between causal responsibility and mental well-being is not 
particularly examined in the contemporary literature. Therefore, I can only dare to make 
an assumption about the benefits of causal responsibility drawing on the psychoanalytic 
theory. 
The first benefit of causal responsibility could be connected to self-knowledge. It 
is plausible that when people recognize that the origin of some distressing behavior (or 
event) lies within themselves, then they can try to identify the cause of this behavior and 
thus extend their self-knowledge. For example, a hellish dream can be caused by certain 
repressed emotions, or some daily anxieties, or some unresolved conflicts, or by all 
these triggers together. To illustrate the point, it is worth attending to the case of Dora 
(1905). The vignette is: Dora had a psychosomatic disorder caused by her unconscious 
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intention to divorce her father with his beloved woman. Since she could not achieve this 
end by common means (e.g., talks, prayers, threats, pity), she resorted to malingering. 
Eventually, Dora started having psychosomatic symptoms. It should be noted, however, 
that Dora suppressed or forgot the motives of her behavior at some point. Presumably, 
Dora considered her motives as shameful and thus decided to force out this episode 
from her awareness. It could be noticed that one of Freud’s first steps during the therapy 
was to explain to Dora that she had an intention to be sick. The illness was not an 
accident, but it had been engendered by the motives that Dora was not willing to 
acknowledge. As Freud writes: the “illness of this kind are the result of intention… An 
attempt must first be made by the roundabout methods of analysis to convince the 
patient herself of the existence in her of an intention to be ill” (1905, p. 77f). In short, 
Freud endeavored to explain to Dora that she had caused her malaise herself. To put it 
otherwise, we can say that Dora was causally responsible for being sick. It seems 
important that the agent comes to understanding that sometimes people bring about 
many vices and privations themselves. This understanding can be the first crucial step 
towards overcoming the issue that troubles the agent.29  
 The second benefit of causal responsibility could be related to self-control. If the 
agent gets to know the cause of a rotten and unconscious event (e.g., disturbing dream), 
they can take decisive steps to affect this cause and take the unconscious event under 
control. Sometimes unconscious events or unintentional actions run counter to 
conscious values of the individual. But it does not mean that the person cannot do 
anything about it. The fact is that conscious and unconscious mentation are firmly 
interlaced. It follows that by conscious actions the person can considerably affect their 
unconscious processes. Consider dreams as an example. What a person dreams about 
(in the unconscious state) is often the result of what they do, think or feel during the day 
(in the conscious state). For instance, a pleasant dream about a sunny beach might be 
caused by recent thoughts of coming summer vocations, while a dreadful dream might 
be the product of anxieties that the person experienced during the day rushing to meet 
deadlines. But, as I mentioned earlier, people can interfere into unconscious processes 
via conscious means. Suppose Bill had a nightmare yesterday. True, he cannot change 
this fact anyway. It already happened. But he can exert some effort not to have the same 
nightmare again. Bill can try to identify the cause of his nightmare, the trigger, when 
awake. It could be some fears, scary events, anxious thoughts, and so forth. Once the 
                                                          
29 For a detailed discussion of self-knowledge and issues, such as how people can know themselves and to 
what extent see (Cassam, 2014). 
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trigger is identified, it can be changed. If Bill copes with the initial cause of his 
nightmare, he will dissolve the grounds to have the same nightmare the coming night. 
All in all, even though the control over human unconscious can be limited, some control 
still remains available. The main point is that people should not remain a passive 
observer in respect of their unconscious life, but one can actively engage in this realm 
and try to bring it in conformity with one’s goals.  
Loewald makes a remark, which is on target: “Tо acknowledge, recognize, and 
understand one’s unconscious as one’s own means to move from а position of passivity 
in relation to it to а position where active саrе of it becomes possible…” (1980, p. 95f). 
Lear also gives a good summary of this thought: “[Freud’s] point is not about blaming 
oneself for the dream or the impulses expressed in it. It is about … coming to recognize 
these impulses as part of me. And in part I do this by acquiring the practical skill by 
which I can recognize these impulses as they arise – and by which I can either modify 
or redirect them. This is not an activity by which I blame myself for impulses not under 
my control, it is an activity by which I expand my living repertoire and bring these 
impulses into the domain of my life” (2015, p. 109f). 
The third benefit of causal responsibility could be connected to the maintenance 
of the unity of the mind. According to psychoanalysis, the human mind consists of 
distinctive parts: the ego, super-ego and id. These parts fulfil different functions and 
sometimes they can come into conflict. Nonetheless, all these parts belong to the human 
character and constitute mental apparatus. Thus, they form a certain psychological and 
causal unity. As Freud writes: “This ego developed out of the id, it forms with it a 
single biological unit… For any vital purpose, a separation of the ego from the id would 
be a hopeless undertaking” (1925, p. 133ff). Another important postulate of the 
psychoanalytic theory is that the person should avoid any dissociation or detachment 
from any part of the mind. Otherwise, there can occur an internal conflict between 
different parts of the mind.  
Suppose that the person does not want to take causal responsibility for a nasty 
dream produced by the id. One says: “It was not me, it was the id”. In a way, the person 
is right. Indeed, the dream was the product of the id and not the ego. However, there are 
two points that should be taken into account. One: the id is still a part of the person in 
all possible senses. The ego does not represent the complete picture of the person. It is 
at most a quarter of the agent. Two: when rejecting causal connection to the id, people 
virtually dissociate themselves from the id, they dissociate from a big part of 
themselves, thus committing a certain breach in the internal unity of their mind. 
130 
 
Potentially, this can lead to the internal conflict between the ego (with which one 
identifies oneself) and the id (which the person pushes aside).  
To start with, the confrontation between the ego and the id can trigger various 
ego’s defense mechanisms. The defense mechanisms are unconscious psychological 
strategies, which reduce anxiety caused by unacceptable, ego-alien urges (that could 
come from unconscious) (McWilliams, 2011). Many people take refuge in the defense 
mechanisms without realizing it. But the problem is that the defense mechanisms 
function by distorting reality. For instance, one can deny a dream produced by the id: “I 
have not had a transgressive dream” (denial). Or one can forget the dream: “I do not 
remember having any such dream” (repression). Or one can attribute the dream to 
someone else: “It is not me; other people have such corrupt dreams” (projection). Or 
one can try to find excuses or justify the dream: “The dream was not so bad” 
(rationalization). Ultimately, the internal conflict between the ego and the id can result 
in a neurotic disturbance.  
In sum, when the agent takes causal responsibility for their unconscious event 
(e.g., dream), the individual acknowledges both their conscious and unconscious 
processes, and, thus, one manages to maintain the unity and continuity of mental 
apparatus (viz., the unity between the ego and the id). To put it differently, by taking 
causal responsibility the agent can prevent internal fragmentation of the mind, 
dissociation from some parts and processes of the mind, and ultimately one can prevent 
internal conflict. 
I take it that one of the primary messages of psychoanalysis is that people should 
get familiar with all sides of their nature. It is important to embrace both the creative 
and destructive, normative and instinctive, overt and covert facets of ourselves. On the 
one hand, this is the only way how we can get to know ourselves fully. On the other 
hand, this the only way how we can get the most control over our behavior. Some try to 
steer clear of certain unsightly sides of their being. It may be the easiest option, which 
gives some relief at present. But the disadvantage is that one runs the risk of losing 
much control in the long term. If one turns a blind eye to the unconscious processes, it 
does not mean that these processes disappear. Whether one recognizes it or not, the 
unconscious can keep intruding into one’s life remaining hidden in the shadow. Freud 
notes, in this context, that “the ethical narcissism of humanity” ought to be content with 
the fact that people have both the “evil nature” and the “moral nature”. Whoever wants 
to be “better than he was created”, enjoying a wishful thinking that he is ultimately 
good, will achieve nothing more than “hypocrisy and inhibition” (1925, pp. 132–134). It 
131 
 
is interesting that Rogers, representing the opposing school of psychotherapy, draws a 
very similar conclusion. As he puts it: “[T]he curious paradox is that when I accept 
myself as I am, then I change. I believe that I have learned this from my clients… - that 
we cannot change, we cannot move away from what we are, until we thoroughly accept 
what we are” (1989, p. 19). 
It should be noted, however, that the last benefit of causal responsibility (the unity 
of the mind) depends much on some psychoanalytic claims being true: 1) that the ego 
and the id exist; 2) that the ego and id are largely distinct but influence each other 
nonetheless; 3) that there could be an internal conflict between the ego and the id; 4) 
that there are ego’s defense mechanisms etc. There is a good chance that the opponent 
of the psychoanalytic theory would be eager to question any of these claims. Many 
personality theories simply do not divide the mind into different parts, such as the ego 
and the id. I should leave out the question of the plausibility of psychoanalytic theory, 
as this deserves individual and scrupulous research. The goal of my discussion here is 
only to come up with a conjecture why causal responsibility could be beneficial for 
mental health and therapeutic treatment. I find it necessary, however, to stress that this 





6.4. Unconscious and blameworthy 
At the end of the paper on dreams Freud leaves a comment: 
 
“The physician will leave it to the jurist to construct for social purposes а responsibility that 
is artificially limited to the metapsychological еgо. It is notorious that the greatest 
difficulties аrе encountered bу the attempts to derive from such а construction practical 
consequences which are not in contradiction to human feelings” (1925, p. 134).  
 
 
I can see three key points in this somewhat perplexing passage. First, Freud does 
not seem to reject the idea of liability-responsibility in general. It is mentioned, for 
example, that the “jurists” have a job to construct an appropriate concept of 
responsibility, which would serve social purposes.  
Second, Freud does not engage in the discussion of liability. He does not set any 
criteria under which a person could be considered culpable, not here, not anywhere else. 
The “physician”, as indicated, should leave this task to the “jurist”. I explain this by the 
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fact that Freud, as well as Rogers, was primarily a psychotherapist and not a writer on 
law. Both scholars were interested only in those aspects of responsibility that were 
directly relevant to a therapeutic enterprise.  
Lastly, Freud appears to say that lawyers and physicians may take somewhat 
different positions concerning responsibility for unconscious events and actions. While 
a psychoanalyst pays attention to both conscious and unconscious processes, a lawyer 
may want to focus just on conscious behavior or, as Freud says, “artificially limit” 
responsibility just to the operation of the ego.  
I should add some more clarity in respect of this last point. This theme has less to 
do with psychotherapy and touches more the research in ethics. But it will enrich our 
earlier discussion of the value of causal responsibility, and it will explain what is the 
“moral” merit of taking causal responsibility. 
First off, Freud does not seem to distinguish different senses of responsibility, 
which are relevant to psychotherapy and law. If I am right, the psychoanalyst is mainly 
concerned with the idea of causal responsibility rather than with liability. Therefore, the 
therapist naturally holds the individual (causally) responsible for every event (both 
conscious and unconscious) that originates from their character. By contrast, the jurist is 
concerned primarily with liability-responsibility. The jurist understands that if the 
person is causally responsible for the event (viz., that one did harm), it does not follow 
that they are also liable-responsible for this event (viz., that one deserves punishment). 
Suppose Mike breaks some objects while sleepwalking. The jurist can agree that Mike 
is causally responsible for the damage, as it was him who produced this event. 
However, the jurist may disagree that Mike is also liable-responsible, as Mike did not 
act intentionally, he did not behave with “guilty mind”.  
It is plausible that the jurists may not always consider a person responsible for 
unconscious events and actions. In the legal process, the jury needs to establish whether 
the action was truly voluntary. But when it comes to unconscious behavior or events 
(e.g., dreams, forgotten appointments), we cannot always guarantee that the person 
acted willingly (Moore, 1984). It is worth noting, in this context, that consciousness is 
often regarded as a necessary condition for moral responsibility, whereas unconscious 
behavior is often treated as an excusing condition (Levy, 2014). In many cases, a person 
can be exonerated if they commit a crime in unconscious state – e.g., under hypnosis, 
somnambulism. It can be explained by the fact that in the unconscious state a person 
lacks many requisite mental faculties that are essential for accountability. For example, 
a person does not have sufficient self-control, responsiveness to moral consequences of 
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their actions, sensitivity to environment. An unconscious event or action supervenes 
unbeknownst to the will or awareness of the individual. 
That said, it should be noted that the jurists do not restrict legal or moral 
responsibility just to conscious actions, as Freud seems to claim. Unconscious and 
unintentional actions are not always considered as an excuse. Drunk driving, for 
example, which is often accompanied by unconscious state of mind, is generally 
considered as a crime. A possible explanation of this might be that human behavior is 
based on the transitivity of causation. Though drunk driving can be carried out by 
unconscious behavior, it is also preceded by some conscious actions. Drunk driving and 
its repercussions is the foreseeable consequence, and people can take conscious actions 
to prevent it. It follows that one reason why the person can be held legally responsible 
for drunk driving is that the agent failed to take conscious decisions to prevent this 
foreseeable harm (e.g., not to drive to a party, not to stop drinking before the overdose, 
not to ask friends to keep an eye on one another etc.). 
I still doubt that liability-responsibility could have any central place in the 
psychoanalytic counselling practice. This is mainly because of the non-judgmental 
therapeutic attitude that is common for the psychoanalytic treatment (see Chapter 8). 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that psychoanalysis, as the theory of mind, has a 
potential to contribute to the discussion of ethics and conditions for liability-
responsibility.  
I argue that there are two points that could have been made based on 
psychoanalysis. First, people could be held liable not only for things that they 
consciously intend to do but also for their unconscious and unintentional actions, such 
as errors, omissions, forgetfulness, neurotic symptoms etc. For example, the person 
could be held liable for drunk driving, even though the agent drove in unconscious state 
and perpetrated harm inadvertently. Second, as one of the criteria for liability, people 
can consider whether the individual had the conscious means to prevent the unconscious 
or unintentional behavior that inflicted harm. Drivers, for example, are well aware of 
the grave consequences of drunk driving and could make conscious choices that would 
prevent this event. That is, the driver has the means to forestall the harm.  
It is curious that we can find a relevant example in Freud’s psychoanalytic corpus 
when a person is held liable for unconscious and unintentional behavior. In one of the 
early works, Freud defends an argument that unconscious actions and events constitute 
a common phenomenon of ordinary human life (1901). Freud describes a few cases of 
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parapraxes30 in which two agents unwillingly forget some of their tasks. To be fair, it is 
not the place where Freud discusses the question of moral responsibility per se. 
Primarily, it is the discussion of unavowed, ulterior motives. Nonetheless, we can detect 
that the suggested examples implicitly contain the theme of moral responsibility. Here is 
the text: 
 
“A lover who has failed to keep a rendezvous will find it useless to make excuses for 
himself by telling the lady that unfortunately he completely forgot about it. She will not fail 
to reply: ‘A year ago you wouldn’t have forgotten. You evidently don’t care for me any 
longer.’ Even if he should … try to excuse his forgetfulness by pleading pressure of 
business, the only outcome would be that the lady, who will have become as sharp-sighted 
as a doctor is in psycho-analysis, would reply: ‘How curious that business distractions like 
these never turned up in the past!’ The lady is not of course wanting to deny the possibility 
of forgetting; it is only that she believes, not without reason, that practically the same 
inference - of there being some reluctance present - can be drawn from unintentional 
forgetting as from conscious evasion…  
 
Similarly, ... a soldier must not forget what military service orders him to do. If he does 
forget in spite of knowing the order, that is because the motives that drive him to carry out 
the military order are opposed by other, counter-motives. A one year volunteer who at 
inspection tries to offer the excuse that he has forgotten to polish his buttons is sure to be 
punished. But this punishment is trifling in comparison to the one to which he would expose 
himself if he admitted to himself and his superiors that the motive for his failure to carry out 
orders was that ‘I’m heartily sick of this wretched spit-and-polish’. For the sake of this 
saving of punishment - for reasons of economy, so to speak - he makes use of forgetting as 
an excuse, or it comes about as a compromise” (1901, p. 154). 
 
 
There are two important points in the above-mentioned cases. First, the characters 
of the above examples act unconsciously and involuntary. Neither the lover nor the 
soldier choose to forget their tasks. It happens despite their will and awareness. None of 
these outcomes were planned or opted for. As a matter of fact, the agents probably 
would have preferred not to forget their tasks, if they could, as in the above examples 
the option to forget entails some negative consequences: the quarrel with the lady and 
the punishment by the officer. Second, we can see that other people are willing to 
ascribe moral responsibility even for involuntary and unconscious actions. The 
examples would appear to indicate that both characters are held liable for their 
parapraxes, for their forgetfulness. The man is confronted and blamed by his lady for 
                                                          
30 A parapraxis (a Freudian slip) is a minor involuntary fault in action (unintended move), memory 
(forgetfulness), speech (slips of the tongue, pen), which psychoanalysts interpret as the impact of 
unconscious forces (subdued memories, repressed wishes etc.). The ordinary examples are calling 
someone by the wrong name, misquoting, misplacing objects. According to Freud, these errors reveal the 
true thoughts, feelings, desires and attitudes that people may hold in their unconscious. Freud introduced 
this concept in his famous work “The Psychopathology of Everyday Life” (1901). 
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forgetting their rendezvous, while the soldier is punished by the officer for forgetting to 
polish his buttons. 
Freud’s examples seem to correspond to ordinary social practices of assigning 
liability. Forgetting of a rendezvous or forgetting of one’s duty on service seem to be 
real-world examples when people are held culpable. Therefore, I can reconfirm my 
earlier thought that unconscious behavior is not always considered as an excuse.  
Both agents have obligations that they violate. The soldier has a duty to polish his 
buttons, as he is in the service of the Army; while the man has a duty to come in time, 
as he has commitments being in the relationship with his lady. Forgetfulness, 
carelessness, or thoughtfulness can be interpreted here as a clear sign of negligence. It is 
expected that the agents can and should remember important tasks, which they are 
bound to deliver. As Freud puts it: “Both the service of women and military service 
demand that everything connected with them should be immune to forgetting. In this 
way they suggest the notion that, whereas in unimportant matters forgetting is 
permissible, in important matters it is a sign that one wishes to treat them as 
unimportant” (1901, p. 154). Another way how to put it would be to say that the 
individual has a “duty to remember” if they deal with important matters (Blustein, 
2017). Remembering seems to be a norm when it comes to one’s obligations.31 
It is true that forgetting is involuntary and an unconscious event. But a 
psychoanalyst can parry and point out that the person had the means to prevent these 
lapses. As I’ve argued earlier, the conscious and unconscious processes are causally 
interlaced. This fact suggests two points. First, given the interlink, unconscious events 
can represent the natural result of what the person does in their conscious life. For 
example, the content of one’s dreams (in the unconscious state) can be caused by the 
things that the person does during the day (in the conscious state). Similarly, a 
parapraxis can be caused by what the person feels, thinks and does in their waking life. 
For example, the fact that the soldier forgets to polish his buttons can be caused by his 
belief that this task is stupid. The man, on the flipside, might forget his rendezvous 
because he has a desire to break up and start a new romance. Second, given the 
interlink, people have a measure of control over their unconscious processes via 
conscious means. If the agent changes what they do in their waking life, they may 
                                                          
31 Things that the person must remember or can forget concerns the research in ethics of memory 
(Bernecker & Michaelian, 2017). Some scholars argue that people could have a moral obligation to 
remember certain things or events from the past, such as crimes against humanity, to preserve memory of 
radical evil (Blustein, 2012; Rieff, 2016). 
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influence the things they dream about. The same principle holds for the parapraxes. If 
the soldier changes his beliefs concerning the meaning or importance of his duties, he 
may stop forgetting to polish his buttons. If the other man, on the other hand, sorts out 
his priorities, he may stop forgetting about his dates.  
It is plausible that, apart from psychoanalysts, many other people come to see that 
the occurrence of some unconscious events and actions could be averted. The person, 
for example, could make effort to memorize what they are supposed to do, which would 
help them to prevent or to diminish the occurrence of an inadvertent forgetting. By 
extension, the man who is used to swearing inadvertently can train himself not to do it 
while at work with his colleagues and customers. In a way, sometimes an unconscious 
event or unconscious behavior can be regarded as natural consequence of how the 
person treats their obligations in the conscious life. Thus, it does not seem inconceivable 
that sometimes people can be deemed liable-responsible for their unconscious behavior. 
From what has been said above the next proposition follows. I have argued earlier 
that the idea of causal responsibility can be associated with three benefits: the agent can 
become more self-aware, take control over their unconscious behavior and to maintain a 
unity and continuity of their mind. But there is a further substantial moral use. The 
person can also reduce the chances to be blamed for their unconscious behavior when it 
shows itself and affects others. Lear makes a good point in this context: “If I don’t 
engage in this practical activity of making these impulses my own, if I leave them split-
off and unconscious, they will eventually leak out into public space – and then others 
will blame me” (2015, p. 109f).  
 Rightly understood, psychoanalysis trains people to be the masters of their 
unconscious to the degree it is possible. Individuals learn to pay attention to their 
unconscious processes and learn to seize control over them when necessary. Ultimately, 
the service users are trained to minimize the chances that their unconscious gets out of 
hand, bursts out and inflicts any harm on others. 
 
    
 
 
6.5. The feeling of responsibility 
The final theme that should be singled out in Freud’s writing on dreams concerns 
feelings. Continuing the same topic about dreams and responsibility, Freud makes a 
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remark that the individual can feel internal compulsion to assume responsibility for 
one’s dreams: 
 
“Experience shows me that I nevertheless do take that responsibility [for the evil content of 
my dreams], that I am somehow compelled to do so. Psycho-analysis has made us familiar 
with a pathological condition, obsessional neurosis, in which the poor ego feels itself 
responsible for all sorts of evil impulses of which it knows nothing, impulses which are 
brought up against it in consciousness but which it is unable to acknowledge. Something of 
this is present in every normal person. It is a remarkable fact that the more moral he is the 
more sensitive is his ‘conscience’. It is just as though we could say that the healthier a man 
is, the more liable he is to contagions and to the effects of injuries. This is no doubt because 
conscience is itself a reaction-formation against the evil that is perceived in the id. The more 
strongly the latter is suppressed, the more active is the conscience” (1925, p. 133f).32 
 
 
One way to understand this passage is to say that sometimes various moral 
feelings, such as guilt, can impel the person to assume moral responsibility.33 Guilt can 
remind the person of their moral commitments, even if the person decides to disclaim 
responsibility and forget about their misdeeds, burying them deep in the unconscious. 
As Freud writes elsewhere: “Even if а man has repressed his evil impulses into the 
unconscious and would like tо tell himself afterwards that he is not responsible for 
them, he is nevertheless bound to be aware of this responsibility as а sense of guilt 
whose basis is unknown to him” (1916–17, p. 331). 
Imagine the following example. John is an upright citizen, but one day his 
daughter gets very sick; she needs a surgery that is very costly. Unfortunately, John 
cannot pay the bills. He collects all his savings, sells the house, borrows from friends, 
takes a loan. But it is still not enough. Driven to despair, and seeing no other options, 
John decides to commit a robbery. The robbery was successful, and John paid for the 
surgery. But after that, Johns feels extreme pangs of guilt for what he did. He feels that 
                                                          
32 Reaction formation is the ego defense mechanism. It refers to the situation when a person does the 
opposite of what she really wants to do or what she really feels. In this case, the real desires are perceived 
as unacceptable or anxiety-provoking. By doing the opposite, a person tries to conceal her real feelings. 
For example, the individual expresses exaggerated politeness, while feeling hostile. Or, one criticizes gay 
people, while feeling some homosexual urges. 
33 This line of the argument is reminiscent of Strawson’s theory of reactive attitudes (1962). Strawson 
proposes that people maintain the practice of moral responsibility because of the existence of human 
blame-ascribing feelings (called reactive attitudes), such as resentment, anger, indignation, guilt, 
gratitude, forgiveness etc. The main implication of this view is that theoretical justifications related to 
moral responsibility are essentially irrelevant. We need to set metaphysics aside. If responsibility is 
embedded in human attitudes, then any metaphysical conclusions cannot effectively shake it. Strawson 
infers that the practice of moral responsibility is basically unavoidable, for (a) presumably it is 
psychologically impossible to opt out of reactive attitudes, and (b) even if it was possible to obliterate 
reactive attitudes nobody would do that, as the elimination of attitudes would impoverish human 
emotional life and ultimately subvert interpersonal relationships. 
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it is a right thing to admit fault and pay the penalty. Eventually, John gives himself up 
to the police.  
This example is supposed to illustrate the operation and the influence of the super-
ego. Having robbed the bank, John has violated one of his normative beliefs, which then 
caused the haunting sense of guilt. At some point, John decides to surrender, as he 
cannot tolerate these bitter feelings anymore. 
In some cases, a person may be acquitted of charges or excused for some 
wrongdoing. But emotionally, even if acquitted, the agent may still experience certain 
moral feelings, which can press down on the agent and prompt to take responsibility 
anyway, irrespective of adopted social practices or verdicts. Metaphorically speaking, 
people can be imprisoned by the verdict of their own conscience.  
The roots of this emotional phenomenon, according to psychoanalysis, we should 
seek in the activity of the super-ego. The super-ego (or conscience in simple terms) is a 
moral part of mental apparatus. It contains social values, obligations, rules and 
expectations that people internalize during their upbringing and socialization.  
The super-ego can be regarded as one of the methods of social control over the 
individual. To understand this thought better, we can mention Freud’s seminal work 
“Civilization and its discontents” (1930). Freud argues that people and civilization stand 
in deep opposition to each other. Some of human urges represent a threat for the 
peaceful functioning of social community (e.g., a drive for immediate sexual 
gratification, an urge to fight an offender etc.). If every individual had a chance to do 
everything they wanted, this could jeopardize the co-existence of people in a group. In 
view of this fact, society resorts to various forms of control over the behavior of its 
members. It makes sense to distinguish mechanisms of external and internal control. 
External control implies the control exercised by various social institutions. There are 
laws that prohibit various wrongdoings: murder, domestic violence, intimidation, 
harassment, rape, stealing etc. There are also social norms that prescribe how people 
should interact with one another in various situations. If social demands or expectations 
are violated, society imposes punishment. A person can be disapproved, blamed, fined, 
exiled or imprisoned. Internal control, on the flipside, refers to the control fulfilled by 
the super-ego. Under the social influence, people inevitably develop their super-ego. 
They internalize a wide range of social demands, rules and prohibitions, which are then 
stored in the super-ego. In essence, the super-ego can be regarded as an installed social 
representative in every person. It watches closely what people do, think and feel. One of 
the central functions of the super-ego is to make the person act in compliance with 
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internalized social norms. If the behaviour deviates from internalized demands, then the 
super-ego generates various moral emotions as sanctions in response to the 
objectionable behavior. The super-ego, so to say, smites the person, until the latter 
decides to conform to the social expectations. Ultimately, the person becomes cornered 
by the mechanisms of external and internal control with no chance to hide.  
The work suggests two main conclusions. First, there is an unavoidable collision 
between society and the individual. The person naturally strives to exercise instinctive 
freedom, doing what they want to do. But society imposes rules and demands obedience 
from its citizens. Second, society is not interested in the happiness of one single 
individual. The thing is that civilization suppresses plenty of human urges. Indeed, often 
these urges are destructive for society (e.g., fighting, stealing, harassment). But 
sometimes, society may also suppress some constructive human urges. For example, 
some totalitarian societies inhibit the desires for learning, creativity and critical 
thinking. In sum, society is not designed to serve an individual. Rather, it is an 
individual who is to serve the goals of society. A person must sacrifice a big portion of 
their wants for the sake of social convictions, ideals and goals. A person is allowed to 
live and function only within the framework of concrete social rules. Society, thus, 
often yields some unpleasant consequences, entailing conformity, neurotic disturbances 
and creating a natural feeling of discontent among its members.  
The intensity of the super-ego apparently varies among people. The occurrence of 
moral feelings can be proportional to the intensity of the responsibility-related beliefs 
stored in the super-ego. The stronger the normative belief is, the more a person is prone 
to feel culpable and responsible. And vice versa, the weaker the belief is, the less a 
person may be prone to feel blameworthy. One extreme of this situation apparently can 
be detected among people diagnosed with psychopathy. It is well known that 
psychopathy is often accompanied with the impairments of conscience. Obviously, 
psychopaths can understand social rules, but they can lack the experience of guilt and 
remorse for what they do (Nentjes et al., 2017). Another extreme of this situation we 
can find among people diagnosed with the obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). One 
well-known fact is that people with OCD tend to have an exaggerated sense of moral 
duty and inflated sense of moral responsibility (Moritz et al., 2011). Freud was one of 
the first clinicians who documented this phenomenon. This can explain his writing: 
“Psycho-analysis has made us familiar with a pathological condition, obsessional 
neurosis, in which the poor ego feels itself responsible for all sorts of evil impulses… It 
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is a remarkable fact that the more moral he is the more sensitive is his ‘conscience” 
(1925, p. 133f).  
It is very instructive that Freud mentions one of the mechanisms how people can 
come to take responsibility. Nevertheless, Freud does not make an important distinction 
between being guilty and feeling guilty. Moore gives a good commentary on this 
matter: “Even if Freud is convincing when he says that we are compelled by our guilt 
feelings to accept … responsibility, this does not mean that we are responsible. To 
determine whether we are responsible …, we need to know something other than 
psychology of guilt” (1984, p. 345). 
The sense of responsibility produced by the super-ego should be treated with 
caution. Even if a person feels guilty and wants to assume responsibility for this reason, 
it does not follow that this person is really guilty and responsible. There is a possibility 
that the person can have distorted or unrealistic beliefs concerning their responsibility. 
As a result, people can hold themselves responsible for all sorts of inappropriate things 
and feel guilt without a reasonable basis. A guru master, for example, may feel pangs of 
guilt for failing to stop the storm which ruined the harvest in the village.  
Apparently, one of the crucial tasks of the therapist is to examine critically the 
nature of client’s guilt and to dissolve it if necessary. Another task would be to teach the 






This chapter has attempted to determine the function of responsibility in Freud’s 
therapy. Most of Freud’s writing on responsibility can be found in the short essay 
“Moral responsibility for the content of one’s dreams”. I have argued, however, that 
Freud lumps together a few distinct themes in this essay that require individual 
attention. These are causal responsibility, the value of taking causal responsibility, the 
blameworthiness for unconscious actions and feeling of responsibility. I have suggested 
that all four themes have direct relevance to psychotherapy and can extend our 
understanding of the function of responsibility in the counselling situation. What is 
more, the discussion of culpability for unconscious actions also relates to the research in 
ethics of memory. 
 First of all, I have argued that, unlike Rogers, by the broad term responsibility 
Freud refers to the sense of causal responsibility (see § 6.2.). The counsellor does not 
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attempt to persuade the client that they are blameworthy for their unconscious behavior 
(one is liable-responsible). Rather, the counsellor tries to spell out that the clients are the 
sources and frequently enough the authors of all their behavior, including conscious and 
unconscious. For example, people cause themselves unconscious and unintentional 
events, such as dreams and parapraxes. But importantly, this knowledge informs that 
people can also seize some control over their behavior if they want to and thus affect 
their dreams and slips (one is causally responsible).  
 I have also proposed that causal responsibility can yield a few positive 
outcomes, such as the increase in self-knowledge, self-control, ensuring the unity of the 
mind (see § 6.3.) and maintaining moral relations with others (see § 6.4.). If correct, 
causal responsibility can be a very valuable area of work during psychotherapy.  
 Then, I have outlined the reason why people can be considered legally and 
morally responsible for unconscious and unintentional actions in ordinary life (see § 
6.4.). I have suggested that one reason why a person can be deemed blameworthy is 
because they had the conscious means to prevent this unconscious and unintentional 
event but failed to do it.  
 Lastly, I have explained that people – especially service users – can sometimes 
assume responsibility under the influence of moral feelings, such as guilt (see § 6.5.). 
Yet, people can also have irrational beliefs about their duties and thus have unwarranted 
sense of guilt. One goal of the therapist, thus, is to coach their clients to distinguish 
between feelings and facts related to one’s responsibility. 
  Freud and Rogers are very similar concerning the question of liability-
responsibility. Liability does not take a central place in any of these theories. While 
Rogers focuses mainly on role-responsibility, Freud concentrates mostly on causal 
responsibility. I can explain this by the fact that both Freud and Rogers, as 
psychotherapists, did not consider blame, disapproval or any form of punishment 
relevant to a therapeutic enterprise. If the individual understands that they could be 
blamed by a therapist, they naturally become cautious of the honest communication. 
The clients will think twice whether they should reveal any intimate secrets or misdeeds 
for which they could be disapproved.  
However, there are no grounds to think that Freud or Rogers rejected liability-
responsibility in general, especially outside a therapeutic room. In fact, it is plausible 
that both authors tried to prepare their clients to the thought of their liability in the 
social context. Rogers might help his clients to recognize their obligations (to take role-
responsibility), as, among other things, he could well understand that other people 
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would blame the individual for the failure to recognize and undertake their obligations 
(to hold one liable-responsible). Similarly, Freud might encourage his clients to 
recognize their unconscious processes (to take causal responsibility), as he 
comprehended that people could judge the person for failure to take control over their 
behavior (to hold one liable-responsible). Viewed from this perspective, not only can 
psychotherapy contribute to human freedom, but it can also foster human moral 
behavior. 
The last three chapters will shed more light on the place of liability-responsibility 
within psychotherapy. We will consider some conditions for blame (Chapter 7), the 
reasons to avoid blame during psychotherapy (Chapter 8) and methods how to handle 
blame if necessary (Chapter 9). I will start off with Wallwork’s argument that moral 










I have argued for the compatibilist interpretation of Freud’s and Rogers’s theories in the 
previous chapters. I have also mentioned in Chapter 2 that I leave one argument against 
compatibilist reading of Freud outstanding. It is now time to address it, as it relates 
directly to moral responsibility and blame.  
Wallwork admits that, indeed, it is tempting to refer to compatibilism to 
understand Freud. More specifically, it is inviting to refer to the so-called “thin theory” 
promoted by Hobbes, Locke and Hume, which holds that: “determinism is true and yet 
compatible with freedom”, since free will is understood as the act on one’s preferences 
while not being coerced (1991, p. 70).34 Wallwork goes on to add: “If this were Freud’s 
position, there would be no problem about free will, because he would hold, with 
Hume, that the whole dispute derives from the confusion in the meanings of words. 
Once certain crucial terms such as free and voluntary were used correctly, the whole 
problem of free will would dissolve” (1991, p. 71). However, Wallwork points out that 
this compatibilist view “fails to do justice to the concept of free choice that is essential 
for the ascription of moral responsibility” (1991, p. 71). In defence of his libertarian 
reading, Wallwork asserts that to be qualified as a responsible agent people must have 
alternate routes into the future and thus be able to do otherwise at least in some 
situations. As Wallwork puts it:  
 
“To say that an action is free means at the very least that the agent could have done 
otherwise, given the very same conditions – not just that the person felt that he was free 
because he approved of what he found himself doing anyway. If the thin theory of freedom 
were valid, it is hard to see how anyone could be held morally responsible. The excuse 
generally afforded only the insane would seem to be available to everyone – that “I could 
not help what did" – and the distinction, for all practical moral purposes, between hard and 
soft determinism would соme to naught” (1991, p. 71).  
 
 
                                                          
34 We can see that by a “thin theory” Wallwork basically means classical compatibilism or a minimal 
view on free will, which we have discussed in Chapter 3, while parsing Rogers’s position. 
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Wallwork appears to refer to the so-called principle of alternate possibilities 
(henceforth the PAP). The PAP states that to be responsible a person should be able to 
do otherwise.  
It is true that the PAP is a well-known incompatibilist view. However, there are 
no sufficient grounds to conclude that it is actually true. I agree with Wallwork that 
classical compatibilism (the thin theory) fails to give sufficient attention to how people 
can be responsible. Yet, it is important to remember that I defend not the classical 
compatibilist reading of Freud but the mesh view. Mesh theories – and almost all 
contemporary compatibilist theories of free will – are based on the premise that the PAP 
is false. The rationale for this position has been presented by Frankfurt’s challenge of 
the PAP (1969).  
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how compatibilist choosing can render 
people morally responsible for their actions. I attempt, first of all, to defend the 
compatibilist interpretation of psychoanalysis and beat back the claim that 
compatibilism fails to justify the ascription of moral responsibility. In addition, the 
discussion of the PAP will help us better understand the role of moral responsibility in 
counselling work, including Rogers’s and Freud’s therapies.   
In § 7.2., I explain the meaning of alternate possibilities and their relationship to 
moral responsibility. Section 7.3. describes Frankfurt’s challenge of the PAP. Section 
7.4. makes an overview of the Dilemma objection, which represents the most recent 
argument against the challenge. The overview suggests that there is no decisive reason 
to conclude that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. The argument 
of semi-compatibilism, for example, suggests that moral responsibility requires only the 
reason-responsive mechanism. That is, people should be sensitive to moral norms and 
reasons before they make a choice. In § 7.5., I argue that even if it turns out that the 
PAP is true, at the end of the day, this will not have any substantial implication for 
counselling practices like those of Freud and Rogers. I return to the distinction between 
different senses of responsibility and point out that the PAP relates only to the sense of 
liability-responsibility. In other words, the principle holds that people can be held 
blameworthy (liable-responsible) only if they have alternate possibilities. It is important 
to remember, however, that Freud and Rogers are not occupied with the question of 
liability. Their theories focus primarily on role, causal and capacity-responsibility. It 
follows that counsellors of psychoanalytic, client-centered, and probably many other 
traditions would be able to work with the concept of moral responsibility – encouraging 
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people to take role, causal and capacity-responsibility – no matter what eventuated in 





7.2. Alternate possibilities 
Alternate possibilities refer to the ability to act differently at the very same given 
situation. Imagine that a person walks down a road and reaches a fork. There are two 
different paths, two alternative routes. The person has alternate possibilities only if they 
can turn left to the very same extent as they can turn right. 
The theme of existence of alternate possibilities is fundamental in the discussion 
of moral responsibility. One popular libertarian view states that a person is morally 
responsible only if they have alternate possibilities (viz., only if the person can do 
otherwise). This view is known as the principle of alternate possibilities. 
Some relate the ability to do otherwise both to free will and moral responsibility 
(Wiggins, 1973). But others consider it only in the context of moral responsibility 
(Fischer & Ravizza, 1998). Frankfurt, in particular, starts with moral responsibility and 
then extends his conclusions to free will (1969, 1971).  
For accuracy of discussion in what follows, I will distinguish between PAPf and 
PAPm. I shall call the PAPf the principle when free will presupposes alternate 
possibilities. And I shall call the PAPm the principle when moral responsibility is linked 
to alternate possibilities. These two principles, prima facie, are closely related.35 It 
might be that the challenge of one principle can ground the challenge to another one. 
Yet, to remain focused, I will concentrate just on the PAPm in our discussion.  
It should be noted, among other things, that alternate possibilities are impossible 
in the deterministic world. Determinism renders possible just one course of action and 
precludes alternate branches into the future. Given the fixity of the past (preceding 
events) and the fixity of the laws of nature, there can be at most one possible present 
and just one possible future. To put it another way, given the very same conditions, a 
person is unable to act differently at the very same situation. There can be at most one 
possible scenario. The formula is the following: the person can choose only A (not B, C, 
D etc.) at time T and under conditions C.  
                                                          
35 Frankfurt, for example, develops the connection between free will and the absence of alternate 




There is a risk, thus, to associate moral responsibility with alternate possibilities. 
Since determinism excludes alternate possibilities, it will also exclude responsibility. 
The argument can be put as follows: 
 
a) If causal determinism is true, then, given the fixity of the past and the fixity of 
laws of nature, there can be just one possible present and one possible future; 
b) If there is just one possible present and one possible future, people are unable to 
act otherwise; 
c) The PAPm: people are responsible only if they can act otherwise; 





7.3. The challenge to the PAPm 
The PAPm states: “a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he 
could have done otherwise” (Frankfurt, 1969, с. 829). If a person is somehow unable to 
act differently, then they should be absolved from responsibility.  
In 1969, Frankfurt argued that the principle was false (1969). That is, we should 
divorce responsibility from alternate possibilities. A person can be held morally 
responsible, even though they lacked access to alternate paths into the future. 
Frankfurt constructs a hypothetical scenario to illustrate the point. Suppose Jones 
wants to vote for Democrats in the next election. Meanwhile, there is Black who also 
wants Jones to vote for Democrats. Black would prefer Jones to act on his own. But just 
in case, Black covertly sets a special nano-device into Jones’s brain, which can monitor 
Jones’s thoughts and control his will. Therefore, if Jones for some reason changes his 
mind to vote for Democrats, the device will kick in and make him vote for Democrats 
anyway. However, the device will be off, if Jones follows the plan of his own accord.  
Suppose that Jones votes for Democrats voluntarily, and the device was never 
activated. Intuitively, we can consider Jones morally responsible in this case. Jones qua 
rational agent acted deliberately for his own reasons, and he was not coerced by anyone 
to do what he did. He marked the ballot in a normal way. However, we should not lose 
sight of the fact that, as a matter of fact, Jones did not have any alternate possibilities. 
Had he decided not to vote, the brain implant would have forced him anyway. The 
implant ensures that there is only one alternative, only one decision and only one 
possible future.  
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By this example, Frankfurt intends to show that the PAPm is false. The concept of 
moral responsibility does not require a condition “could have done otherwise”. The 
example demonstrates that, on the one hand, Jones could not have done otherwise, as 
the device eliminated any options. But, on the other hand, Jones can be held morally 
responsible because he intended and desired to make a choice he did. In sum, although 
Jones has no actual freedom of action or the ability to do otherwise, still he remains a 
responsible agent. 
The challenge to the PAPm suggests that responsibility and alternatives should be 
separated. Ultimately, this implies that moral responsibility can be compatible with 
causal determinism. It is true that causal determinism eliminates alternate possibilities, 
but it does not follow that it must eliminate moral responsibility as well. Thus, even if 
causal determinism is true, and people cannot do otherwise, people still can be morally 
responsible agents.36  
Importantly, we have now the argument against Wallwork’s claim. We can 
respond that the claim that responsibility requires alternate possibilities is false, unless, 





7.4. The dilemma objection 
The challenge to the PAPm has generated an incredible amount of literature since 1969. 
There are literally volumes written on this subject. But we do not need to canvass all 
existing literature. For our purposes, it will be sufficient to do justice to the most recent 
argument, which indicates the current state of affairs in the debate. 
One of the most recent arguments against Frankfurt’s challenge is known as “the 
Dilemma Objection”. It was elaborated by Kane (1985, 1996), Ginet (1996), Wyma 
(1997) and Widerker (1995a, 1995b, 2000). By now, it has many variations and 
developments. The dilemma consists of two possible scenarios: where determinism or 
indeterminism is presupposed.  
                                                          
36 Dennett also gives an interesting example which bears on alternate possibilities and responsibility 
(1984, p. 133). Martin Luther once famously declared: “Here I stand; I can do no other”. This phrase 
suggests that Luther experiences a certain sense of compulsion or inevitability. However, this phrase does 
not imply that Luther was trying to eschew moral responsibility for his actions. He was well aware of 
moral repercussions of his choice. Neither was Luther giving a testimony of the lack of free will. The 
point is that in those circumstances Luther, in fact, did not require any alternate possibilities. He 
confidently restricted himself with purely one course of action, for only this alternative could dovetail 
with his values. Contrariwise, other options would simply contravene what Luther craved for and what he 
believed in. In some sense, it would be an infringement of his free will. 
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7.4.1. The deterministic scenario 
In the first scenario, it is presumed that there is a deterministic link between the 
readiness (the neural sign monitored by Black that indicates that Jones is going to vote 
for Democrats), choice and the subsequent action. On this horn, incompatibilists argue 
that Frankfurt fails to show that Jones can be responsible under causal determinism. 
Jones is not responsible for his act, for his act could never be different.  
This thought can be explained better if we refer to Fischer’s distinction between 
two types of determinism. Fischer suggests that we can distinguish between an actual 
sequence determinism and an alternate sequence determinism (1982): 
 
“There are two ways in which it might be true that one couldn’t have done otherwise. In the 
first way, the actual sequence compels the agent to do what he does, so he couldn’t have 
initiated an alternate sequence; in the second way, there is no actual-sequence compulsion; 
but the alternate sequence would prevent the agent from doing other than he actually does” 
(1982, p. 33). 
 
 
Fischer then points out that Frankfurt describes in his examples only the alternate 
sequence determinism (brain implant), but he does not show that a person can be 
responsible under actual sequence compulsion. The example considers the case when 
some external device robs Jones of alternatives and thus prevents of doing otherwise. 
But the example fails to consider the internal mechanism that pushes Jones to desire 
what he desires and to make a choice that he does after all.  
To summarize, if causal determinism obtains, it entails actual sequence 
compulsion, which necessitates that Jones acts (feels, chooses) the way he does. Simply 
put, incompatibilists refer to the traditional thesis of incompatibility between 
determinism and responsibility. To respond to this argument, one basically needs to 
rebut the thesis of incompatibilism. 
Some philosophers, however, question whether the incompatibilist thesis is 
correct in the first place. Compatibilists, for example, do not see any threat in the fact 
that there is actual sequence compulsion preceding the action. What is important – a 
compatibilist may respond – is what properties a deterministic sequence provides 
(McKenna, 2003). For example, it is relevant to discriminate between coerced decision 
making and voluntary decision making. While both of these states can be determined, 
there is a manifest difference between them. These two determined states hold different 
properties. In the voluntary decision making the agent can employ a number of mental 
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faculties that are impaired or simply absent in the state of coercion. In sum, a 
compatibilist can respond that it is important to think discriminatively about 
deterministic actual sequences. Coercion is not always the case. It would be prudent to 
avoid making overgeneralizations.  
Semi-compatibilism is probably the most well-known example of such 
discriminative approach to determinism. With reference to Frankfurt’s challenge, 
Fischer & Ravizza developed a view known as semi-compatibilism (1998). The kernel 
of this view is that we should distinguish between conditions for free will and moral 
responsibility. Incompatibilists hold that determinism undermines any true control. The 
most popular argument is that determinism (preceding events and laws of nature) makes 
people do inescapably what they do. Provided people cannot have an alternate path into 
the future, they cannot be rightfully held responsible. Fischer & Ravizza, however, 
disagree with a view that determinism threatens all forms of control. The authors 
suggest distinguishing between two types of control: guidance control and regulative 
control. Regulative control implies alternate possibilities, viz., the ability to do 
otherwise. Guidance control, by contrast, involves two conditions: a) a reason-
responsive mechanism, and b) that this reason-responsive mechanism is yours (not 
implanted). Then, it is proposed that free will and moral responsibility presuppose two 
different types of control. While free will requires regulative control, moral 
responsibility demands only guidance control. Thus, Fischer & Ravizza agree with 
libertarians that free will may presuppose the existence of alternate possibilities. Yet, 
they argue that responsibility does not need the very same type of control as free will.  
To illustrate the point, let’s return to Frankfurt’s challenge of the PAPm. On the 
one hand, Jones lacks regulative control, as he is deprived of the ability to do otherwise 
(due to both the actual sequence compulsion and alternate sequence compulsion). Given 
this, we infer that Jones lacks the type of control that is necessary for free will. But, on 
the other hand, Jones preserves guidance control, as he remains reason-responsive and 
acts on his personal reasons. He understands the moral consequences of his decision. He 
is sensitive to moral reasons not to vote for Democrats. He can also form an intention 
and control his moves to achieve his goal. Jones is able to “guide” his behavior in a 
chosen direction. Thus, it is proposed that Jones can be held morally responsible for his 
choice.  
Fischer points out, however, that it would be false to ascribe responsibility always 
under actual sequence compulsion (1982). Suppose there are inevitable events in the 
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world, which are even possible in a libertarian world.37 An inevitable event – e.g., 
sunrise – will occur irrespective of anything that a human being could do. However, if 
we omit this fact, we may incorrectly expand the notion of moral responsibility for these 
events. We may infer that certain people are responsible for inevitable events, whereas, 
in fact, no one could be accountable for such events. 
Consider an example. Mark believes that he has a power to control the rain. 
Suppose it has been raining for a long time, and it is believed that too much water can 
ruin the harvest. Mark is certain that he is able to stop the rain, but he refuses to do it for 
his own reasons. Suppose he does not want to “waste his powers”. But the science 
suggests that it will rain anyway, regardless of Mark’s actions. Mark would fail to stop 
the rain in any case, even if he willed. On Frankfurt’s view, Mark is accountable, as he 
willingly refuses to use his “powers” to stop the rain.  
Fischer points out that it is important to take into account nomologically 
inevitable events when considering moral responsibility. As he puts it: “The actual 
sequence of events proceeds in such a way that the agent’s not stopping the rain is 
causally necessitated. Similarly, the physical laws that obtain (even in a libertarian 
world) are such that (given present technology) it is causally necessitated that no person 
can stop the Earth’s rotation” (1982, p. 39). In sum, it is proposed that a person can be 
held morally responsible under actual sequence compulsion, unless there are events 
which people cannot possibly control. 
7.4.2. The indeterministic scenario 
In the second scenario, it is presumed that the connection between the readiness (the 
neural prior sign monitored by Black), choice, and the subsequent action is 
indeterministic. For the sake of simplicity, suppose that the readiness occurs at time T1, 
the choice at T2, and the action at T3. Since the T1, T2 and T3 occur in the 
indeterministic manner, the final action (T3) can diverge from the initial readiness (T1) 
that Black detects. In other words, under indeterminism, Black is unable to expunge all 
alternate possibilities. He may try to do this at T1 or T2, yet it will not still guarantee 
the desired outcome at T3. So, we can call Jones’s inability to act otherwise into 
question.  
In this scenario, libertarians agree with Frankfurt that Jones is responsible. But 
they emphasize that Jones retains the ability to do otherwise on his own. In brief, 
                                                          
37 Libertarianism does not assume that everything in the world is uncaused. Even if there is agent-
causality, some events in the physical world can still follow the causal laws. 
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incompatibilists argue that Frankfurt’s example is flawed, for it fails to show that 
Jones’s action is unavoidable.  
Responding to this critique some compatibilists come up with the alternate 
Frankfurt-style examples, which are more ingenious than the original example, and 
which incorporate indeterminism. For instance, we can mention Mele & Robb (1998), 
Stump (1999), McKenna (2003), Hunt (2005) and Fischer (2006). Some propose even 
theological scripts, where the decision becomes unavoidable due to the foreknowledge 
and interference of God (Hunt, 1996, 2000). To understand the response better, I should 
cite briefly Mele & Robb’s intricate example: 
 
“At T1, Black initiates a certain deterministic process P in Bob's brain with the intention of 
thereby causing Bob to decide at T2 (an hour later, say) to steal Ann's car. The process, 
which is screened off from Bob's consciousness, will deterministically culminate in Bob's 
deciding at T2 to steal Ann's car unless he decides on his own at T2 to steal it or is incapable 
at T2 of making a decision (because, e.g., he is dead by T2.) (Black is unaware that it is 
open to Bob to decide on his own at T2 to steal the car; he is confident that P will cause Bob 
to decide as he wants Bob to decide.) The process is in no way sensitive to any “sign” of 
what Bob will decide. As it happens, at T2 Bob decides on his own to steal the car, on the 
basis of his own indeterministic deliberation about whether to steal it, and his decision has 
no deterministic cause. But if he had not just then decided on his own to steal it, P would 
have deterministically issued, at T2, in his deciding to steal it. Rest assured that P in no way 
influences the indeterministic decision-making process that actually issues in Bob’s 
decision” (Mele & Robb, 1998, p. 101f). 
 
 
Unlike Frankfurt’s initial example, Mele & Robb’s upgraded example features 
both indeterministic and deterministic sequences. It attempts to show that an agent can 
have a libertarian freedom (i.e., the choice and the action made on one’s own are 
entailed indeterministically), but apart from this, there can be a deterministic 
mechanism that guarantees that the final action is unavoidable (i.e., Bob steals the car 
anyway). Therefore, Mele & Robb address the previous concerns. On the one hand, an 
agent is free and morally responsible, for his choice and action are made on his own and 
are caused by the indeterministic sequence. On the other hand, the deterministic device 
precludes Jones from acting other than the way he does. The alternate possibilities in 
fact do not exist. Thus, the PAPm is undermined again. 
It is time to recapitulate the whole dilemma objection. On the first horn, under 
determinism, it is assumed that Frankfurt fails to ground that Jones is responsible, 
provided his action is the mere outcome of the deterministic sequence (actual sequence 
compulsion). On the second horn, under indeterminism, it is claimed that Frankfurt fails 
to show that Jones’s action is unavoidable. Jones can do otherwise, for Black is unable 
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to rule out all alternate possibilities. In both cases, libertarians state that the PAPm 
remains unscathed. Compatibilists, however, respond to both horns. On the one hand, it 
is argued that a deterministic sequence (actual sequence compulsion) does not deprive 
people of all forms of control, including control which is necessary for moral 
responsibility. On the flipside, it is proposed to consider upgraded Frankfurt-type 
examples, which illustrate that the agent may be deprived of alternatives even if there is 
indeterminism in play.    
It is curious that in the course of the debate some incompatibilists have altered 
their attitude to the PAPm. Widerker, for example, was a fierce defender of the PAPm 
and a critic of Frankfurt’s example for a prolonged time (1995a, 1995b). Yet, after a 
while Widerker has admitted that it is possible to imagine situations when the PAPm is 
false indeed, and he even suggested a defense known as a “Frankfurt-friendly 
libertarianism” (2009, 2011). However, some other incompatibilists keep resisting any 
new attempts to provide a warranted example in which it is not within the agent’s power 
to avoid the action (Widerker & McKenna, 2003); or one can be responsible under the 
deterministic conditions (Widerker & Goetz, 2013). In fact, it looks like that the debate 
has got stalled in a cycle. It has been unfolding in the same manner for more than 
several decades.  
I started this discussion primarily to respond to Wallwork’s claim that 
responsibility requires alternate possibilities. It is undeniable that the PAPm is a very 
popular and strong incompatibilist argument. But as far as the current arguments go, 
there are reasons to conclude that the PAPm is false. Of course, these reasons are not 
decisive. It is possible that new research could uncover some powerful considerations in 
favour of the PAPm and will beat back Frankfurt’s challenge. But as things stand, the 
strongest arguments suggest that the PAPm is false. This suggests that counsellors can 
well work with the concept of moral responsibility even if determinism is true, and 





7.5. Keeping things in perspective 
Suppose for the sake of the argument that the PAPm turns out to be true. Suppose it is 
proved that responsibility requires alternate possibilities, and thus responsibility and 
determinism are incompatible. Would it mean that Freud, Rogers, the contemporary 
followers of their schools, and all other compatibilism-oriented therapists had to 
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renounce their views that people are responsible agents? Would it mean that they had to 
stop encouraging clients to take responsibility?  
On the face of it, it is tempting to conclude that compatibilist therapists should 
make revisions in their theories and practices. From an epistemological point of view, 
therapists should not promote false beliefs that contradict to how things really are. From 
an ethical standpoint, it might be cynical to delude the clients that they are responsible 
agents, while it is not true. Thus, one should either change the belief that human 
behavior is fully determined or retract the claim that people are responsible agents.  
I argue, however, that even if the PAPm proved to be true, this would not have 
any substantial implication for Rogers’s, Freud’s, or many other counselling practices. 
It is primarily because the PAPm and Freud’s/ Rogers’s theories operate with different 
senses of responsibility.  
We should pose the following question: “What kind of responsibility are we 
talking about when we discuss the PAPm?” There is no doubt that the debate is 
concerned with liability-responsibility. Philosophers basically enquire whether people 
should be blamed or punished for their actions, if they are unable to do otherwise. 
Should we punish Bob for his decision to steal the car? Or should we praise or blame 
Jones for his decision to support Democrats on the last general elections (depending on 
the consequences of Democrats’ policy)? 
Meanwhile, it is important to remember that Freud and Rogers, as 
psychotherapists, are concerned with other aspects of moral responsibility, as compared 
to judges or writers on law. According to the analysis of the previous chapters, Rogers 
is primarily interested in the aspect of role-responsibility, while Freud is mainly 
occupied with causal responsibility. Whether the clients deserve to be punished or not 
has no relevance for their therapeutic enterprise.  
Another important point is that alternate possibilities may matter only in some 
context but not others. Consider the following propositions: 
 
PAPm: 
1) PAPm-liability: to be blamed for an action requires that one could have done 
otherwise. 
 
2) PAPm-capacity: to act as a mature and healthy adult (knowledgeable of moral 
rules, being reason-responsive, and having self-control) requires that one could 




3) PAPm-causation: to bring about an event requires that one could have done 
otherwise. 
 




While it can be argued that the PAPm-liability is true, we can see that the PAPm-
role, PAPm-causation and PAPm-capacity appear to be clearly false. One can undertake 
a certain duty (to go to the polls), while needing no alternate possibilities. One can also 
cause a desirable event (to vote for Democrats), while requiring no other options. 
Finally, the person can be deprived of alternate possibilities, but one can still act as a 
mature and healthy adult (to vote for Democrats after careful deliberation, being 
responsive to different reasons and understanding possible repercussions of one’s 
choice). 
It follows that if the PAPm-liability turns out to be true at the end of the day, it 
may indeed have an impact on interpersonal relationships and the system of justice, but 
it is unlikely to have any considerable impact on counselling practices. On the one hand, 
counsellors will continue working with role, capacity and causal responsibility as 
before. Even if society comes to conclusion that people do not deserve to be blamed, it 
does not follow that people should not develop capacities that could make their life 
more proactive, healthier and ethical. Even if blame becomes inappropriate, it does not 
follow that people should not undertake obligations, that they should not foresee the 
consequences of their behavior, that they should not conform their behavior to legal 
norms, or that they should not try to build moral relationships with others. On the other 
hand, as before many counsellors will continue to keep clear of liability-responsibility 
in their work. If service users expect to be criticised, let alone punished, by their 
therapists, there is always a risk to undermine rapport and effective therapeutic work. 
The avoidance of blame and punishment is not something rare or extraordinary in 
psychotherapy. It seems that a large array of therapists from various traditions – apart 
from the psychoanalytic and client-centered schools – go to great lengths to avoid 








Objecting to a compatibilist interpretation of psychoanalysis Wallwork makes a claim 
that people can be fairly considered responsible only if they have the ability to do 
otherwise (the so-called PAPm) (see § 7.2.). I have argued, however, that Wallwork 
omits the fact that the PAPm has been challenged. Frankfurt provides an example when 
the person can be considered morally responsible, even though they are artificially 
deprived of alternate possibilities (see § 7.3.).  
Frankfurt’s work has generated an incredible body of literature since 1969. There 
is still no general agreement whether Frankfurt’s challenge has been successful. 
Wallwork is right that there are arguments in support of the PAPm. But there is no good 
reason to conclude that the PAPm is actually true. Many philosophers, including some 
incompatibilists, find the challenge effective. Semi-compatibilism, for example, 
contends that moral responsibility requires only reason-responsive capacities (guidance 
control), which people can have in the deterministic world. As of this writing the debate 
continues (see § 7.4.).   
I have also pointed out that the debate around the PAPm does not really pose a 
threat for counselling practice, including Freud’s and Rogers’s therapies (see § 7.5.). 
Alternate possibilities are linked only to the sense of liability-responsibility (blame), 
which is not particularly present during psychotherapy. Meanwhile, alternate 
possibilities have no relationship to other senses of responsibility, such as role, capacity 
and causal responsibility, which are actively employed in the counselling work. It 
follows that clinicians would be able to continue work with the concept of moral 
responsibility (role, causal and capacity senses), regardless of how the PAPm debate 
(liability sense) ended eventually. 
The next chapter will concentrate more on the reasons why psychoanalytic and 










I have argued in the previous chapters that Freud and Rogers do not refer to the sense of 
liability-responsibility whenever they state that people are responsible or should take 
responsibility. Freud, Rogers and possibly many other clinicians are primarily 
concerned with role-responsibility, causal responsibility and capacity-responsibility. 
Yet, it was not explained at length why the sense of liability-responsibility is misplaced. 
Potentially it can be objected that Freud and Rogers simply fail to make it 
straightforward that they are wedded to all senses of responsibility, including liability. 
The aims of this chapter are: a) to explain why Rogers and Freud are not occupied 
with the sense of liability-responsibility; b) to determine whether it is consistent to 
detach responsibility from blame in the counselling work.  
Sections 8.2. and 8.3. investigate the nature of Freud’s and Rogers’s therapeutic 
relationships, pointing out that both types of therapies are based on the non-judgemental 
counselling attitude. I will argue in both sections that liability-responsibility 
(judgements of client’s blameworthiness) is essentially incompatible with the non-
judgemental counselling attitude, which has place in Freud’s and Rogers’s practices. Of 
course, counsellors, as ordinary normal people, can have personal opinions about 
whether their clients deserve blame/ punishment or not. But counsellors, as mental 
health specialists, omit this aspect of responsibility on purpose. Even if they happen to 
have personal negative opinions about their clients, they forbear to express these 
opinions for therapeutic reasons. Given this, I conclude that Freud and Rogers do not 
forget about liability-responsibility, but they deliberately or intuitively keep the distance 
from this aspect in their practices. In § 8.4., I examine the puzzle of “responsibility 
without blame” outlined by Pickard (2011). Pickard points out that the effective 
psychotherapy requires encouraging the service users to take responsibility for their 
wrongdoings and avoiding blame. Yet, some clinicians often find this attitude 
confusing, as ordinarily responsibility presupposes blame responses. One consequence 
of this is that while believing in responsibility counsellors often become judgemental 
with their clients, which can undermine the therapeutic process. I argue that clinicians 
should keep in mind the distinction between different senses of responsibility to 
overcome this difficulty. There is only one sense of responsibility which is interlaced 
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with the idea of blame (liability). Clinicians become confused simply because they 
make a mistake of bringing the sense of liability-responsibility in their work. By 
contrast, there are three other senses of the term responsibility (role, causal and 
capacity) which are not associated with blame anyhow. Thus, clinicians can hold 





8.2. Freud’s neutrality 
The distinguishing techniques of psychoanalytic treatment is taking the attitude of 
neutrality. Neutrality is considered as the recommended psychoanalytic stance in order 
to facilitate work with the clients (Moore & Fine, 1990, p. 127). 
The term “neutrality” originates from 1915 when Freud wrote: “In my opinion, 
therefore, we ought not to give up the neutrality towards the patient, which we have 
acquired through keeping the counter-transference in check… The treatment must be 
carried out in abstinence” (1915, p. 164f). The interesting fact is that Freud actually 
never used the term “neutrality” [Neutralität] in his original papers. It was Strachey’s 
translation of the German word “Indifferenz” [indifference] that Freud actually used in 
the paper “Observations on transference-love” (1915). Nonetheless, Strachey’s choice 
of translation received wide acceptance in psychoanalytic circles, and the term was 
subsequently used by the next generation of therapists. 
Unfortunately, Freud never wrote a distinct essay on neutrality, which would 
embody definitions and details. This was done only by the next generation of 
psychoanalysts.38 Freud gave only brief descriptions and similes of the recommended 
attitude in different papers throughout his work.  
Generally speaking, Freud’s neutrality is commonly associated with a detached 
and non-judgemental clinical stance. This is primarily because of the “surgeon” and 
“mirror” metaphors used by Freud to explain the work of analysts, which are given in 
“Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psychoanalysis” (1912). The surgeon 
metaphor suggests that the analysts should model themselves on the aloof attitude 
                                                          
38 Schafer, for example, describes the analytic attitude as follows: “The analyst remains neutral in relation 
to every aspect of the material being presented by the analysand… In his or her neutrality, the analyst 
does not crusade for or against the so-called id, super-ego or defensive ego. The analyst has no favourites 
and so is not judgemental… The simplistic, partisan analyst, working in terms of saints and sinners, 




similar to that of the surgeon. As Freud writes: “I cannot advise my colleagues too 
urgently to model themselves during psychoanalytic treatment on the surgeon, who puts 
aside all his feelings, even his human sympathy, and concentrates his mental forces on 
the single aim of performing the operation as skilfully as possible” (1912, p. 115). The 
mirror metaphor informs that that the therapist ought to present themselves as a mirror 
for the client. One should reflect back only what the clients show themselves, without 
adding any personal opinions or judgements to this image. As Freud writes: “The 
resolution of the transference, too – one of the main tasks of the treatment – is made 
more difficult by an intimate attitude on the doctor’s part… The doctor should be be 
opaque to his patients and, like a mirror, should show them nothing but what is shown 
to him” (1912, p. 117f). 
Other texts provide some further pointers towards neutrality. For example, 
elsewhere Freud notes that the psychoanalyst refuses an ambition to have a role of 
moral authority who tells people what it is good or bad: “We refused most 
empathetically to turn a patient who puts himself in our hands in search of help into our 
private property, to decide his fate for him, to force our own ideals upon him, and with 
pride of a Creator to form him in our own image and to see that it is good” (1919, p. 
164). 
There is a range of professional reasons to maintain neutrality. First, neutrality 
creates a viable condition to secure emotional safety for the therapists themselves (1912, 
p. 115). A counsellor may work with a vast number of clients daily and thus face a high 
degree of emotional distress. If the counsellor took to heart every word heard from the 
couch, this could apparently affect their emotional state, colour judgements and 
diminish work capacity.  
Second, neutrality facilitates the work with the client’s self-disclosure. One 
problem is that if the counsellor reveals of himself or herself, the client can become 
more interested in the analysis of the counsellor rather than their own. Another problem 
is that the more the therapist discloses, the less the client becomes eager to disclose. 
Having heard of therapist’s personal values, beliefs or feelings, the client becomes 
cautious of revealing those aspects of their internal life that they could find shameful or 
which would run counter to those of the counsellor. This explains Freud’s mirror 
metaphor. The counsellor must show the client only what the client is: what one feels, 
thinks, dreams, values, how one behaves etc. It involves that the counsellor keeps out of 
the urge to advise, to educate or to impose values. One bans any information that could 
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influence the client, introduce distortions and get in the way of the client’s attempt to 
open up and understand themselves.39 
Third, neutrality helps to establish a good rapport with the client. The central aim 
at the start of the therapy is to establish attachment and working alliance between the 
counsellor and client. It is possible to achieve this task if the client understands that they 
will not be condemned in any way during the therapy. The link between two can be 
jeopardized, however, if the counsellor makes a mistake to take sides. As Freud puts it: 
“It is certainly possible to forfeit the first success if from the start one takes up any other 
standpoint than one of sympathetic understanding, such as a moralizing one, or if one 
behaves like the representative or advocate of some contending party” (1913, p. 139f).  
Fourth, neutrality helps the analysts to keep their counter-transference in check 
(1915, p. 164f). Transference is the state when the person unconsciously puts their 
feelings from the past onto the therapist or some other individual. Suppose Sophie 
becomes hostile around a colleague at work, teasing and spreading gossip (negative 
transference). This can be caused by the fact that Sophie unwittingly identifies her 
colleague with a bully she used to know at school and unconsciously brings these 
experiences to the present situation. Also imagine Frank who finds himself acting 
submissive towards his therapist, constantly looking for approval and praise (positive 
transference). This could be a scenario when the agent unconsciously identifies his 
therapist with his authoritarian and critical father. By contrast, counter-transference is 
when the therapist unconsciously projects or redirects some of his or her feelings from 
the past onto the client. In this case, the therapist loses objectivity as one becomes 
overwhelmed by one’s own boiling feelings and unresolved conflicts. The judgements 
of the therapist become contaminated and biased. In addition, the therapist loses focus 
on the client and becomes occupied with their own issues, needs and desires. The 
examples of counter-transference could be: falling in love with the client; wanting to 
rescue the client; wanting to socialize outside therapy; getting irritated if the client 
disagrees; making negative comments about values, beliefs, choices of the client or 
some third party; failure to listen; giving advice instead of allowing the client to form a 
personal judgement; pushing to action instead of allowing the client to make a personal 
choice. In sum, it can be seen that the idea of neutrality is closely connected to the 
                                                          
39 Moore & Fine point out, however, that though neutrality prescribes to avoid imposing values upon the 
client, but some therapists’ values are always operative in a therapeutic situation, such as “search for 
truth, knowledge, and understanding, and those emphasizing orientation toward reality, maturity, and 
change” (1990, p. 127).  
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concept of counter-transference. With a neutral stance in interaction, the analyst can 
make sure that they do not bring in some personal baggage and thus control counter-
transference.  
I hold that from this overview we have reasons to conclude that psychoanalysis 
promotes a type of relationship that is essentially incompatible with the idea of blame 
(liability-responsibility). It does not seem possible to maintain neutrality and to report 
simultaneously that one’s clients deserve blame or punishment for their actions.  
I admit, however, that the analyst could resort to liability-responsibility whenever 
they withdraw from neutrality and terminate treatment. It should be noted that it is 
widely accepted today that there are occasions when it is necessary to depart from 
neutrality. According to Hoffer, these situations constitute: “a) emergencies for the 
patient – e.g., suicidality, psychosis, toxic state, etc.; b) emergencies for someone 
potentially vulnerable to the patient’s destructiveness – e.g., the analysand’s children; 





8.3. Rogers’s unconditional positive regard 
Rogers’s work in psychotherapy has encouraged him to consider the nature of helping 
relationships. As he writes: “In my early professional years I was asking the question: 
How can I treat, or cure, or change this person? Now I would phrase the question in this 
way: How can I provide a relationship which this person may use for his own personal 
growth?” (1961, p. 32). 
A helping relationship is a type of relationship between participants, which is 
designed to facilitate psychological safety and personal growth. Anybody can strike up 
a helping relationship. There should be just the goal to promote development and 
accelerate functioning due to this communication. A helping relationship can cover a 
relationship between two individuals or a relationship between an individual and a 
group. One-to-one relationship can include interactions between a counsellor and a 
client; a teacher and a pupil; a supervisor and a student; a manager and employee; or a 
parent and a child. A group relationship may include interactions between a tutor and a 
class; a physician and a therapeutic group; a chief and staff etc. Potentially, any 
ordinary interaction can be transformed into a helping relationship.  
The helping relationship involves a unique interpersonal attitude, which is hard to 
find in any ordinary interactions. As Rogers writes: “One is the fact that it is the 
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attitudes and feelings of the therapist, rather than his theoretical orientation, which is 
important” (1961, p. 44). Elsewhere, he reiterates: “It seems clear that relationships 
which are helpful have different characteristics from relationships which are unhelpful. 
These differential characteristics have to do primarily with the attitudes of helping 
person on the one hand and with the perception of the relationship by the “helpee” on 
the other” (ibid., p. 49f). 
Rogers outlines ten necessary conditions for the helping relationship, which he 
made up based on his counselling practice and some empirical research (1961, pp. 50–
57). It is easy to notice that Rogers’s helping relationship presupposes setting up a 
blame free environment. This can be found in conditions 7, 8 and 9.  
Condition 9 informs of the need to suspend any evaluations and judgements 
concerning the behavior of another person. The common part of human life is to be a 
subject to external judgements, evaluations, rewards and punishments. This can include 
phrases like: “That’s bad”, “That deserves a good mark”, “That’s mean behavior” etc. 
Rogers admits that he finds himself making such evaluations and judgements like 
anybody else, and they can be of use in some institutions, like schools (1961, pp. 54f). 
But he also comes to realize that such judgements do not create a condition for the 
effective personal growth. Rogers contends that it is worth avoiding both negative and 
positive evaluations, if one wants to create a helping relationship. The main reason is 
that both blame and praise can create the feeling of external threat. When there is blame, 
the person experiences external threat directly, as one is being accused of something. 
But when there is praise, the agent can experience threat indirectly, having in mind that 
if one can tell another person that they do good, they are also entitled to tell that they do 
wrong in some situations. Given this, Rogers’s main recommendation is to refrain from 
any evaluations and personal judgements. As he writes: “I should like to work toward a 
relationship in which I am not, even in my own feelings, evaluating him” (1961, p. 55). 
The point basically suggests that counsellors need to take the attitude of neutrality in 
order to foster the climate of safety. We can see that Rogers and Freud are on the same 
wavelength concerning this point completely.  
Condition 8 reports that one should dodge any type of behavior which could be 
perceived even as a minor threat. This condition has the same justification as the 
previous one. One should be cautious of one’s behavior overall so that another person 
does not get any alarming experience of external threat. Only if the agent feels safe with 
another person, they diminish their fear to open up and to share. They also become more 
confident to face their own personal conflicts that they are used to finding threatening.   
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Condition 7 holds that one should accept another person unconditionally. I take it 
that Rogers talks here about the concept of unconditional positive regard, which is a 
certain hallmark of the client-centered therapy. Unconditional positive regard roughly 
means taking non-judgemental attitude and accepting others, no matter what (Amadi, 
2013; Gibson, 2005; Wilkins, 2000). You accept other individuals, whether they 
perform “good” or “bad” deeds, whether you like them or not, whether you agree with 
them or not. It involves that the therapist sets aside his own standards and places no 
conditions for decent treatment. Unconditional positive regard should not be confused 
with love. One can accept other people as they are but have no affection to them. Nor 
should it be confused with approval. One can accept that another person has the right to 
make a choice but still believe that this choice would be wrong.  
To see what such a view amounts to, it can help to think of a parent-child 
relationship. First, parents can resort to negative regard. This means expressing critical 
and punishing attitude towards the children. Children are punished once they do 
something wrong. Second, there can be conditional positive regard. This means that one 
shows support only when some requirements are met. Parents, for instance, can show 
their interest only when their children excel (e.g., in sports, in school) and withdraw 
their attention or support when children fail. Third, there can be unconditional positive 
regard. It involves showing acceptance to children, regardless of what they do or how 
they behave. If children fail, they are still welcomed. If teenagers disagree with parents, 
it is respected. If one expresses a desire to have a gap year, it is tolerated.  
It is suggested that conditional and unconditional positive regard have different 
impact on the formation of self-worth. If people experience enough unconditional 
positive regard in their childhood, they learn that they have value as human beings, no 
matter whether they succeed or fail. But if people were nurtured by conditional 
treatment, they come to learn that they have worth only under certain conditions. 
Numerous people feel satisfied only when they succeed – attaining popularity, 
recognition or fortunes – and feel down the rest of the time. In view of this fact, it 
comes as no surprise why unconditional positive regard belongs to the conditions of 
helping relationship. As the counsellor accepts the client, the client gradually renounces 
the belief that there are “conditions of worth” and learns that it is normal to cultivate 
self-acceptance even when one fails.  
In summary, I conclude that – like in the case of Freud’s neutrality – the nature of 
Rogers’s helping relationship is intrinsically incompatible with the idea of blame 
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(liability-responsibility). It would be impossible to nurture unconditional positive regard 





8.4. Responsibility without blame 
As follows from the previous sections, Freud’s and Rogers’s practices are based on the 
idea of non-judgemental attitude. This fact supports my earlier contention that Freud 
and Rogers do not refer to liability-responsibility whenever they say that the agent is 
responsible or should take responsibility.  
It can be noticed that we have ended up speaking of responsibility that does not 
embody blame. My argument has been that the clinicians maintain the idea of 
responsibility but refrain from blaming their clients for misdeeds. It should be 
mentioned, however, that some philosophical literature has presented the idea of 
responsibility without blame as a certain clinical conundrum. Pickard argues, in 
particular, that having “responsibility without blame” is desirable in the therapeutic 
work, but this unusual combination may appear as a paradox for practitioners (2011, 
2014). Pickard contends that there is actually no paradox, and that clinicians can well 
divorce responsibility and blame in theory and in practice. Pickard’s strategy is to draw 
a distinction between the meaning of responsibility and the meaning of blame. I agree 
with Pickard that there is no paradox, but I run a bit of a different line of the argument. 
Though I also build the argument on making the distinctions between responsibility and 
blame, I demarcate different senses of responsibility, some of which have nothing to do 
with blame. In general, I hold that the two arguments are complementary, and they can 
make the picture more complete together. This will be explained below. 
Pickard suggests that when it comes to responsibility counsellors have three 
clinical attitudes at their disposal: the rescue attitude, the blaming attitude and the 
responsibility without blame.  
Some clinicians adopt the rescue stance in their work. Such counsellors reject the 
belief that their clients are responsible agents, and therefore they manage not to blame 
them for their problematic behavior. The premise can be that the agency of service users 
is impaired by their disorders.40 For example, it is reasonable to excuse wrong behavior, 
                                                          
40 Apart from psychotherapy, this line of the argument figures heavily in the legal practice, when 
attorneys appeal to the insanity defence, arguing that the defendant is not responsible and guilty by reason 
of mental illness (Asokan, 2016).  
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if the individual lacks self-control of their behavior. Sometimes service users reinforce 
the rescue attitude themselves when they report that they cannot help what they do, that 
they have no choice, or that they feel compelled to act as they do. The shortcoming of 
the rescue attitude, however, is that while believing in the rescue mission, the therapist 
depreciates the agency and potential of another person. Some service users are well 
capable of recognizing their faults and altering their behavior. Therefore, it makes sense 
to motivate such individuals to be more proactive and to do things differently. 
According to Pickard, those who take the rescue attitude tend to believe generally that:  
 
1) Service users diagnosed with personality disorder lack self-control over their 
behavior; 
2) Personality disorder is a disease and gives an excuse;  
3) Therefore, service users are not responsible agents; 
4) Service users should be “rescued”, rather than blamed. 
 
 
Other clinicians, by contrast, often swing to the blame stance. Such therapists 
strongly believe that the majority of service users are responsible agents, but they 
struggle with their blame responses. The rationale of this attitude is that it is worth 
distinguishing the extent of mental disorder. Unless there is a psychotic diagnosis, 
people with personality disorders are healthy enough to understand and control what 
they are doing.41 The disadvantage of this attitude, however, is that believing in full 
responsibility therapists are often prone to become judgemental and attribute blame 
whenever the service users make damaging choices. Blame, in turn, may scare off the 
client and divert from further therapeutic work.  
 
1) Except psychotic cases, service users with personality disorders have self-
control and understand the consequences of their behavior; 
2) Personality disorder does not afford excuse for wrongdoing;  
3) Service users with personality disorders are responsible agents; 
4) Therefore, service users deserve blame if they do harm. 
                                                          
41 For the argument that agents with personality disorders are morally responsible and can be the targets 
of blame and praise see (Bjorklund, 2004). For an example of a moderate approach see (King & May, 
2018). The authors defend the Nuanced view, which holds that there are circumstances when 





Pickard contends that both the rescue or the blaming attitude have some 
substantial drawbacks. There is either the risk of infantilizing the individual, believing 
that service users are not responsible and powerless to make any personal changes. Or 
there is a risk of hurting the individual and jeopardizing the further therapeutic work, 
believing that service users are responsible and thus deserve blame for their 
wrongdoings.  
The way how to escape the Rescue-Blame trap is to take the stance of 
responsibility without blame. This stance does not involve neither rescuing nor blaming 
another person. Pickard reports that she encountered the model of responsibility without 
blame in her work in the Therapeutic Community. Staff members considered patients as 
responsible agents, but they also adopted the attitude of compassion and kept clear of 
blame. That is, service users were held responsible for wrongdoings but not blamed.  
There was a plain explanation for this approach. Responsibility, on the one hand, 
is often considered essential for effective treatment. This is because personal growth is 
hardly possible without the individual recognizing that they commit wrongdoings or act 
in harmful ways. The change becomes viable when the agent realizes that there was 
something wrong in their behavior, and they had the power to change this and to make a 
more adaptive choice in the future. Blame, on the other hand, is believed to be 
detrimental for effective treatment. Based on the clinical observations, blame can bring 
about lots of negative feelings, such as fear, anger, shame, vulnerability, self-hatred. 
Understanding that there is a threat to be condemned, service users can resist self-
disclosure, sabotage therapeutic alliance and ultimately quit the therapy. Those with low 
self-esteem might even give up an attempt to get better and relapse to self-harming 
behavior. 
Pickard notes, however, that responsibility without blame may appear as a certain 
paradox. This differs from the attitude people ordinarily take in response to 
wrongdoings. If one is responsible, and one does wrong, then one deserves blame. The 
first worry is that responsibility without blame may be simply conceptually flawed. The 
second worry is that it may be hard or even impossible to separate responsibility and 
blame effectively in practice. That said, Pickard argues that the paradox is only 
apparent. There is a tendency to lump together responsibility and blame, thinking that 
one requires another. This is what creates confusion. But, in fact, responsibility and 
blame are distinct, and we simply need to keep in mind their distinction.  
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According to Pickard, responsible means that one meets certain conditions to be 
answerable or accountable for one’s behavior. This can involve having conscious 
knowledge, choice and control over one’s behavior. In the clinical context, responsible 
agents can explain why they make certain choices; they are receptive to the reasons of 
others, and they can be encouraged to change their behavior. Blame, on the other hand, 
is about how we respond to the wrongdoing. Usually it consists of negative feelings 
(anger, resentment), critical judgements and punitive behavior. Blame can also involve 
the imposition of negative consequences, such as fine, imprisonment etc. 
We can now see that holding someone responsible and blaming someone for 
something are distinct things. To hold an individual responsible is to judge that they 
meet all conditions to be answerable for their behavior. To blame the individual is to 
judge or to feel that they do wrong. It follows that clinicians can make a judgement that 
clients meet all conditions to explain and change their behavior, but they refrain from 
judging that it is appropriate or desirable to blame clients for their wrongdoings. 
Pickard further suggests that there are two sorts of blame: affective and detached. 
Affective blame consists of various negative emotions, such as anger, resentment, 
indignation, fury, contempt, disgust etc. Or it can be manifested in hostile behavior, like 
putting labels, disapproval, aggression, dislike, criticism, and so forth. On the whole, 
affective blame is what can obviously “sting” other people. Detached blame, on the 
other hand, is a judgement or belief that the person is blameworthy, viz., that one does 
harm having no excuse. This can further involve a judgement that some sanctions are 
appropriate to compensate the harm or that the person should revise their behavior.  
Unlike affective blame, detached blame does not involve an emotional aspect. For 
example, we can judge that some historical figure did wrong and was blameworthy for 
their behavior, but we do not have to feel anything about it. In addition, unlike affective 
blame, detached blame does not intend to hurt or suppress. For example, whenever 
children act dishonestly, parents may point out that they have acted wrong, that they 
should revise their behavior, or there will be some repercussions including punishment. 
Pickard admits, however, that detached blame may hurt sometimes. Judgements of 
blameworthiness can be expressed in a very harsh form. Alternatively, constructive 
criticism can be perceived negatively because of the character of the blamed (e.g., low 
self-esteem, melancholic temperament etc.). But the point is that detached blame can be 
also expressed without offending another person.  
Pickard then concedes that some sort of blame may, in fact, be in place during an 
effective therapy. Detached blame may be of use, if it helps clinicians to point out 
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mistakes of their clients and encourage change. However, affective blame, on Pickard’s 
view, is always detrimental to good treatment and needs to be avoided. Hardly is it 
possible to keep the therapy going if service users expect to be attacked or defamed. 
This applies both to private therapy and system of justice (Lacey & Pickard, 2013; 
Pickard & Ward, 2013). Under affective blame, offenders become either more hostile or 
defendant, and the possibility of rehabilitation falls short. So, responsibility without 
blame, strictly speaking, means responsibility without affective blame. Pickard 
concludes that mental health staff need to “strike a difficult balance” in their work: one 
ought to be tolerant of harmful choices of one’s clients, motivate them to take 
responsibility for their choices and refrain from expressing affective blame (2011, p. 
220). 
Turn now to the alternative line of the argument. I agree that there is no paradox 
in holding people responsible and eschewing blame. This becomes apparent when we 
consider Hart’s taxonomy (1968). It suggests that there are four senses of responsibility, 
and only one of them is linked to blame. How can clinicians hold service users 
responsible but not blame them? The answer is straightforward: clinicians can work 
with the senses of role, causal or capacity-responsibility. None of these senses alone 
embodies the idea of blame. Working with role-responsibility, the therapist simply 
encourages the client to recognize their obligations or to undertake some tasks. By 
causal responsibility, the therapist merely clarifies the link between a certain outcome 
and the behavior of the client. And with reference to capacity-responsibility, the 
therapist only points out that the client has capacities of a normal and healthy adult, 
such as self-control, choice and reason-responsiveness. 
Of course, it would be wrong to say that the aforesaid senses have nothing to do 
with the discussion of blame. As mentioned before, role, capacity and causal 
responsibility can be considered as necessary conditions for retribution (liability-
responsibility). But importantly, none of these senses alone is a sufficient condition for 
blame. Take causal responsibility as an example. To judge whether blame is pertinent, 
we need to know whether the agent contributed to the harm anyhow. But even if the 
agent was involved in causing harm, it does not follow that they necessarily deserve 
blame. A person, for example, can be involved in a car crash, colliding with other cars, 
but still not blamed, as he or she did not initiate the accident.  
I take it that the blaming attitude described by Pickard basically means liability-
responsibility. Liability-responsibility is the most common understanding of 
responsibility, which has a place in ordinary human relationships and the system of 
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justice when people judge whether one deserves (meets all necessary conditions) to be 
blamed or punished. Those who take the blaming attitude simply make a mistake of 
applying the ordinary, legal sense of responsibility, which is not particularly helpful for 
the therapeutic work. There is no wonder why the therapist thereby becomes prone to 
ascribe blame in this case. Like a judge or a prosecutor, the therapist gets interested only 
in the ethical and criminal aspects of their clients’ behavior, and when time comes one 
is ready to deliver a verdict.  
The rescue attitude mentioned by Pickard appears to mean that clinicians do not 
employ any sense of responsibility at all. Trying to escape an adverse impact of blame, 
these therapists make a mistake to deny all senses of responsibility altogether. They 
neither encourage service users to take any obligations in their life, nor to recognize 
causality of events in their life, nor to employ any capacities, such as making choices or 
exercising self-control.  
It is hard to deny that both blaming and rescue attitudes have some serious flaws, 
and thus we need to seek a better option. 
As an alternative, it is suggested to have responsibility without blame. According 
to Pickard, responsibility means that the person meets certain conditions to be 
answerable for their behavior. And these conditions include having conscious 
knowledge, choice and self-control of one’s behavior. Referring to our terminology, 
Pickard virtually outlines the sense of capacity-responsibility. To be a participant of 
moral relations, the agent must have certain capacities of a mature and healthy adult. It 
is curious that Hart and Pickard mention almost identical capacities, such as choice, 
self-control and knowledge (Hart, 1968, p. 227).  
I should point out, however, that it would be too narrow to relate responsibility 
just to the sense of capacities. We should not forget that apart from capacity-
responsibility, we can also distinguish role and causal responsibility. It is important to 
keep this distinction in mind, as the therapy can involve the work with only one of the 
senses of responsibility. This can be well exemplified by Freud and Rogers. While 
Rogers was predominantly occupied with role-responsibility, Freud mostly referred to 
the sense of causal responsibility.  
But I suppose Pickard does not intend to restrict responsibility just to the sense of 
capacity-responsibility. She appears just to put an emphasis on this aspect, while 
remaining open to the view that responsibility can also capture the senses of causality 
and duty.  
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In the meantime, Pickard makes an essential distinction between different sorts of 
blame, which can extend our understanding of liability-responsibility. My argument has 
been that both Freud and Rogers steer clear of liability-responsibility. But we should be 
aware that sometimes clinicians from Freud’s and Rogers’s traditions can withdraw 
from neutrality and ascend to the level of liability-responsibility. This can happen, for 
example, in the cases of emergencies when the service users pose a threat either to 
themselves or others. In addition, we should know that it can be natural for clinicians 
from some other traditions to work with the aspect of liability-responsibility routinely. I 
have personally met counsellors who do not shy away from making critical and 
affective judgements to their clients from time to time (affective blame). Some other 
therapists see it as their role just to point out that some aspect of their client’s behavior 
is wrong, even though they try not to sound harsh and judgemental (detached blame). 
Whether critique is good or not for therapy, and when it can be appropriate is the 
subject of another discussion. What matters for us is the fact that liability-responsibility 
can take place during the therapy. In this case, it is useful to have in mind the distinction 
between detached and affective blame.  
It rings true that affective blame would be destructive for a good therapeutic 
relationship, as it intends to suppress another person emotionally and even physically. It 
is also true that detached blame can be unpleasant and can jeopardize work with some 
clients. Nonetheless, one should know that if expressed in tactful and respectful form, 
detached blame does not have to traumatize or scare off at least some service users. This 
suggests that if the therapist is to work with liability-responsibility for some reason, one 
should focus precisely on detached blame and do one’s best to forbear from affective 
blame.  
The table below makes a short summary of our discussion: 
 









(1) Legal liability:  
 
Criminal punishment, fine, 
imprisonment 
 
(2a) Moral liability:  
Affective blame 
 
The expression of reactive 
attitudes, such as indignation, 




(2b) Moral liability:  
Detached blame 
 
Judgement that one does harm to 
oneself or others having no 





Conscious knowledge, choice, self-control 
 
(2) Causal responsibility 
 








 As compared to our original table (see § 5.2.), I have made some addition, 
pointing out that liability-responsibility can embody two distinct moral responses to a 
wrongdoing: affective and detached blame. Counsellors should be aware of this 






The first goal of the chapter has been to provide further explanation why we should not 
interpret the broad term “moral responsibility” used by Freud and Rogers as the sense of 
liability-responsibility, which involves blame and punishment. My argument has been 
that the idea of blame would be at odds with the nature of non-judgemental relationship, 
which is common for Freud’s and Rogers’s practices.  
Both Freud and Rogers defend the view that it is important to suspend blame 
attitudes in the work with the client. Psychoanalysis promotes the idea of therapeutic 
neutrality towards the client (see § 8.2.), while Rogerian therapy is committed to the 
concept of unconditional positive regard towards the client (see § 8.3.). Taken together, 
non-judgementalism is considered in both cases as a necessary condition for effective 
treatment, helping to control counter-transference, to create the climate of psychological 
safety for both parties, to stimulate rapport, to encourage self-disclosure and ultimately 
to work towards change.  
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I argue that it is not that two authors simply fail to impart that they are wedded to 
all senses of responsibility, including the aspect of blame and punishment. The more 
plausible explanation is that two authors intentionally or intuitively omit the sense of 
liability-responsibility, as the idea of blame would contradict the non-judgemental 
therapeutic attitude. 
The second goal of the chapter has been to explain how it is possible to hold a 
person responsible but refrain from blame (see § 8.4.). Pickard suggests that some 
clinicians can perceive responsibility without blame as a certain paradox. Pickard’s 
solution is to show that responsibility and blame are distinct things. Responsibility 
refers to certain conditions for the person to be answerable for one’s behavior, such as 
having conscious knowledge, choice and control of one’s behavior. Blame, on the other 
hand, implies our negative response to the wrongdoing. With this distinction in mind, 
clinicians can hold a person responsible but avoid blaming them. That is, one can judge 
that a person meets all conditions to answer and change their behavior but also judge 
that it is not desirable to respond critically to their misdeed.    
Aligned with Pickard’s view, I have argued that there is no paradox at all. Blame 
and responsibility are interwoven only in one sense of the term responsibility (liability-
responsibility). But there are also three other senses of responsibility (role, causal and 
capacity) that do not entail a blame response. The clinician, thus, can hold the service 
user responsible (in role, causal or capacity sense) and easily avoid blaming them. It is 
not to deny that the counsellors, as normal people, could not think of liability and form 
their personal opinions about whether their clients deserve blame/ punishment or not. It 
is just that they omit the question of liability in their counselling work and refrain from 
voicing their judgemental opinions whether someone is culpable or not for professional 
reasons. 
Yet, as compared to Pickard’s position, I have also argued that responsibility 
should not be associated solely with the sense of capacities. Responsibility can include 
three distinct and important aspects: role, capacity and causality. When it comes to 
therapy, clinicians can either focus on one of these senses or swing between them. We 
have discovered, for example, that Freud highlighted the sense of causal responsibility, 
while Rogers was primarily occupied with role-responsibility.    
Though the attitude of neutrality is recommended by some reputable therapies, 
sometimes it can be extremely hard to avoid affective blame. In the final chapter of this 
thesis, we will consider some techniques that could be used by counsellors to pacify 
their emotions and take blame under control. 
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It should be noted that the non-judgemental attitude advocated by Freud and Rogers can 
be extremely hard to achieve. Even trained and experienced specialists – including 
Freud and Rogers – could wrestle sometimes with their blame feelings.  
It is hard to find any instructions in Freud’s or Rogers’s corpus how exactly one 
can manage blame. This appears to be a considerable omission, given the fact that in 
both therapies the non-judgemental attitude constitutes the foundation of therapeutic 
intervention, and the achievement of this attitude is not the easy one.  
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to reveal some methods how counsellors 
and even ordinary people can cope with blame if needed.  
In § 9.2., I intend to determine the type of blame-free relationship which is 
common for Freud’s and Rogers’s therapies. I point out that there can be different 
degrees of blame-free relationship, which may involve different mechanisms how to 
cope with blame. While suspension means temporary removal of blame attitudes only in 
some situations (e.g., therapy, excuses), abolition implies the removal of blame attitudes 
from human interactions altogether. I then go on to argue that Freud and Rogers are 
committed to the idea of suspension, rather than abolitionism. In § 9.3., I review the 
arguments that the belief in determinism and attention to past histories could mortify 
blame responses. I argue, however, that these mechanisms may fail to give a sufficient 
effect under certain conditions. For example, attention to past histories may fail to 
extinguish blame fully if people encounter the cases of violent crimes or radical evil. 
There are also reports that incompatibilists fail to cope with their blame feelings, despite 
their convictions that people are not responsible. In § 9.4., I argue that another 
mechanism to temper blame would be to attend to the underlying beliefs of blame 
feelings. Drawing on the ABC model used in cognitive psychotherapy, I explain that 
feelings are often based on certain beliefs. Blame feelings, for example can be caused 
by the normative beliefs about the world and others (e.g., the “demand for good will”). 
The model also suggests that it is possible to change one’s feelings, if one identifies and 







9.2. Reasons to stay cool 
Our first task is to determine the type of blame-free relationship which is presupposed 
by Freud’s and Rogers’s therapies. I will explain below that therapies may promote 
different extents or regimes of blame-free interaction. 
Ordinary interpersonal relationships between normal adults include blame-
ascribing feelings and behavior, which are commonly known in the philosophical 
literature as reactive attitudes. Reactive attitudes are expressed as a response towards 
the good will or ill will of other people (Strawson, 1962). Technically, reactive attitudes 
can be divided into three groups (Strawson, 1962, p. 29).42 Personal attitudes are 
expressed by people who are directly involved in the situation. They involve anger, 
resentment, hurt feelings, forgiveness, gratitude or love. For example, if Ann offends 
Kate, then Kate may feel anger as a personal response. Vicarious attitudes are expressed 
by people who witness the situation but do not participate in it personally or directly. 
These can include moral indignation, disapproval and condemnation. For instance, Jade 
may see Ann offending Kate and feel indignant about this misconduct. Self-directed 
attitudes are experienced by those who do harm. They include shame, guilt and remorse. 
For example, Ann may feel guilty after she offended Kate. 
However, there can also be relationships without reactive attitudes. People may 
become willing either to suspend reactive attitudes for some reasons or to abandon them 
completely.  
9.2.1. Suspension 
Suspension implies that the agent stops reactive attitudes temporarily under certain 
conditions. But when exactly do we suspend reactive attitudes? There are minimally 
three conditions: exemption, excusing pleas and professional purposes. The table below 
makes a short summary: 
 
                                                          
42 There is no universally accepted list of reactive attitudes. Strawson is the author of the first and 
extensive list, which amounts reactive attitudes to a pretty vast spectrum of emotions, including anger, 
resentment, hurt feelings, forgiveness, gratitude, love, indignation, moral disapprobation, shame, guilt, 
remorse, compunction, feeling bound or obliged, and feeling responsible (1962, pp. 21, 28, 29). By 
contrast, Wallace defends a restrictive list, which includes only resentment, indignation, and guilt (2014, 
p. 122). The argument is that some feelings classified as reactive attitudes by Strawson do not evidently 
presuppose moral responsibility. Love and hurt feelings, for example, often occur outside moral 
transactions. For instance, it is possible to love a person or a thing that cannot be classified as a moral 
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Exemption refers to the subjects who cannot be qualified as adequate participants 
of moral relations. This primarily concerns animals, children and people with abnormal 
behavior and disorders. The premise here is that it is not appropriate to expect any 
moral behavior and manifestation of good will from such agents. A subject of this sort 
simply lacks the ability to display good will and comply with social norms and 
expectations. Given this, people decide to suspend blame or praise towards these 
subjects. This may consist of phrases like: “This person suffers from schizophrenia”, 
“He is just a child”, “It was the instincts”, “She acted under hypnosis”, “He was 
brainwashed” etc. 
Excuses refer to those who did not intend to breach moral norms. This mainly 
includes accidents and unintentional behavior. The premise in this case is that we do not 
believe that another person breached moral norms or the demand for good will on 
purpose. It was just fortuity or bad luck. Having this in mind, people can excuse and 
suspend blame towards the misconduct of others. This may include phrases like: “It was 
an accident”, “He did not mean to”, “He was cornered”, “Someone pushed him”, “He 
had nothing to do”, “He was given no other options” etc. 
Professional purposes cover situations when it is necessary to avoid reactive 
attitudes in order to achieve certain goals. A doctor, for example, can freeze his or her 
emotions to keep a cool head when performing a surgery. Similarly, a therapist may 
decide to suspend reactive attitudes at work with the client, considering that blame can 
jeopardize any therapeutic progress. It is noteworthy that the counsellor can consider the 
client to be an adequate participant of moral relations, who does not fall under the 




Both suspension and abolition involve blame-free relationships, but there is a 
considerable difference between the two. Suspension implies that the agent stops 
reactive attitudes temporarily in one situation or another. Abolition entails, on the 









It is illogical and unfair to express certain 
attitudes, if people are inevitably determined 
to do what they do. 
 
Practical irrationality It is unhelpful to express some attitudes, as 










One abandons reactive attitudes and rejects 
the belief in free will and moral 




One abandons reactive attitudes but endorses 
the belief in free will and moral 





The first question that needs to be raised is: “Why would anyone want to abandon 
reactive attitudes?” Abolitionism seems to be an effortful enterprise, to say nothing of 
the consequences it may entail. I argue that there are at least two motives which could 
underlie abolitionism: theoretical irrationality and practical irrationality.  
Theoretical irrationality is connected to the metaphysical considerations about the 
role of reactive attitudes. Suppose there is no libertarian free will. People are simply 
determined to do what they do. In this light, some human attitudes automatically lose 
sense. There are two reasons why (Milam, 2014). First, there is an epistemological 
error. That is, some reactive attitudes become unreasonable, as they contradict to some 
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facts about the world. Take, for example, resentment. When people resent, they believe 
that another person could have done otherwise. It is believed, for instance, that one 
could have refrained from breaking a promise. But the thing is that people get the facts 
wrong. It is impossible to do otherwise in the deterministic world. What people do, 
therefore, is that they mistakenly ascribe properties that other individuals cannot 
possibly have. Second, there is a moral error. In other words, if people could not escape 
the way they act, it becomes unfair to express blame or praise attitudes towards their 
behavior. Determinism implies that it was simply meant to happen. We do not blame a 
car that breaks down. Nor do we praise the Sun for rising. These events were meant to 
be, they could not have been otherwise. The same principle holds to human behavior. A 
genius, for example, was determined (e.g., by his genes, environment etc.) to make a 
brilliant breakthrough B, on day D, at time T. Alternatively, a thief was determined to 
steal from a person P, on day D and at time T. There is nothing free in these events and 
behavior. Thus, praise or blame, as attitudes, are misplaced.  
Practical irrationality, on the other hand, refers to the merit of reactive attitudes 
for human life per se. The motive suggests that reactive attitudes can result in some 
undesirable consequences: provoke maladaptive behaviour, deteriorate mental health, 
undermine interpersonal relationships, or exert a debilitating effect on society. Thus, 
one can argue to forswear blame attitudes (e.g., resentment, guilt, shame or damning 
anger) for the sake of personal and social well-being.   
In a way, the practical motive is more radical than the theoretical one. It contends 
that it is vital to discard reactive attitudes, regardless of any metaphysical conditions. 
Irrespective of the fact whether people have free will or not, it may be still appealing to 
abandon some reactive attitudes, as by this move people may be able to enhance the 
quality of their life. 
The second question that we should pose is: “Who would endorse abolitionism?” 
Milam has proposed to associate abolitionism with free will sceptics (e.g., hard 
incompatibilists), with those who deny the existence of free will and reject the view that 
people are morally responsible (2014). However, this view does not capture the whole 
picture. My contention is that abolitionism can be endorsed both by sceptics and 
advocates of free will. I propose to distinguish between hard abolitionists and soft 
abolitionists for the sake of precision. Hard abolitionism refers to those who wish to 
abandon both reactive attitudes and reject the belief in free will and moral responsibility 
(e.g., hard incompatibilists). Soft abolitionism, by contrast, refers to those who want to 
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abandon reactive attitudes (at least one) but uphold the belief in free will and moral 
responsibility (e.g., compatibilists, libertarians, revisionists, illusionists).  
Basically, my argument is that abolitionism can be attractive under all 
metaphysical positions. It all boils down to the motive of abolition which one supports. 
On the one hand, free will sceptics tend to focus on the motive of theoretical 
irrationality. That is, sceptics hold that it is illogical to express blame or praise, if people 
are inevitably determined to do what they do (Milam, 2016; Pereboom, 2001; Sommers, 
2007). On the other hand, a supporter of free will may be eager to endorse the motive of 
practical irrationality, while not being concerned with theoretical or metaphysical 
reasons. One can believe, rightly or wrongly, that some blame attitudes simply do more 
harm than good, and therefore it is worth avoiding them. For example, a person can 
consider shame as a self-defeating emotion, which deteriorates one’s mental well-being. 
Alternatively, one can believe that damning anger and resentment wreck interpersonal 
relations and underlie various social ills, such as conflicts, terror attacks, wars and even 
genocide. It should be noted that the belief in free will would be well compatible with 
abolitionism under this condition. The agent can believe in free will but also hold that it 
is appropriate to give up some reactive attitudes anyway for personal or social good. A 
libertarian, for example, believes that people have free will and can do otherwise in 
some situations. It follows that, theoretically, the libertarian may find reactive attitudes 
as fair and logical responses towards a misdeed, as the libertarian believes that another 
person could have prevented the harm. But practically, the libertarian may also decide 
to refrain from resentment, for instance, considering it as a self-harm response. In the 
final analysis, the libertarian can appeal to a wrongdoer based on normative reasons and 
even demand legal punishment for the wrongdoing but also steer clear of resentment for 
one’s own good. 
I have introduced the above material so that the reader had a clear understanding 
of what type of blame-free relationships we have on the table when we consider Freud 
and Rogers. Counselling theories potentially can endorse different views concerning 
viable therapeutic and personal relations. Some clinicians may advocate, rightly or 
wrongly, ordinary interpersonal relationships both in therapy and everyday life, which 
involve all sorts of reactive attitudes. Others can be committed to suspension during 
therapy, which seems to be the most common and uncontroversial practice. Still, others 
might endorse hard or soft abolitionism. 
To the best of my knowledge, a counselling theory that approaches to soft 
abolitionism is Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT). First, REBT supports the 
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belief in free will, namely in compatibilism. As Ellis, the founder of REBT, writes: 
“Although REBT is not absolutistic in its espousal of free will, and to a large degree 
accepts a soft deterministic position…like most other therapies, its practitioners believe 
in will or agency, else they would not try to help people change” (2002, p. 94). Second, 
REBT argues that it is helpful to restrain some blame attitudes in one’s daily life to 
maintain a good level of mental well-being (practical motive for abolition). According 
to REBT, a few reactive attitudes (such as guilt, hurt feelings, shame and damning 
anger) constitute a group of unhealthy negative emotions, and it is suggested to replace 
these unhealthy emotions with more healthy negative emotions (such as remorse, 
sorrow, disappointment and irritation) (Dryden & Branch, 2008). I interpret that REBT 
leans towards abolitionism rather than suspension, as it proposes to extinguish a set of 
reactive attitudes overall in one’s daily life and not just to suspend them under certain 
conditions (e.g., when there are excuses). Yet, I cannot relate REBT to soft abolitionism 
entirely, as it is wedded only to the “minimization” of reactive attitudes rather than to 
the “extermination” of them.43 Taken together, I conclude that REBT represents a 
certain transitive position: it is not a suspension already, but it is not a pure abolition 
yet.  
Meanwhile, I am positive to infer that Rogers’s and Freud’s therapies belong to 
the suspensive practices. Both clinicians defend the view that it is necessary to have a 
non-judgemental attitude only under some conditions: within clinical settings or when 
one wants to have a helping communication. But they do not argue to erase reactive 
attitudes universally and completely from human daily life.  
On the face of it, suspension appears to be much easier task than abolition. But in 
reality even suspension can be a tall order. Some of Freud’s patients – Wortis (1954), 
Doolittle (1956), Blanton (1971), Kardiner (1977) – testify that sometimes Freud was 
apt to lose his temper, despite his straightforward instruction for abstinence. Wortis, for 
example, shares his recollection: “He [Freud] seemed to be a bit hard of hearing, but did 
not admit it. On the contrary he continually criticized me for not talking clearly and 
loudly enough. “You’re always mumbling,” he said with some petulance, and he gave a 
mumbling imitation, “like the Americans do. I believe it is an expression of the general 
American laxity in social intercourse…” (1954, p. 24).44 Meanwhile, Rogers admitted 
himself that it could be challenging and tricky to maintain unconditional positive regard 
                                                          
43 Dryden’s quote from private correspondence with the author. 
44 Late in life, Freud suffered from mouth cancer and struggled with speaking and hearing debilities 
caused by numerous jaw surgeries. 
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on a regular basis. As he writes: “I believe … that the effective therapist experiences 
unconditional positive regard for the client during many moments of his contact with 
him, yet from time to time he experiences only a conditional positive regard—and 
perhaps at times a negative regard, though this is not likely in effective therapy. It is in 
this sense that unconditional positive regard exists as a matter of degree in any 
relationship” (1957, p. 101). Rogers’s point seems to be that counsellors should aspire 
to unconditional positive regard, but they should also realize that it may be an uphill 
battle and even sometimes impossible to put it into practice, and thus clinicians should 
not be too hard on themselves if they fall short in this enterprise.45  
Below, we will consider some methods which could be of use to crusade affective 





 9.3. Adopting new beliefs 
The thought how to manage blame occupies many philosophers. One line of the 
argument is that the belief in determinism can alleviate blame-ascribing attitudes (Kane, 
1996, p. 84; Pereboom, 2001, p. 99; G. Strawson, 1986, p. 88; Watson, 1987, p. 259). 
Provided people acquired a steadfast belief in determinism, they would manage to 
handle reactive attitudes. As Nagel claims: “When we first consider the possibility that 
all human actions may be determined by heredity and environment, it threatens to 
defuse our reactive attitudes as effectively as does the information that a particular 
action was caused by the effects of a drug”  (1986, p. 125). Relatedly, Pereboom points 
out that history knows examples when people dispense with their old attitudes in the 
light of new beliefs, even if the attitudes are profoundly entrenched (2001, p. 98f). An 
example would be the tempering of racist and sexist attitudes after society accepts new 
progressive and democratic beliefs about equality of all people. A new belief can be that 
“People do not differ substantially across race and gender”. As Pereboom puts it: “This 
reflection could and should radically alter human attitudes and practices, even if they 
are deeply rooted and longstanding” (2008, p. 226). 
However, it is important to consider one caveat. Even if people have managed to 
cease blame attitudes concerning gender and race, it does not follow that people can 
                                                          
45 By way of example some clinicians report that it is extremely hard to achieve unconditional positive 
regard in the work with hostile and antisocial personalities (Freeth, 2007, p. 136ff).  
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equally terminate blame attitudes in response to a wrongdoing, let alone radical evil. It 
should be noted, for example, that some incompatibilists confess that they fail to 
suspend reactive attitudes in their daily life, even though they hold beliefs in 
determinism and incompatibism. Here is how Nichols describes his personal 
experience: “From the first time I encountered the problem of free will in college, … I 
threw my lot in with philosophers … who conclude that no one is truly moral 
responsible. But after two decades of self-identifying as a nihilist, it occurred to me that 
I had continued to treat my friends, colleagues, and acquaintances as morally 
responsible. Hardly ever did I call on my philosophical views to excuse people’s 
actions” (2007, p. 405). In short, Nichols originally identified himself as an 
incompatibilist and tried to live accordingly. But it did work out: he continued ascribing 
blame and holding people accountable for their actions. This personal observation 
prompted Nichols to revise his earlier convictions and eventually to agree with 
Strawson’s perspective about the power of reactive attitudes. Sommers gives the very 
same confession: “Like Shaun Nichols, I have always found the arguments for nihilism 
or scepticism compelling… Yet like Nichols I hold myself morally responsible all the 
time. I feel that I deserve blame for my bad actions and praise for good actions and 
accomplishments. I also commonly hold other people morally responsible – my family, 
friends, criminals, and (perhaps especially) athletes who are connected in any way to 
Boston sports” (2012, p. 303f). 
These two stories suggest that the belief in determinism and even incompatibilism 
may be not enough to cast out reactive attitudes. The most striking thing is that we 
observe philosophers in these examples and not lay people. We witness the individuals 
who specialise in the free will debate, who have strong convictions concerning 
incompatibilism, and who are trained by their education and work to maintain the 
discipline of their thinking. It is natural to pose the following question in this situation: 
“Even if a trained and confirmed person finds it hard to cope with blame, what about 
ordinary people then?”  
Of course, it would be false to generalize that if two incompatibilists failed to 
suspend their reactive attitudes, then all incompatibilists would fail as well. 
Nonetheless, given the fact that at least some individuals fall short, it is reasonable to 
question the claim that the belief in determinism can be an effective cure to subvert 
reactive attitudes universally among a general audience.  
I suppose that this discussion begs a few good questions for the future research in 
experimental philosophy. One study could ask: “How many hard incompatibilists 
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actually succeed in suspending their reactive attitudes?” Another study could investigate 
whether inducing the belief in determinism or incompatibilism could suspend reactive 
attitudes among ordinary people, and if yes, whether this could have a long-term effect.  
Another popular line of the argument is that people can keep reactive attitudes at 
bay if they take into account the past histories. Writing about a psychotherapy without 
blame, Pickard proposes: 
 
“But perhaps the most important counter to blame within clinical contexts is proper 
attention to service users’ past history. … in attending to this history… service users in all 
likelihood come to be seen not only as people who harm others, but as people who have 
been harmed by others. This capacity to see patients both as victims and as perpetrators can 
help clinicians avoid blame. It requires keeping in mind the whole of the person and the 
whole of their story, which undercuts any single attitude or emotion, forcing any blame to 
exist alongside other attitudes and emotions, such as understanding and compassion, and 
thereby at least tempering, if not outright extinguishing, its force” (2014, p. 13ff). 
 
 
Pickard suggests that attention to past histories can act as “antidote” to “affective 
blame” (viz., reactive attitudes) (2011, p. 220). The mechanism is roughly the 
following: when we appeal to past histories, we understand that people act wrongly 
because they were traumatized themselves at some point of their life; this 
understanding, in turn, should evoke compassion and empathy, which compete with 
blame and ultimately extinguish it. It is not to deny that the clinician can still form a 
judgement that the agent acts wrongly and should take responsibility for this misdeed. 
The point is just to cope with one’s personal feelings, to avoid blame in interaction with 
the client and thus to maintain an effective clinical relationship. 
However, though an appeal to past history may be a blame-antidote indeed, it may 
fail to produce a sufficient effect in all cases. Pickard mentions Watson’s writing about 
Robert Harris, US psychopath, and how attending to Harris’s story can temper blame: 
“The sympathy towards the boy he was is at odds with outrage towards the man he is” 
(2011, p. 220). However, this example also points out that an appeal to past history can 
be insufficient to curb blame. It is worth considering this case in a bit more detail.  
Robert Harris was sentenced to death penalty for abducting and murdering two 
boys (Watson, 1987). While in jail, Harris showed no remorse for what he did. Watson 
suggests that, on the face of it, Harris is an “archetypal candidate” for blame (1987, p. 
271). Most people apparently would respond to his deeds with “moral outrage and 
loathing” (ibid.). But then Watson invites us to learn more about the “roots” of Harris’s 
evil. Harris was not born as a psychopath. On the contrary, the eyewitnesses report that 
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he was a very sensitive boy, who loved animals and his family. But it turns out that 
Harris was surrounded by very abusive environment. Harris’s father was an alcoholic 
who molested and regularly beat him; Harris’s mother did not show any affection for 
her son and blamed him for all her misfortunes; Harris’s classmates regularly teased 
him for his learning disabilities; Harris was put into prison at the age of 14; he was 
raped; he committed a few attempts of suicide. All in all, we can come to see that Harris 
was a victim himself. He was influenced by extraordinary cruelty from the moment of 
his birth, having no robust chance to learn anything different. He also did not ask to be 
born in such adverse milieu and to be traumatized. Watson then points out that our 
initial attitudes towards Harris might start to change. When we see the whole story, the 
attitudes of blame may subside. Some readers may even start feeling pity for Harris.  
This story suggests two points. On the one hand, historic considerations may, 
indeed, abate reactive attitudes to some extent. If the bigger picture is in focus, the 
intensity of attitudes may diminish. But, on the other hand, though reactive attitudes 
may indeed reduce to some extent, they do not fade away. Watson points out that, in 
fact, we are likely to end up with a mix of contradictory feelings, which include both 
blame and compassion. As Watson points out: “Seeing [Harris] as a victim does not 
totally dispel those attitudes. Rather, in light of the “whole” story, conflicting responses 
are evoked. The sympathy toward the boy he was is at odds with outrage toward the 
man he is” (1987, p. 275).  
The corollary of this story is that sometimes attention to past histories may be 
insufficient to extinguish blame. It is important, however, that we do not jump to any 
generalizations. If people find it hard to get rid of outrage in the case of Harris, it does 
not follow that they would have the same hardship considering more moderate cases. 
Nonetheless, we should be aware that attention to past histories may be not enough 





9.4. Uprooting the underlying beliefs 
I now want to explain an alternative method that can be used to mollify blame. I will 
explain first the model I want to use for the argument, and then we will apply this model 
to consider the question of blame.   
One of the most recognized methods in cognitive psychotherapy is the ABC 
Model (Ellis, 1962; Ellis & Dryden, 2007). The acronym ABC has the following 
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meaning. “A” stands for an activating event. This can be any external or internal 
stimulus. For example, it can be a conversation with a friend, a job errand, driving a car, 
watching TV etc. “B” refers to beliefs. This is the set of beliefs that a person holds 
about oneself, others or the world. People interpret perceived events based on their 
beliefs. “C” signifies consequences. It can be an emotion that a person experiences, or 
it can be some behavior in which a person engages. 
Beliefs play the primary role in any cognitive theory and counselling method. 
Feelings do not occur by chance. Various cognitive schools concur that emotions are the 
result of specific beliefs. The ABC model suggests the following pattern. At first, a 
person faces an event (A). Then, one interprets this event based on one’s beliefs (B). 
Finally, the person experiences a particular feeling concerning this event (C). In sum, 
feelings result from how people interpret events.  
Here is an example. A person witnesses a strike on the street (A). This is just an 
event. So far no attitudes or feelings are experienced. Then the person evaluates this 
event (B). One may think that protesters are idle people who avoid hard work. Or, one 
might come to believe that the strike causes a horrible traffic jam. Following this 
interpretation, the person comes to feel bad about this whole situation (C). But there can 
be an alternative interpretation. The person may come to think that the protesters fight 
for social justice, and they make the world a better place (B2). Consequently, one will 
naturally feel good about the protest (C2).  
Importantly, the ABC model gives us also the method of work with one’s feelings 
and behavior. To change consequences (C), one should change the underlying beliefs 
(B). If the person wants to alter their emotions concerning a certain situation, one 
should change the beliefs that entail these emotions. Referring to the above-mentioned 
example, to stop feeling bad about the strike, the person should change the way they 
interpret this event. Once the beliefs are changed, the attitudes become amenable to 
modification as well.46 
It should be also mentioned that beliefs form a hierarchy. We can distinguish 
between underlying and peripheral beliefs. Underlying beliefs are the central beliefs in 
                                                          
46 The view that emotions can be regulated by beliefs is not brand new. We can track this idea, for 
example, in philosophy of Stoicism. Stoics believed that some negative emotions – like anger, for 
example – occurred because of erroneous opinions. Nearly two millennia ago Marcus Aurelius wrote: “It 
is all within yourself, in your way of thinking. If you are distressed by anything external, the pain is not 
due to the thing itself but to your own estimate of it; and this you have the power to revoke at any 
moment” (Meditations, 8:47). In a similar vein, Epictetus wrote: “Men are disturbed not by things that 
happen, but by their opinion of the things that happen… When then we are impeded, or disturbed, or 
grieved, let us never blame others, but ourselves – that is, our opinions” (Enchiridion, §5). 
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the hierarchy. They reflect the outlook and values of the person. They are quite rigid, 
generalized and often unconscious. They also underlie plenty of other thoughts. 
Peripheral beliefs spring from the underlying beliefs. They are more modifiable, 
subject-specific and noticeable. Here is an example. Suppose we have the demand for 
good will as an underlying belief. This belief is generalized. But it gives rise to various 
subject-specific peripheral beliefs (Pb). Pb1 is that the President must show good will. 
Pb2 is that our friend Lucy must show good will. Pb3 is that our tutor Frank must show 
good will, and so forth. Thus, the underlying belief can produce thousands of peripheral 
beliefs.  
When it comes to therapy, the extent of behavioural change depends on what 
beliefs we target. We can either change one peripheral belief or a few peripheral beliefs. 
Or, we can try to change an underlying belief.  
What beliefs we change depends on the goals of the client. Here is an example. 
Ann wants to remove resentment towards her boss, as this threatens her career. But she 
does not intend to get rid of resentment overall. She finds it appropriate to respond with 
this pattern towards other people. To achieve this task, the therapy will target one 
peripheral belief only (the belief which causes resentment towards Ann’s boss). But 
another client may want to remove resentment more generally. Claire, for instance, 
wants to get rid of resentment as far as it is possible, as she intends to become a more 
positive and calm person. In this case, the therapy would be concerned more with the 
underlying belief (the belief that underpins resentment in most situations). 
Back to our main question. How can a counsellor (or any ordinary person) cope 
with blame? The recipe which has not been considered before is very simple: one 
should identify the beliefs that cause blame responses and then change these underlying 
beliefs.  
It is reasonable to ask: “What beliefs exactly underlie blame?” Potentially the list 
may be very long, and there is no point in covering this material in this chapter. But by 
way of example, I should mention one belief that is likely to be involved in many cases 
of blame attribution. This belief is called “the demand for good will”, and it was first 
invoked by Strawson in his ground-breaking paper on reactive attitudes (1962) and then 
by Wallace in his analysis of Strawson’s work (1994).   
Strawson notes that reactive attitudes have a cognitive undercurrent and rest on 
the normative belief called the “demand for good will”. As he puts it: “reactive attitudes 
rest on, and reflect, an expectation of, and demand for, the manifestation of a certain 
degree of goodwill” (1962, p. 29). According to Strawson, all reactive attitudes are 
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based on the demand for good will. Personal reactive attitudes (such as anger, 
resentment, hurt feelings) involve the demand on others concerning the treatment of 
oneself: “The personal reactive attitudes rest on, and reflect, an expectation of, and 
demand for, the manifestation of a certain degree of goodwill or regard on the part of 
other human beings towards ourselves” (1962, p. 29). Vicarious attitudes (such as 
indignation, disapproval) imply the demand about good treatment of the third party: 
“The generalized or vicarious … attitudes … rest on, or reflect… the demand for the 
manifestation of a reasonable degree of goodwill or regard … not simply towards 
oneself, but … towards all men” (ibid). Self-directed attitudes (such as guilt, shame) 
include the demand on oneself: “Just as there are personal and vicarious reactive 
attitudes associated with demands on others for oneself and demands on others for 
others, so there are self-reactive attitudes associated with demands on oneself for 
others” (ibid). 
We can well apply the ABC model to Strawson’s standpoint. The “demand for 
good will” refers to B (beliefs), while reactive attitudes reflect C (consequences). The 
pattern is roughly the following. The person at first adopts a demand for good will in 
their belief system. This could happen in childhood or at any point of life. The agent 
basically acquires a rigid expectation of how other people must behave. Then, the 
person evaluates the surrounding events referring to their belief system, including to the 
demand for good will. If the agent comes to believe that other people fail to show 
enough good will, then they will respond with a certain reactive attitude. But again, this 
pattern can be controlled and changed. If the person removes the demand for good will, 
one also prevents a reactive attitude.  
It is noteworthy that the proverbial demand for good will invoked by Strawson is 
a well-known belief in the cognitive psychotherapy. Some know it as a “demand for 
fairness” (Bernard, 1998; Lindner et al., 1999). It may have idiosyncratic descriptions 
and slightly differ among people. But at all events, there is always a common gist: one 
way or another, the person always demands good treatment from others. For example: 
“You must treat me kindly and fairly, or else you are a rotten individual” (Ellis, 1996, p. 
69); “You must  treat me reasonably, considerately, and lovingly, or else you’re no 
good” (Carlson, 2013, p. 331). One of the sub-beliefs of this demand is: “If people act 
unfairly or inconsiderately, they deserve to be punished” (Pucci, 2010, p. 124). 
Cognitive therapists generally hold a rather negative attitude toward the demand 
for fairness. First, cognitive theories tend to consider demands per se as the core 
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triggers of emotional disturbances.47 Dryden describes demand as a “rigid belief where 
the person dogmatically insists that certain conditions must or must not exist” (2003, p. 
12). Demands are usually couched in normative verbs: “must”, “have to”, “should” and 
“ought to”. For example, it could be “Others must show good will to me”. One problem 
is that demands often undermine flexible thinking. If the person dogmatically believes 
in something, they can become deaf to alternative opinions and thus hinder further 
learning. Another problem is that people become extremely frustrated if their demands 
are not satisfied. Second, it is common to believe that the “demand for fairness” 
represents one of the main self-defeating beliefs, which underlies much mental issues. 
Ellis identified the demand for fairness as one of main irrational beliefs (1977).48 It is 
presumed that this belief has a considerable negative impact. With respect to emotions, 
it provokes resentment, anger, hostility, fury and aggression. With respect to behavior, it 
entails vindictiveness, psychosomatic illnesses and acts of violence (Ellis, 2004, p. 78). 
As Ellis writes: 
 
 “People must treat me nicely and fairly, and [when they] don’t, this makes them utterly 
rotten people who deserve to be damned and punished. This Irrational Belief…can lead to 
an enormous amount of rage, feuds, wars, and even genocide. Then, the usual result is that 
others become equally enraged: They naturally condemn you for your anger… So anger 




It was mentioned that the demand for good will is considered as the irrational 
belief. I should say a few words to clarify this point. It is common to distinguish 
between rational and irrational beliefs in the cognitive approach. Irrational beliefs are 
those beliefs that include questionable evidence, logic errors and delusions. Ellis 
suggests three key criteria how to examine the irrationality of belief (1965).49 Empirical 
criterion enquiries whether there is any empirical evidence to support the belief. Is the 
belief consistent with the known facts, science and reality overall? Logical criterion 
                                                          
47 In fact, this conclusion was drawn by several therapeutic schools, including psychoanalysis. See the 
concept of “Tyranny of shoulds” in the work of Karen Horney (1950). 
48  Two other irrational beliefs are (1) “I must do well and get approval from others, or else I am a 
worthless person”; (2) “Life must be easy and fair, otherwise it is unbearable and awful” (1977). 
49 As a measuring method, it is common to use various irrational belief tests. The very first method was 
the Irrational Belief Test (Jones, 1968). Later on, there were developed other inventories such as Rational 
Behavior Inventory (RBI) (Shorkey & Whiteman, 1977) and the Irrational Belief Inventory (IBI) 
(Koopmans et al., 1994). Some research supports the cross-cultural applicability of the IBI (du Plessis, 
Möller & Steel, 2004). 
187 
 
examines the logic behind a belief. Does the conclusion follow from logical premises? 
Pragmatic criterion weights the utilitarian value of the belief. Does this belief do more 
harm than good?  
By way of example we can consider the demand for fairness (good will). If the 
therapist finds herself or himself holding on to the demand for fairness, which causes 
some reactive attitudes towards the client out of hand, the therapists can pose 
themselves the following investigative questions. Is there any scientific evidence that 
my clients must show good will towards me? Do I know any law of nature which makes 
it possible? (the empirical criterion). It is understandable that I want fair and considerate 
treatment from others – but does it follow that other people must do the thing that I 
want? (the logical criterion). If I continue to believe that my clients must always be kind 
and just towards me, could I be able to achieve my professional goals, which is to keep 
my temper? (the pragmatic criterion).50 
The goal of disputing is to show that the demand for fairness is unwarranted. 
First, there is no law of nature which renders it possible that people must be considerate 
or fair. In fact, one can find a lot of counter-evidence in philosophy, psychology and 
biology. Without going into great detail, one can recall a very old Latin proverb: “Homo 
homini lupus”.51 Second, there is no reason why others must act as we want them to. 
The world does not always cater to our desires. Even if we treat people fairly, it does 
not follow that they must reciprocate. Lastly, the harm of the demand for good will can 
outweigh the profit for psychotherapy. As an advantage, one may argue that the demand 
for fairness serves to maintain moral standards and decent behavior in interpersonal 
relations and psychotherapy.52 But, on the other hand, while believing that the clients 
must act fair and decent, the therapist may find it impossible to maintain the attitude of 
neutrality and thus perform any effective therapeutic work. 
The representatives of REBT, however, do not propose to surrender the belief for 
fairness overall. There is nothing wrong in asking for a kind and fair attitude from 
others. The only problem is how the belief itself is framed. The demand, as a cognitive 
                                                          
50 The therapist may pose the same questions to the client, if the goal is to dispute the demand for fairness 
of the client. 
51 “A man is a wolf to another man”. 
52 Ironically, though the demand for fairness aims to maintain social order, it can also often underlie 
severe moral curses. It can lead to conflicts with those who show disrespect. It can break up relationships 
and turn former partners into enemies. It can fuel abuse and revenge. It can result in wars, terror attacks 
and even genocide. Other disadvantages may include constant stress, mental disturbances, and 




construct, is what causes problems. As an alternative, it is proposed to replace demands 
with preferences (David et al., 2009, p. 150). One can see outright that there is a 
considerable difference in demanding good treatment from someone and preferring that 
someone treats you well. But importantly, it is suggested that demands and preferences 
produce distinct emotional and behavioural outcomes. While demands tend to generate 
extreme emotional and behavioural consequences, preferences are prone to produce 
more moderate outcomes. For example, if frustrated the demand for good will may 
cause damning anger towards another individual, whereas a frustrated preference for 
good will can entail only irritation.  
This suggests that the therapist should not surrender the belief for good treatment 
per se. One can give up only the dogmatic demand that one’s clients must be 
considerate and adopt a preference for good treatment. For example, the demand for 
good will can be substituted with a following preference: “I strongly prefer that you 
treat me reasonably, kindly… but since I don’t run the universe, and it’s a part of your 
human nature to err, I, then, cannot control you” (Carlson, 2013, p. 331).  
In concluding this discussion, I should explain why the arguments covered earlier 
about suspension do not reach the target. The arguments were that the belief in 
determinism or attention to past histories could curb blame attitudes. In a way, these 
arguments rest on the cognitive approach as well. If one adopts some new beliefs (e.g., 
that determinism is true), these beliefs (B) should, in turn, affect one’s attitudes (C). But 
we remember that some incompatibilists fail to get rid of their reactive attitudes. Also, 
we remember that attention to Harris’s past history does not dissolve the feeling of 
outrage completely. We have a cognitive method, but it does not work out. What is the 
reason?  
The core problem is that the demand for good will remains untouched in both 
cases. The two arguments make a common mistake: they suggest adopting some new 
beliefs in order to extinguish reactive attitudes, but they do not address the underpinning 
of those reactive attitudes. There is no surprise why we end up with conflicting feelings 
towards Harris. On the one hand, we acquire some new beliefs about Harris’s grievous 
past. Indeed, these new beliefs should entail compassion and thus enervate blame. But, 
on the other hand, we do not uproot the existing demand that Harris must show good 
will towards others. This belief sits tight and remains intact. As such, it continues to 
cause and fuel the feeling of outrage whenever we consider Harris’s wrongdoings. I 
suspect the same argument can explain why some incompatibilists may fail to cope with 
their reactive attitudes. A sceptic may acquire plenty of metaphysical beliefs that free 
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will does not exist and that people are not responsible agents. But this will not help to 
cope with blame so long as one retains a demand that people must be fair and 
considerate creatures. 
I do not want to tout the cognitive models as panacea against affective blame. I 
consider it just as one of the tools in the arsenal of methods that could be used to 
manage one’s negative feelings. No doubt there are many other techniques that could be 
of use.53 It appears that the more one is knowledgeable about the available methods, the 






It was pointed out that while neutrality was the necessary condition of therapeutic work 
in Rogers’s and Freud’s practices, achieving neutrality could be a very challenging 
undertaking. Both Freud and Rogers failed sometimes to practice what they preached, 
according to the reports of their clients and their own confessions. The goal of the 
chapter was to establish what techniques could be used to handle blame. 
Our first task was to establish what kind of blame-free relationship we have in the 
case of Freud and Rogers (see § 9.2.). Some counselling practices can involve common 
interpersonal relations, which include blame attitudes. Others can practice suspension 
and terminate blame only in the counselling work. Still others may adhere to 
abolitionism (either soft or hard), and thus they would like to remove blame attitudes 
completely. 
To start with, I drew a line between suspension and abolition of blame. 
Suspension means ceasing reactive attitudes temporarily under certain conditions, while 
abolition stands for the removal of reactive attitudes altogether. I made a further 
distinction between soft and hard abolitionism. Hard abolitionism refers to those who 
abandon reactive attitudes and oppose free will and moral responsibility. Soft 
abolitionism refers to those who abandon reactive attitudes but favour free will or moral 
responsibility. Earlier, it was common to believe that abolitionism can be nourished 
only by free will sceptics. I argued, however, that abolitionism could also be supported 
by the advocates of free will. Much depends of the motive of abolition. A free will 
sceptic usually focuses on the motive of theoretical irrationality, considering reactive 
                                                          




attitudes as unfair and illogical responses, given certain metaphysical realities. A free 
will advocate, on the other hand, can be preoccupied with the motive of pragmatic 
irrationality, considering certain reactive attitudes as self-defeating ways of behavior. 
Thus, the person may find it appropriate to restrain some reactive attitudes for one’s 
own good. One implication of the distinction between soft and hard abolitionists is that 
abolitionism can be appealing under all metaphysical conditions. It may be fair to abjure 
some reactive attitudes, if free will does not exist. But it may also be appealing to swear 
off some reactive attitudes, even if free will exists.  
I have suggested that we can find some version of soft abolitionism in REBT. But, 
when it comes to Freud and Rogers, we deal with a clear example of suspension.  
With regard to methods against blame, some researchers suggest that it could help 
to adopt belief in determinism or to appeal to past histories (see § 9.3.). I have pointed 
out, however, that these methods alone may be insufficient. A person can be a 
confirmed sceptic or appeal to past histories but continue attributing blame.  
I have argued in this respect that it is necessary not only to adopt new beliefs that 
could extinguish blame but also to work with the beliefs that underlie blame in the first 
place (see § 9.4.). When we address the underlying beliefs, we can target the primary 
cause of reactive attitudes. All in all, counsellors can capitalize on the available 







Psychology is steadily moving towards integration. Universities already offer 
degrees in integrative psychotherapy, and people increasingly embark on integrative 
counselling. Researchers continue, however, the quest for the unified theory of 
personality.  
The thesis has sought to throw some light on the place of free will and moral 
responsibility in a potential unified theory of personality. There were two primary 
objectives of this study: 1) to establish whether it is possible to integrate Freud’s and 
Rogers’s theories with regard to free will and moral responsibility; 2) to determine the 
functions of free will and moral responsibility in the psychoanalytic and client-centered 
counselling work. 
The thesis has achieved both goals. The first significant finding to emerge from 
this work is that Freud’s and Rogers’s theories can be fully and harmoniously integrated 
with regard to the subject of free will and moral responsibility. There is still little 
understanding of what theoretical integration consists of, as the research in this field has 
only taken its first steps. But as this study demonstrates, integration can involve 
minimally two stages. On the one hand, we should eliminate any possible obstacles to 
integration. When it comes to free will, the obvious obstacle can be that two theories 
hold polar metaphysical views on free will or define free will differently. We have 
established, however, that theories by Freud and Rogers maintain the same 
metaphysical thesis, which is compatibilism. Moreover, both theories relate free will to 
the ability to make a choice based on one’s reasons. On the other hand, integration is 
more than removing any obstacles, and it also requires the introduction of some new 
framework, which could allow two theories to merge and coexist. In this sense, we need 
to go beyond the original theories, which we attempt to integrate, and suggest a novel 
and more compelling theoretical model. In respect of free will, I have suggested that we 
can avail ourselves of Watson’s mesh theory, which would unify Freud’s and Rogers’s 
views and would provide a more coherent and robust perspective on the nature of free 
will. In respect of responsibility, I have proposed to leverage Hart’s taxonomy, which 
can illuminate different senses of responsibility used in psychotherapies. I have pointed 
out that Rogers, for instance, refers predominantly to the sense of role-responsibility, 
while Freud emphasizes the aspect of causal responsibility. But importantly, these two 
senses of responsibility are complementary: an integrative counsellor can work with 
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both role and causal responsibility when necessary, encouraging clients both to 
recognize their obligations and to recognize the link between their behavior and the 
outcome. In addition, Freud’s and Rogers’s theories tend to avoid the sense of liability-
responsibility in their work. The reason is that two theories promote non-judgmental 
therapeutic attitudes in the counselling practice, which is incompatible with the idea of 
blame. It is not that the counsellors of two schools do not believe in blame at all, it is 
just that they decide to suspend their blame responses over treatment for therapeutic 
reasons.  
When it comes to the second goal of this thesis, I have argued that free will and 
responsibility are important subjects for the therapeutic work. As the research suggests, 
free will and responsibility can play practical and therapeutic functions during 
treatment, affecting the mental health of clients and therapeutic work itself. A 
considerable body of studies indicate that choosing (aka the exercise of free will in 
Freud’s and Rogers’s theories) is generally associated with various positive outcomes, 
such as increased motivation, vitality, life satisfaction, better performance etc. There is 
also empirical evidence that taking even small obligations (aka taking role-
responsibility) predicts good outcomes for mental health and agency. Drawing on the 
psychoanalytic theory, I have also argued that recognizing the roots of one’s behavior 
(aka taking causal responsibility) can contribute to the increase in self-knowledge, self-
control and maintaining the unity of the mind.  
I have also argued that it is important to know how to avoid blame while working 
with responsibility, as blame can have a negative impact on clients and therapy overall. 
My first suggestion has been that counsellors can keep in mind the distinction between 
different senses of responsibility. One should not make a mistake to refer to the sense of 
liability-responsibility, which is common for the judicial system, and which 
interconnects the meaning of responsibility and blame. Instead, one can work with the 
senses of role, capacity and causal responsibility, which are useful ideas for the 
therapeutic work, and which do not contain the idea that the person is blameworthy. On 
top of that, I have argued that counsellors can avail themselves of the methods available 
in the cognitive psychotherapy to manage their blame feelings. Counsellors, for 
example, can identify the beliefs which underlie their blame responses, and by changing 
those beliefs they can change their attitudes. 
It remains an open question whether psychotherapy can furnish people with any 
libertarian form of free will. But it is certain that people can acquire a compatibilist 
form of free will understood, for example, as an act on conscious reasons. Though it 
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may not render people ultimately free, it can definitely increase the degree of freedom 
people have in ordinary life.   
I infer that one big value of free will and responsibility in psychotherapy is that by 
reference to these concepts counsellors can foster many proactive and mature qualities 
of human personality, such as counterfactual thinking, consciousness, moral reasoning, 
self-knowledge, choosing, self-control, confidence and commitment. These, in turn, 
often lead to a positive impact on agency and mental health, let alone social life. There 
is also a very high probability that the concept of free will can help people to gratify 
their psychological need for autonomy (see § 4.2.). 
The findings of this study make multiple contributions to the current literature. 
First, this study adds to the literature on psychoanalysis and client-centered theory by 
providing two novel and comprehensive readings about the place of free will and 
responsibility in two psychotherapies. The findings of this research challenge a widely 
accepted view that Freud was a hard determinist (Erwin, 2002; Wallace, 2008) and the 
view that psychoanalysis allows leeway choice (Wallwork, 1991) (see § 1.3., 1.4.). 
Second, the present study adds to a growing body of work on personality integration. 
This study has demonstrated, for the first time, that personality theories can be 
integrated with regard to the subject of free will and moral responsibility. The findings 
of this study contradict to the view that the integration of personality theories is 
impossible because personality theories rest on fundamentally incompatible 
assumptions about human nature (Wood & Joseph, 2007) (see Introduction). Third, the 
research has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of responsibility 
without blame in psychotherapy. The findings of this study support the earlier research 
on responsibility without blame, and it suggests some extension of knowledge by 
explaining why blame can have a detrimental effect on treatment, how counsellors can 
define responsibility, and what techniques they can use to mitigate their reactive 
attitudes (Pickard, 2014) (see § 8.4., 9.4.). Fourth, the research adds to the growing 
literature on reactive attitudes and abolitionism. I have argued that people might be 
willing to abandon reactive attitudes, regardless of their metaphysical convictions. 
These findings suggest some extension of earlier research on abolitionism by 
introducing the distinction between hard and soft abolitionism (Milam, 2017) (see § 
9.2.). 
The thesis suggests four main implications. First, the results of this study inform 
historians and psychologists to reconsider the subject of free will in Rogers’s and 
Freud’s theories. For one, the thesis recommends giving up the commonly held belief 
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which relates psychoanalysis to hard determinism. Plus, textbooks on personality 
psychology, which introduce students to the field, may find it appropriate to change a 
traditional approach to exhibit Freud and Rogers as antagonists on free will. This 
research points out that two theorists hold, in fact, almost identical standpoints on the 
matter. 
 Second, the results of this research suggest that a unified personality theory could 
be committed to compatibilism. I remain cautious of how a unified theory of personality 
(if ever developed) should treat the subject of free will, as more work needs to be done 
on this matter. But, as it stands now, compatibilism appears to be the main candidate for 
this role. On the one hand, we have some compelling evidence that free will has high 
instrumental value for human mental well-being. If true, it is highly unlikely that 
psychologists would be willing to reject this construct from personality theory and 
psychotherapy. On the other hand, compatibilism seems to dominate among personality 
theories. Apart from Freud and Rogers, this study has also mentioned in passing that 
compatibilism can also be found in theories by Frankl, Skinner and Ellis. I suspect that 
Watson’s theory can also be well-suited to most of cognitive theories, as human 
capacity for rational thinking is the cornerstone of the whole cognitive approach. Of 
course, this claim demands further scrutiny and verification. But if correct, then we 
already have five personality theories from five different traditions (psychoanalysis, 
humanism, behaviorism, cognitivism and existentialism) that uphold compatibilism. I 
am positive that this number can grow substantially if we investigate other counselling 
theories. 
Third, the findings of this study suggest that the training of mental health 
specialists should include scholarly modules in free will and moral responsibility. Partly 
what the thesis shows is that free will and moral responsibility are not purely theoretical 
or abstract questions, as many psychologists – including Freud and Rogers – are used to 
treating them. A growing body of research indicates that free will and responsibility are 
practical issues, which bear heavily on human mental health. Whether a counsellor 
believes personally in free will or not, one should know that free will and responsibility 
can be considerable determinants of mental well-being, and the lack of knowledge in 
this area can jeopardize the therapeutic work. As a minimal suggestion, the training 
module can consist of some themes covered in this thesis: different definitions of free 
will, the implications of the belief in free will, the pros and cons of choosing, the pros 
and cons of role-responsibility, the function of causal responsibility, the distinction 
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between feeling and fact of being responsible, the explanation of how to divorce 
responsibility and blame, the techniques how to suspend affective blame, and so forth. 
Fourth, the results of this research suggest thought leaders and policymakers to be 
extremely cautious when issuing their verdicts on free will to the general public. In 
recent years, it has become quite popular to publish books with “revelatory” titles that 
there is no such thing as free will (Caruso, 2013; Harris, 2012; Wegner, 2002). 
Commonly, one argues against libertarian forms of free will, such as agent causation or 
event-indeterminacy, and turns a blind eye to the fact that plenty of people can 
understand free will in a compatibilist manner. An adverse consequence is that 
laypeople who are not competent in the free will debate can make overgeneralizations 
that one cannot have any kind of freedom at all, or they may jump to irrational 
conclusion that life is meaningless. Another worry is that if people come to believe that 
they cannot act freely anyhow, they may frustrate their psychological need for 
autonomy, which would result in the deterioration of their mental well-being (see § 
4.2.). My recommendation is that even if the authors argue against some form of free 
will, they should inform their readers about freedoms people can have, keeping in mind 
that the subject of free will and human mental health can be closely interwoven.      
A number of limitations also need to be acknowledged. First, the thesis has 
examined the subject of free will and responsibility at length only in two personality 
theories. There remains a question whether these results can be transferrable and 
generalized to other personality theories as well. Second, we have examined only one 
assumption about human nature, omitting other themes. Even if it proves that free will 
does represent an obstacle for integration, there can be some other assumptions and 
subjects that could prevent any further integration. Third, some better frameworks for 
the integration on free will and responsibility might be suggested. As mentioned earlier, 
I have made use of Watson’s theory and Hart’s taxonomy because they did the job well 
with regard to Freud’s and Rogers’s theories. But I concede that it might be possible of 
finding an alternative framework when we deal with the broader scope of theories. 
Fourth, one should interpret the argument about the value of the exercise of free will 
with caution (see § 4.2.). Because of Freud and Rogers, I have associated free will with 
rational choosing and then reviewed research on the value of choosing. But we have 
also established that there is no universally accepted definition of free will, and people 
can understand free will differently. This suggests that the value of the exercise of free 
will depends on how one defines free will in the first place, and this can vary. Though 
understanding free will as rational choosing is fairly common both among philosophers 
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and laypeople, it is worth remembering that some may stick to the view that free will is 
something else (e.g., the ability to be the ultimate source of one’s actions, whatever this 
means in practice). Fifth, some caution must be applied to the assumption about the 
value of causal responsibility (see § 6.2.). I have suggested that causal responsibility can 
be of use to avoid internal conflicts and maintain the unity of the mind. However, this 
conjecture is based entirely on the psychoanalytic assumptions about the organization 
and functioning of human mind, which can be false.  
This study has thrown up several questions in need of further investigation. One 
possible area of future research would be to examine the link between responsibility and 
mental health. There is only a modicum of empirical studies which bear on role-
responsibility and human agency. And there appears no empirical research on causal 
responsibility and mental health. This thesis has suggested a theoretical position that 
taking causal responsibility could predict several positive outcomes. Further research 
can either confirm or refute this conjecture experimentally. Second, further work is 
needed to establish whether all personality theories can be integrated in the subject of 
free will and moral responsibility. The hypothesis to be verified is whether 
compatibilism prevails among personality theories. This thesis does not pretend to solve 
the issue of free will in personality theory. Rather, it initiates a novel discussion and 
invites researchers from different fields to enter the fray. Third, further research needs 
to be done to establish whether other assumptions about human nature can threaten the 
personality integration. I am positive that we can find multiple points of divergence 
between the theories, but I am sceptical that it is impossible to overcome these 
controversies.  
A unified theory of personality will require integration of ideas and theories of 
many types. I am prone to think that a robust unified theory can emerge only from a 
prolific interdisciplinary research of scholars from different fields, in particular, close 
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